Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel
Pluto Middle Eastern Studies
Also available
Jewish History, Jewish Religion
The Weight of Three Thousand Years
Israel Shahak
Open Secrets
Israeli Foreign and Nuclear Policies
Israel Shahak
Jewish Fundamentalism
in Israel
Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky
*
Pluto Wf ^1 Press
LONDON • STERLING, VIRGINIA
First published 1999 by Pluto Press
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Copyright © Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky 1999
The right of Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky to be
identified as the authors of this work has been asserted
by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the
British Library
ISBN 7453 1281 hbk
ISBN 7453 1276 4 pbk
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Shahak, Israel.
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel / Israel Shahak and Norton
Mezvinsky.
p. cm. — (Pluto Middle Eastern series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7453-1281-0 (hbk.)
1 . Orthodox Judaism — Israel — Controversial literature.
2. Orthodox Judaism — Political aspects — Israel. 3. Political
violence — Israel. I. Mezvinsky, Norton. II. Tide. III. Series.
BM390.S486 1999
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Contents
Preface vi
Glossary xiii
Introduction 1
1 Jewish Fundamentalism Within Jewish Society 5
2 The Rise of the Haredim in Israel 23
3 The Two Main Haredi Groups 44
4 The National Religious Party and the Religious Settlers 55
5 The Nature of Gush Emunim Settlements 78
6 The Real Significance of Baruch Goldstein 96
7 The Religious Background of Rabin's Assassination 1 13
Note on Bibliography and Related Matters 150
Notes 164
Index 169
Preface
Virtually identified with Arab terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism
is anathema throughout the non-Muslim world. Virtually identified
with ignorance, superstition, intolerance and racism, Christian
fundamentalism is anathema to the cultural and intellectual elite
in the United States. The recent significant increase in its number
of adherents, combined with its widening political influence,
nevertheless, make Christian fundamentalism a real threat to
democracy in the United States. Although possessing nearly all the
important social scientific properties of Islamic and Christian fun-
damentalism, Jewish fundamentalism is practically unknown outside
of Israel and certain sections of a few other places. When its
existence is acknowledged, its significance is minimized or limited
to arcane religious practices and quaint middle European dress,
most often by those same non-Israeli elite commentators who see
so uncompromisingly the evils inherent in Jewish fundamentalis-
m's Islamic and/or Christian cousins.
As students of contemporary society and as Jews, one Israeli, one
American, with personal commitments and attachments to the
Middle East, we cannot help seeing Jewish fundamentalism in
Israel as a major obstacle to peace in the region. Nor can we help
being dismayed by the dismissal of the perniciousness of Jewish fun-
damentalism to peace and to its victims by those who are otherwise
knowledgeable and astute and so quick to point out the violence
inherent in other fundamentalist approaches to existence.
This book is a journey of understanding - often painful, often
dreary, often disturbing - for us as Jews who have a stake in Jewry.
With our hearts and minds we want Jews, together with other
people, to recognize and strive for the highest ideals, even as we
fall short of them. We see these ideals as central to the values of
Western civilization and applicable throughout the civilized world.
We believe these values do not stand in the way of peace anywhere.
That a perversion of these values in the name of Jewish funda-
mentalism stands as an impediment to peace, to the development
of Israeli democracy and even to civilized discourse outrages us,
both as Jews and as human beings. To identify and lessen, if not
purge, this outrage, we have written this book and undertaken this
journey in the hope that it may bring understanding to our readers
PREFACE vii
as it has brought understanding to us. Our assumption is that
peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved until the currents and
cross-currents of contemporary life in the region are understood.
In this most historical and most religious area, understanding
entails an exploration of the past that continues to impinge upon
the attitudes, values, assumptions and behaviors of all the people
of this beautiful and troubled land. Jewish opposition in Israel to
Jewish fundamentalism greatly increased after a Jewish, funda-
mentalist, religious fanatic, Yigal Amir, who insisted that he was
acting in accordance with dictates in Judaism, shot and killed
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. That numerous groups of religious
Jews after the assassination supported this murder in the name of
the "true" Jewish religion aroused interest in Israel in past killings
by Jews of other Jews who were alleged to be heretics or sinners.
In our book we cite present and past investigations by Israeli
scholars documenting that for centuries prior to the rise of the
modern nation state, Jews, believing they were acting in accordance
with God's word and thus preparing themselves for eternal paradise,
punished or killed heretics and/or religious sinners. Contemporary
Jewish fundamentalism is an attempt to revive a situation that
often existed in Jewish communities before the influence of
modernity. The basic principles of Jewish fundamentalism are the
same as those found in other religions: restoration and survival of
the "pure" and pious religious community that presumably existed
in the past.
In our book we describe in some detail the origins, ideologies,
practices and overall impact upon society of fundamentalism. We
emphasize mostly the messianic tendency, because we believe it to
be the most influential and dangerous. Jewish fundamentalists
generally oppose extensions of human freedoms, especially the
freedom of expression, in Israel. In regard to foreign policy, the
National Religious Party, ruled by supporters of the messianic
tendency of Jewish fundamentalism, has continuously opposed
any and all withdrawals from territories conquered and occupied
by Israel since 1967. These fundamentalists opposed Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai in 1978, just as twenty years later they
continued to oppose any withdrawal from the West Bank. These
same Jews printed and distributed atlases allegedly showing that
the land of Israel, belonging only to the Jews and requiring liberation,
included the Sinai, Jordan, Lebanon, most of Syria and Kuwait.
Jewish fundamentalists have advocated the most discriminative
proposals against Palestinians. Not surprisingly, Baruch Goldstein
and Yigal Amir, the most sensational Jewish assassins of the 1990s,
and most of their admirers have been Jewish fundamentalists of the
messianic tendency.
viii JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
In the 1990s, Israeli sociologists and scholars in other academic
fields have focused more attention than ever before upon the social
effects in Israeli society of Jewish fundamentalists. The
overwhelming opinion of these scholars is that the adherents of
Jewish fundamentalism in Israel are hostile to democracy. The fun-
damentalists oppose equality for all citizens, especially non-Jews
and Jewish "deviants" such as homosexuals. The great majority of
religious Jews in Israel, influenced by fundamentalists, share these
views to some extent. In a book review published on October 14,
1998, Baruch Kimmerling, a distinguished Israeli sociologist, citing
evidence from a study conducted by other scholars, commented:
The values of the [Jewish] religion, at least in its Orthodox and
nationalistic form that prevails in Israel, cannot be squared with
democratic values. No other variable - neither nationality, nor
attitudes about security, nor social or economic values, nor
ethnic descent and education - so influences the attitudes of
[Israeli] Jews against democratic values as does religiosity.
Citing additional evidence, Kimmerling commented further that
secular, Israeli Jews who had acquired college or university education
had the greatest attachment to democratic values and that religious
Jews who studied in yeshivot (religious schools) most opposed
democracy. It is clear that fundamentalist antagonism to democratic
values, as well as to most aspects of secular culture and life style,
is deeply instilled in Israel's religious schools.
The documentation of fundamentalist antagonism to the secular
life style of a majority of Israeli Jews is clear. The September 20,
1998, edition of Yediot Ahronot, the largest circulation, Hebrew-
language, daily Israeli newspaper, for example, contained a "cultural
profile" survey of Israeli Jewish society. The survey revealed that
the major Israeli consumers of culture, who visit museums and
attend concerts and the theater, had finished high school and
defined themselves as either secular or not Orthodox (religious).
The Israeli religious press and pronouncements by Israeli rabbis,
condemning cultural activity, have confirmed the survey's findings.
Jewish fundamentalists have displayed severe enmity against
Jews who adopt a different sexual life style. Many Israeli rabbis and
the Israeli religious political parties in the 1990s reacted sharply
against the increased visibility and power of the homosexual and
lesbian communities in Israel. According to the Halacha (Jewish
religious law), homosexuality is punishable by death by stoning,
and, although the punishment is not clear, lesbian relations are
forbidden. The Israeli secular press emphasized in the 1990s some
of the more outrageous rabbinical proposals for dealing with
homosexuals; these included a "compulsory healing treatment"
PREFACE ix
and/or a period of "education in a closed institution." Many rabbis,
when interviewed, indicated that they favored imposition of the
death penalty for Jewish homosexual men. (The rabbis tended to
leave lesbians alone.) In their televised election advertisements,
Israeli religious political parties usually have emphasized that
homosexual Jews constitute one of the greatest dangers facing
Israel. The religious parties have been successful in their attempts
to eliminate in public school courses any mention of Hebrew
homosexual love poems, some of which contain beautiful Hebrew
lyrics. This censorship is evidence of fundamentalist influence.
Conflicts in Israeli society between adherents and opponents of
Jewish fundamentalism rank among the most important issues in
Israeli politics. In this book we do not attempt to discuss all of these
problems and/or issues. Rather, we focus upon what we consider
to be the most vital problems and issues of Jewish fundamentalism.
Defenders of the "Jewish interest" often attack persons who
write critically about Jews and/or Judaism for not emphasizing in
the same text positive features that may have nothing or little to
do with the substance under focus. Some of these defenders, for
example, attacked Seffi Rachlevsky after the publication of his
best-selling book, Messiahs' Donkeys. In his book, Rachlevsky
correctly claimed that Rabbi Kook, the Elder, the revered father
of the messianic tendency of Jewish fundamentalism (who is
featured in our book), said "The diffeicnce between a Jewish soul
and souls of non-Jews - all of them in all different levels - is greater
and deeper than the difference between a human soul and the souls
of cattle." The Rachlevsky detractors did not attempt to refute sub-
stantively the relevance of the Kook quotation. Rather, they argued
that Rabbi Kook said other things and that Rachlevsky, by neglecting
to mention them, had distorted the teachings of Rabbi Kook.
Rachlevsky pointed out that Rabbi Kook's entire teaching was
based upon the Lurianic Cabbala, the school of Jewish mysticism
that dominated Judaism from the late sixteenth to the early
nineteenth century. One of the basic tenants of the Lurianic
Cabbala is the absolute superiority of the Jewish soul and body over
the non-Jewish soul and body. According to the Lurianic Cabbala,
the world was created solely for the sake of Jews; the existence of
non-Jews was subsidiary. If an influential Christian bishop or
Islamic scholar argued that the difference between the superior souls
of non-Jews and the inferior souls of Jews was greater than the
difference between the human soul and the souls of cattle, he
would incur the wrath of and be viewed as an anti-Semite by most
Jewish scholars regardless of whatever less meaningful, positive
statements he included. From this perspective the detractors of
Rachlevsky are hypocrites. That Rabbi Kook was a vegetarian and
even respected the rights of plants to the extent that he did not allow
X JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
flowers or grass to be cut for his own pleasure neither distracted
from nor added anything to his position regarding the comparison
of the souls of Jews and non-Jews. That Kook deprecated
unnecessary Jewish brutality against non-Jews should not minimize
criticism of his expressed delight in the belief that the death of
millions of soldiers during World War One constituted a sign of
the approaching salvation of Jews and the coming of the Messiah.
The detractors of Rachlevsky and those who may level similar
criticisms against our book and us are not the only hypocrites in
this area. Shelves of bookshops in English-speaking and other
countries groan under the weight of books on Jewish mysticism in
general and on Hassidism and the Lurianic Cabbala more
specifically. Many of the authors of these books are widely regarded
as famous scholars because of the minutiae of their scholarship.
The people who read only these books on these subjects, however,
cannot suspect that Jewish mysticism, the Lurianic Cabbala,
Hassidism and the teachings of Rabbi Kook contain basic ideas
about Jewish superiority comparable to the worst forms of anti-
Semitism. The scholarly authors of these books, for example
Gershon Scholem, have willfully omitted reference to such ideas.
These authors are supreme hypocrites. They are analogous to
many authors of books on Stalin and Stalinism. Until recently,
people who read only the books written by Stalinists could not know
about Stalin's crimes and would have false notions of the Stalinists'
regimes and their real ideologies.
The fact is that certain Jews, some of whom wield political
influence, consider Jews to be superior to non-Jews and view the
world as having been created only or primarily for Jews. This belief
in Jewish superiority is most dangerous when held by Jews who love
their children, are honest in their relations with other Jews and
perform, as do fundamentalists in all religions, various acts of
piety. This belief is less dangerous when held by Jews who are not
overwhelmingly concerned about religion and/or corruption. A
parallel worth citing here is that in a secular, totalitarian system, a
dedicated party worker or a convinced nationalist is usually more
dangerous and harmful than a corrupt member of the same
ideological system.
Our final point in this preface is both personal and universal. As
Jews, we understand that our own grandparents or great-
grandparents probably believed in at least some of the views
described in our book. This same statement may apply to other
contemporary Jews. In the past many non-Jews, as individuals and
as members of groups, held anti-Semitic views, which, especially
when the circumstances were propitious, influenced the behavior
of others towards Jews. Similarly, in the past, slavery was universally
practiced and justified, the inferior status of women was a global
PREFACE xi
phenomenon and the belief that a country belonged to an individual
or family and was heritable was common. Jewish fundamentalists
still believe, as they have in the past, in a golden age when everything
was, or was going to be, perfect. This golden age is so much of a
reality for them that, when faced with issues of pernicious beliefs
and practices, they take refuge by invoking God's word, by falsely
describing the past and by condemning non-Jews for harboring
feelings of superiority and having contempt for Jews. The funda-
mentalists also justify their own belief in Jewish superiority and their
feeling of contempt for non-Jews; they seek to reproduce the
mythical golden age in which their views would dominate. We have
written this book in order to reveal the essential character of Jewish
fundamentalism and its adherents. This character threatens
democratic features of Israeli society. We believe that awareness
is the necessary first step in opposition. We realize that by criticizing
Jewish fundamentalism we are criticizing a part of the past that we
love. We wish that members of every human grouping would
criticize their own past, even before criticizing others. This, we
further believe, would lead to a better understanding between
human groups and would be followed, perhaps slowly and
hesitantly, by better treatment of minorities. Most of our book is
concerned with basic beliefs and resultant policies in Israeli Jewish
society. We believe that a critique of Jewish fundamentalism, which
entails a critique of the Jewish past, can help Jews acquire more
understanding and improve their behavior towards Palestinians,
especially in the territories conquered in and occupied since 1967.
We hope that our critique will also motivate other people in the
Middle East to engage in criticism of their entire past in order to
increase their knowledge of themselves and improve their behavior
towards others in the present. All of this could constitute a major
factor in bringing peace to the Middle East.
Glossary
Agudat Israel ("Association of Jews" in Hebrew): A former name of
the Askenazi Haredi party now called Yahadut Ha'Torah.
Aron Ha'kodesh ("Cupboard of the Holiness" in Hebrew): Place in
synagogue where the Scrolls of Law are stored, to be taken out only
on specific occasions. Regarded as the holiest place in the synagogue.
Ashkenazi ("German" in pre-modern Hebrew): A common name for
Jews whose ancestors lived in northern France, England, Germany,
Poland, Russia and other countries of central and eastern Europe.
Bar Mitzva ("capable of [fulfilling] commandments" in Hebrew): A
ceremony usually accompanied by a feast, to celebrate the occasion
when a Jewish boy reaches the age of thirteen, is then obliged to fulfill
all religious commandments and becomes capable of sinning. According
to traditional Judaism the father is responsible for all sins committed
by sons below the age of thirteen.
Black Panthers: In the context of this book this term refers to a small
and ephemeral, but highly publicized, organization of Oriental Jews
in Israel during the 1970s, which protested discrimination of Oriental
Jews.
Bnei Brak: Israeli town near Tel Aviv, inhabited almost only by
Haredim, mainly Ashkenazi.
Border guards: A paramilitary unit of the Israeli police.
Cabbala ("The received [thing]" in Hebrew): The usual name for
Jewish mysticism; used especially for the Jewish mystical groups that
have developed since the eleventh century.
Davar ("Matter," in Hebrew): A Hebrew newspaper that ceased to
appear in the mid-1990s.
Degel Ha'Torah ("Flag of the Torah" in Hebrew): A faction of
Mitnagdim within the party, Yahadut Ha'Torah.
Der'i, Aryeh: Chief politician of the Shas party, born in 1959. In April,
1 999, he was convicted for taking bribes and sentenced to four years
of imprisonment. The punishment was suspended pending his appeal.
Ga'on ("genius" in Hebrew): Title of the two chief rabbis in Iraq from
about 650 to 1050, each of whom was acknowledged by all Jews as
the supreme religious authority. In the last two hundred years also used
in a vague manner to designate (or to flatter) any important rabbi.
Ge'onim: Plural of Ga'on.
Goren, Rabbi Shlomo: An important Israeli rabbi. Appointed by
Prime Minister David Ben Gurion as the first Chief Rabbi of the
GLOSSARY xiii
Israeli army. Subsequently a Chief Rabbi of Israel in the 1960s and
1970s.
Gush Emunim ("Block of Faithful" in Hebrew): The ideological and
settling messianic movement (see chapters four and five). Founded
in early 1974.
Ha'ain Hashvi'it ("the seventh eye" in Hebrew): Bimonthly issued
by the Israeli Institute for Democracy and devoted to media criticism.
Haaretz ("The land" in Hebrew): The most prestigious Hebrew
newspaper, read mainly by the elite.
Hadashot ("News" in Hebrew): A radical Hebrew newspaper of the
1980s and early 1990s.
HaHr ("The town" in Hebrew): A Friday, widely read, Hebrew
newspaper of Tel Aviv and neighboring towns with radical tendencies.
Halacha ("Accepted" in Hebrew): The term as two meanings in
Hebrew. 1. The entire body of the Jewish religious law. 2. A single
regulation of that law. To avoid confusion in this book we used the
term only in its first meaning. Where it occurred in our Hebrew
sources in the second meaning (for example, in references in quotations
to books codifying Jewish religious law), it was translated as "rule."
Haredim ("Fearful" in the meaning "God-fearing" in Hebrew):
Name of those Jewish fundamentalists who refuse modern innovations.
Haredi is the singular form and is also an adverb.
Ha'Shavua ("The week" in Hebrew): An extreme Haredi weekly.
Heder ("Room" in Hebrew) : Name for the pre-modern Jewish school
system.
Hesder ("Arrangement" in Hebrew): Name for religious units in
Israeli army that serve by a special arrangement.
Israel A and Israel B: Popular Israeli terms designating the two parts
of Israeli Jewish society that often oppose each other: the former
leaning to the right and the second leaning to the left and less influenced
by religion.
Karo, Rabbi Yoseph: 1488-1575, the author of Shulhan Aruch,
commentaries on Maimonides and other religious works. Regarded
as the most important rabbinic authority of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.
Kashrut ("proper manner" in Hebrew): A set of rules governing the
types of food that religious Jews can eat according to the Halacha and
the proper manner of their preparation.
Kitzur Shulhan Aruch ("abridgment of Shulhan Aruch" in Hebrew):
A popular book containing the most necessary rules of Halacha, used
in the education of Haredi children and by the uneducated Haredim.
Written by rabbi Shlomo Gantzfried in early nineteenth century.
Kollel ("entire" or "inclusive" in Hebrew): An institution for the
studying of Talmud by adults who have finished their Yeshiva studies.
Kook, Rabbi Avracham Yitzhak Hacohen: 1865-1935, also called
and referred to in this book as "Rabbi Kook the elder." After filling
various rabbinic posts he was the Chief Rabbi of Palestine 1920-35.
A prolific author, many of whose works were posthumously edited from
xiv JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
his notes. The founder of the messianic ideology (chapters four and
five). Held in great regard by Gush Emunim followers and to some
extent by all Zionists.
Kook, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Hacohen: 1890-1982, a son of Rabbi
Avraham Yitzhak Kook. Called and referred to in this book as "Rabbi
Kook the younger." Took over the leadership of the adherents of
messianic ideology after the death of his father. All important Gush
Emunim rabbis are his students.
Kosher: Yiddish expression used in Hebrew with ironic undertones
to refer to food, chosen and prepared according to rules of Kashrut.
The proper Hebrew word "Kasher" is used mainly in polite discourse.
Kuneh: A Yiddish word meaning a particular type of stocks used by
Jews in Eastern Europe. Adopted in Hebrew historical and religious
works.
Labor: Proper name The Israeli Labor Party. The largest and also the
oldest Israeli left party.
Likud ("consolidation" in Hebrew): The largest Israeli right party.
Lurianic Cabbala: The most important branch of Cabbala since the
early seventeenth century. Founded by Rabbi Isaac Luria (1538-72)
and his disciples, it has dominated all subsequent Jewish mysticism.
Maariv ("eventide" in Hebrew): The Hebrew daily paper with the
second largest circulation.
Maimonides: Used in this book, following Hebrew usage, in two
meanings: 1. Rabbi Moshe son of Maimon, called in European
languages Maimonides, 1138-1204, author of many books of
commentary on the Halacha. Also, the greatest philosopher of Judaism.
2. The largest codex of Halacha composed by Maimonides; the proper
name is "Mishneh Torah" ("second rank Torah"). It includes all
commandments and beliefs of Jewish religious law. It is divided into
books that are in turn divided into tractates, entitled according to the
issues with which they deal; they tractates in turn are divided into
chapters and individual rules. In our references following the Hebrew
usage, only the tractate, chapter and the number of the rule are given.
Maskilim ("the enlightened ones" in Hebrew): Name adopted by the
Jews who introduced modern influences into Judaism in late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.
Mishnah ("repetition" in Hebrew): The basic and easier part of
Talmud, often studied by itself and equipped with special
commentaries.
Mitnagdim ("opponents" in Hebrew): The most extreme right-wing
party now represented in the knesset.
National Religious Party: Often referred to by its acronym NRP.
Represents the fundamentalist Jews in Israel who are not Haredim.
Oriental Jews ("mizrahim" in Hebrew): Collective name used at
present for Israeli Jews who are not Ashkenazi.
Orthodox: In Israel and elsewhere, a common name for Jews who keep
the rules of Halacha, or at least most of them. Orthodoxy refers to the
behavior and practices of Orthodox Jews. (Contrary to Christianity,
GLOSSARY xv
Orthodox and orthodoxy in Judaism refer mostly to practices and not
to beliefs.)
Palestinian Talmud (called incorrectly in Hebrew "Jerusalem
Talmud"): The less authoritative and extensive of the two Talmuds.
Pentateuch: The first five books of the Bible, believed to have been
written by Moses and regarded as more sacred than the rest of the Bible.
Purim: A lesser Jewish holiday that occurs about one month before
Passover. It has many features of the carnival but is also characterized
by increased hostility to non-Jews.
Rabenu ("our rabbi" in Hebrew): An unofficial title given to specially
important rabbis.
Rebbe ("rabbi" in Yiddish): Kept to this day by the holy men of
Hassidic sects as one of their titles. Used in Hebrew in this connotation.
Sages: The customary English translation of the Hebrew term "our
wise men of blessed memory." Used primarily to designate all rabbis
mentioned in the Talmud, but also to refer more vaguely to all past
Orthodox rabbis.
Sephardi ("Spanish" in Hebrew): Until the late 1970s used in Israel
instead of the term, Oriental Jews.
Sha'atnez: A Hebrew word denoting the forbidden mixture of wool
and flax in a textile.
Shach, Rabbi Eliezer: 1898-, the spiritual leader of the Degel
Ha'Torah faction and one of the most influential rabbis in Israel.
Shas: The party of Oriental Jewish Haredim.
Shishi ("Sixth" or "Friday" in Hebrew): Name of a defunct Hebrew
weekly.
Shofar: Ram's horn used for sacred blowing during some synagogue
services and especially on the New Year.
Sholem, Professor Gershon: 1897-1982, founder of the modern
study of Cabbala; wrote many authoritative books on Jewish mysticism.
Shulhan Aruch ("prepared table" in Hebrew): A summary of a
longer work, Bet Yoseph, by Rabbi Yoseph Karo but shorter than the
Maimonides version, because it omits many less important subjects.
It is regarded as authoritative by most Orthodox Jews. Usually the
differences between the Shulhan Aruch and the Maimonides version
are minor.
Tal, Professor Uriel: Died in 1985. Professor of German history at
Tel Aviv University.
Talmud ("study" in Hebrew): Although there are two Talmuds,
Palestinian and Babylonian, the term "Talmud" without qualification
always refers to the Babylonian Talmud, regarded as the most author-
itative text by Orthodox Jews. The Palestinian Talmud (much shorter
and inferior in its arrangement) enjoys only a supplementary authority.
The basic part of both Talmuds is the Mishnah, a collection of terse
laws written in Hebrew. The other part, called "Gemarah" consists
of a discussion of those laws mixed with many legends. The Gemarah
is much longer than the Mishnah and is written in both Aramaic and
Hebrew. Both Talmuds are divided into sixty tractates. The Babylonian
xvi JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Talmud is always printed in standard editions with the same division
of pages so that all references are to the names of tractate and page
numbers.
Torah Sheba'al Peh ("oral Torah" in Hebrew): Term used, especially
by Orthodox Jews, to refer to the sacred Jewish literature other than
the Bible.
Tractate: A major division of the Talmud. Each tractate has a name,
usually roughly describing its main contents.
Tsomet ("junction" in Hebrew): Secular right-wing party headed by
Reserve General Raphael Eitan and allied with Likud. Tsomet has been
politically powerful in the early 1990s.
Yahadut Ha'Torah ("Judaism of the Torah" in Hebrew): Party of
Ashkenazi Haredim, comprised of two almost independent factions:
one Degel Ha'Torah and the other a coalition of Hassidic sects.
Yated Ne'etnan ("faithful tent peg" in Hebrew): Weekly of Degel
Ha'Torah.
Yediot Ahronot ("last news" in Hebrew): The Hebrew newspaper
with by far the largest circulation.
Yerushalaitn ("Jerusalem" in Hebrew): A Hebrew Friday paper
published in Jerusalem. Belongs to Yediot Ahronot.
Yeshiva ("sitting" or "meeting" in Hebrew): Institution for higher
Talmudic studies. The plural is Yeshivot.
Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement in English): The most sacred day
of the Jewish religious calendar.
Yoseph, Rabbi Ovadia: The spiritual leader of the Shas party.
Introduction
This is a political book about Jewish fundamentalism in Israel. It
includes some original scholarly research but is based to a great
extent upon the scholarly research of others. Hopefully, this book
is analytical.
We have inserted in the text many and copious quotations from
serious articles that have appeared in the Israeli Hebrew press. The
majority of articulate Israeli Jews have learned about Jewish fun-
damentalism and some of the reactions thereto during the past ten
to fifteen years from these articles. Some of these articles provided
summaries of and analyses by leading scholars who have researched
in-depth aspects of Jewish fundamentalism.
We have quoted and have usually explained texts from talmudic
literature. Such texts have been and still are often used in Israeli
politics and often quoted in the Israeli Hebrew press. We have
concluded that in the usual English translations of talmudic
literature some of the most sensitive passages are usually toned down
or falsified - as a result, we have ourselves translated all of the texts
from talmudic literature that we have quoted in the book. The
quotations from the Bible, however, follow the standard translations,
sometimes in more modern English, except when specifically noted
otherwise.
We realize that we have presented a number of lengthy quotations.
We determined that this was necessary in order to explain our points
adequately. We believe the quotations deserve to be and should
be read in full. Instead of footnoting each quotation separately in
the traditional scholarly manner, we decided to mention in the text
from where each quotation was taken. Although this may at times
appear to be a bit redundant, it makes the flow of understanding
easier.
Although our book deals primarily with recent developments in
Jewish fundamentalism, it is rooted in Jewish history. A brief
overview of Jewish history, especially for readers who may lack
adequate knowledge thereof, is necessary in order to provide the
contextual framework for the subject matter. Fundamentalists of
all religions wish to restore society to the "good old times" when
the faith was allegedly pure and was practiced by everyone.
Fundamentalists believe that in the "good old times" all the evils
2 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
associated with modernity were absent. To gain an understanding
of Jewish fundamentalism, it is imperative to identify the historical
period that fundamentalists believe should be re-established. In
order to do this, we must specify the various periods of Jewish
history.
Jewish history is usually divided into four major periods. The first
is the biblical period during which most of the Jewish Bible (Old
Testament in the Christian tradition) was written. Although its
beginning time is uncertain, this period lasted until about the fifth
century bc. Judaism, at least in its major characteristics, did not
exist in this time period. The Hebrew word "yehudim" ("Jews" in
post-biblical Hebrew) and its cognates in the Jewish Bible only
denotes the inhabitants of the small kingdom of Judea and is used
to distinguish these inhabitants from all the other people, called
Israelites or "sons of Israel" or, rarely, "Hebrews." The Bible
anyway is not the book that primarily determines the practices and
doctrines of Orthodox Jews. 1 The most fundamentalist Orthodox
Jews are largely ignorant of major parts of the Bible and know some
parts only through commentaries that distort meaning.
Controversies, moreover, consumed the biblical period. The
majority of Israelites, including inhabitants of Judea, practiced
idolatry throughout much of this period. Only a minority of Israelites
followed those tendencies from which Judaism subsequently arose.
In short, Judaism, as it came to be known, did not exist during the
biblical period.
The second period of Jewish history, usually called the Second
Temple period, began in the fifth century bc and lasted until the
destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in ad 70. This
was the formative period of Judaism with its subsequent charac-
teristics. The term "Jews," which denotes those people who followed
the distinctive religion of Judaism and the name Judea, which
denotes the land wherein Jews lived, appeared in this period. Near
the end of this period, after Jews had conquered most of Palestine,
the Romans adopted the term "Judea" in describing Palestine. 2 The
two most important new Jewish characteristics that developed in
this period were Jewish exclusiveness and the resultant separation
of Jews from all other nations. For the first time the persons of other
nations were referred to by the collective name of gentiles. 3 The
second new characteristic was based upon the assumption that the
Jews must follow biblical law, that is, the true interpretation of the
law. During most of this period, however, disputes centering upon
differing and rival interpretations of the law occurred. At times, these
disputes erupted into civil wars. The long-lasting quarrel between
the Pharisees and Saducees was but one example of such disputes.
Shortly after the beginning of this period, Alexander the Great
conquered Palestine. States influenced by Hellenism ruled Palestine
INTRODUCTION 3
for almost a thousand years thereafter; even the short-lived
independent Jewish state of the Hasmonean dynasty was in most
essentials a type of Hellenistic state. Consequentially, Jewish society
and the Hebrew language, even though keeping their Jewish char-
acteristics were transformed by the influences of Hellenism,
Hellenism influenced even more deeply the Jewish diaspora in
Mediterranean countries. Jews in those countries often spoke and
prayed in Greek. Unfortunately most of the Jewish literature in
Greek, which was produced in this period, was subsequently lost
by the Jews; only that part preserved by various Christian churches
has remained.
Most historians date the beginning of the third period in ad 70
with the destruction of the Second Temple. Other historians prefer
to date the beginning of the third period in ad 135, when the last
major Jewish rebellion against the Roman Empire ended. This
period ended at different times in different countries with the onset
of modernity and the rise of modern nation states. Modernity
began when Jews were granted rights as citizens equal to those
granted to non-Jews and consequently when their autonomy, which
entailed subjection to the rabbis, ended. This occurred in the
United States and France, for example, by the end of the eighteenth
century; this did not occur in Russia until 1917 or in Yemen until
the 1950s. The Jewish rebellions against the Romans resulted in
a permanent loss of Jewish population in Palestine; the importance
of the Jewish diaspora thus increased. This change became fully
operative in the fifth century ad. Additionally, the failure of
rebellions caused the Jews to lose hope that the Temple would be
rebuilt and that the animal sacrifices performed in the Temple,
previously the heart-center of the Jewish religion, would be restored
before the coming of the Messiah. The repeated defeats caused most
Jews to accommodate themselves to the ruling authority of Rome
and of other states in return for the limited autonomy directed by
the rabbis. Thus, in the Roman empire of the fourth century ad,
in a system created much earlier, all the Jews were in religious
matters subject to the Patriarch who had the power to punish
them by flogging, by levying fines for religious offenses and by
imposing taxes. The dignitary called Patriarch in Roman sources
was called President ("Nassi" in Hebrew) in Jewish sources. He
presided over the Sanhedrin, the supreme Jewish court, and in
Palestine appointed court members and other religious func-
tionaries. The Patriarch, whose post was hereditary, held a high
official rank in the hierarchy of Roman state officials. A similar
arrangement simultaneously existed in Iraq where the top official
was called the head of the diaspora. Both the patriarch and the head
of the diaspora claimed to have been descended from the family
of King David. The office of the patriarch lapsed shortly after
4 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
ad 429; the office of the head of the diaspora lasted until about
ad 1 100. Both offices provided the framework for models of Jewish
autonomy. This autonomy, which persisted until the modern era,
and later repercussions thereof, contributed to the rise of Jewish
fundamentalism. The great abundance of literature produced in
the third period, the longest in the entire course of Jewish history,
was written mostly in Hebrew but also in Aramaic, Greek, Arabic,
Yiddish and other languages. The major theme was religion; the
minutiae of religious observances were mainly emphasized. Poetry,
philosophy and science, predominantly of the Aristotelian variety,
appeared at some times in some places but were neither universal
nor continuous. In many diaspora areas, particularly in central
Europe, the only literature produced until 1750 was religious.
From the perspective of Jewish fundamentalism the most important
occurrence in the third period was the growth of Jewish mysticism,
usually referred to by the name of Cabbala. Jewish mysticism
transformed Jewish beliefs without changing, except for a few
details, Jewish observance. Between 1550 and 1750, the great
majority of Jews in western Europe accepted the Cabbala and its
set of beliefs. This was the end of the third period of Jewish history,
which immediately preceded the rise of modern nation states and
the beginning of modern influences. Mysticism is still accepted by
and constitutes a vital part of Jewish fundamentalism, being
especially important in the messianic variety. As shown in our
book, the ideology of the messianic variety of Jewish fundamen-
talism is based upon the Cabbala. In spite of making occasional
references to the Bible, Jewish fundamentalists generally have
consistently pinpointed and described the last part of this third
period as the golden age that they wish to restore. It is important
to note that, beyond the spawning of Jewish fundamentalism, the
wide circulation of religious literature in this third period created
a strong sense of Jewish unity, based upon a common religion and
the Hebrew language. (Almost all educated Jews, regardless of what
language they spoke, understood and employed Hebrew as a
written language for their religion.)
The fourth and modern period of Jewish history is the one in
which we live. It began at different times in different countries; many
Israeli Jews passed directly from pre-modern to modern times. As
discussed in Chapter 3 of our book, this phenomenon has been
especially important for Oriental Jews. Our book emphasizes that
Jewish fundamentalism arose as a reaction against the effects of
modernity upon Jews. The influence of Jewish fundamentalism upon
the Israeli Jewish community can only be understood adequately
within the context of the entire course of Jewish history.
Jewish Fundamentalism Within Jewish
Society
Almost every moderately sophisticated Israeli Jew knows the facts
about Israeli Jewish society that are described in this book. These
facts, however, are unknown to most interested Jews and non-Jews
outside Israel who do not know Hebrew and thus cannot read most
of what Israeli Jews write about themselves in Hebrew. These facts
are rarely mentioned or are described inaccurately in the enormous
media coverage of Israel in the United States and elsewhere. The
major purpose of this book is to provide those persons who do not
read Hebrew with more understanding of one important aspect of
Israeli Jewish society.
This book pinpoints the political importance of Jewish funda-
mentalism in Israel, a powerful state in and beyond the Middle East
that wields great influence in the United States. Jewish funda-
mentalism is here briefly defined as the belief that Jewish Orthodoxy,
which is based upon the Babylonian Talmud, the rest of talmudic
literature and halachic literature, is still valid and will eternally
remain valid. Jewish fundamentalists believe that the Bible itself is
not authoritative unless interpreted correctly by talmudic literature.
Jewish fundamentalism exists not only in Israel but in every country
that has a sizeable Jewish community. In countries other than
Israel, wherein Jews constitute a small minority of the total
population, the general importance of Jewish fundamentalism is
limited mainly to acquiring funding and garnering political support
for fundamentalist adherents in Israel. Its importance in Israel is
far greater, because its adherents can and do influence the state in
various ways. The variety of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel is
striking. Many fundamentalists, for instance, want the temple
rebuilt on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem or at least want to keep
the site, which is now a holy Muslim praying place, empty of
visitors. In the United States most Christians would not identify
with such a purpose, but in Israel a significant number of Israeli
Jews who are not fundamentalists identify with and support this
and similar demands. Some varieties of Jewish fundamentalism are
clearly more dangerous than others. Jewish fundamentalism is not
only capable of influencing conventional Israeli policies but could
6 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
also substantially affect Israeli nuclear policies. The same possible
consequences of fundamentalism feared by many persons for other
countries could occur in Israel.
The significance of fundamentalism in Israel can only be
understood within the context of Israeli Jewish society and as part
of the contribution of the Jewish religion to societal internal
divisions. Our consideration of this broad topic begins by focusing
upon the ways sophisticated observers divide Israeli Jewish society
politically and religiously. We then proceed to the explanation of
why Jewish fundamentalism influences in varying degrees other
Israeli Jews, thereby allowing fundamentalist Jews to wield much
greater political power in Israel than their percentage of the
population might appear to warrant.
The customary two-way division of Israeli Jewish society rests
upon the cornerstone recognition that as a group Israeli Jews are
highly ideological. This is best evidenced by their high percentage
of voting, which usually exceeds 80 per cent. In the May 1996
elections, over 95 per cent of the better educated, richer, secular
Jews and the religious Jews in all categories of education and
income voted. After discounting the large number of Israeli Jews
who live outside Israel (over 400,000), most of whom did not
vote, it can be safely assumed that almost every eligible voter in
these two crucial segments of the population voted. Most Israeli
political observers by now assume that Israeli Jews are divided into
two categories: Israel A and Israel B. Israel A, often referred to as
the "left," is politically represented by the Labor and Meretz
Parties; Israel B, referred to as the "right" or the "right and religious
parties," is comprised of all the other Jewish parties. Almost all of
Israel A and a great majority of Israel B (the exception being some
of the fundamentalist Jews) strongly adhere to Zionist ideology,
which in brief, holds that all or at least the majority of Jews should
emigrate to Palestine, which as the Land of Israel, belongs to all
Jews and should be a Jewish state. A strong and increasing enmity
between these two segments of Israeli society nevertheless exists.
There are many reasons for this enmity. The reason relevant to this
study is that Israel B, including its secular members, is sympathetic
to Jewish fundamentalism while Israel A is not. It is apparent from
studies of election results over a long period of time that Israel B
has consistently obtained a numerical edge over Israel A. This is
an indication that the number of Jews influenced by Jewish fun-
damentalism is consistently increasing.
In his article "Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel,"
published in the Autumn 1994 issue of the periodical, Z' Manim
(no. 50-51), Professor Baruch Kimmerling, a faculty member of
Hebrew University's sociology department, presented data
pertaining to the religious division of Israeli Jewish society. Citing
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 7
numerous research studies, Kimmerling showed conclusively that
Israeli Jewish society is far more divided on religious issues than is
generally assumed outside of Israel, where belief in generaliza-
tions, such as "common to all Jews," is challenged less than in Israel.
Quoting the data of a survey taken by the prestigious Gutman
Institute of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Kimmerling
pointed out that whereas 19 per cent of Israeli Jews said they
prayed daily, another 19 per cent declared that they would not enter
a synagogue under any circumstances. l Influenced by the Gutman
Institute analysis and similar studies, Kimmerling and other scholars
have concluded that Israel A and Israel B contain hard-core believers
who hold diametrically opposed views of the Jewish religion. This
conclusion is almost certainly correct.
More generally, the attitude towards religion in Israeli Jewish
society can be divided into three parts. The religious Jews observe
the commandments of the Jewish religion, as defined by Orthodox
rabbis, many of whom emphasize observance more than belief. (The
number of Reform and/or Conservative Jewish in Israel is small.)
The traditional Jews keep some of the more important
commandments while violating the more inconvenient ones; they
do honor the rabbis and the religion. The secularists may
occasionally enter a synagogue but respect neither the rabbis nor
the religious institutions. The line between traditional and secular
Jews is often vague, but the available studies indicate that 25 to 30
per cent of Israeli Jews are secular, 50 to 55 per cent are traditional
and about 20 per cent are religious. Traditional Jews obviously
belong to both the Israel A and Israel B categories.
Israeli religious Jews are divided into two distinctly different
groups. The members of the religiously more extreme group are
called Haredim. (The singular word is Haredi or Hared.) The
members of the religiously more moderate group are called religious-
national Jews. The religious-national Jews are sometimes called
"knitted skullcaps" because of their head covering. Haredim usually
wear black skullcaps that are never knitted, or hats. The religious-
national Jews otherwise usually dress in the more usual Israeli
fashion, while the Haredim almost always wear black clothes.
The Haredim are themselves divided into two parties. The first,
Yahadut Ha'Torah (Judaism of the Law) is the party of the
Ashkenazi Haredim who are of East European origin. Yahadut
Ha'Torah itself is a coalition of two factions. The second is Shas,
the party of the Oriental Haredim who are of Middle Eastern
origin. (The differences between the two types of Haredim will be
more specifically discussed in Chapter 3.) The religious-national
Jews are organized in the National Religious Party (NRP). By
analyzing the 1996 electoral vote and making some necessary
adjustments, we can estimate the population percentages of these
8 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
two groups of religious Jews. In the 1996 election the Haredi
parties together won 14 of the 120 total Knesset seats. Shas won
ten seats; Yahadut Ha' Torah won four. The NRP won nine seats.
Some Israeli Jews admittedly voted for Shas because of talismans
and amulets distributed by Shas that were supposedly valid only
after a "correct" vote. Some NRP members and sympathizers,
moreover, admittedly voted for secular right-wing parties.
Everything considered, the Haredim probably constitute 1 1 per cent
of the Israeli population and 13.4 per cent of the Israeli Jews; the
NRP adherents probably constitute 9 per cent of the Israeli
population and 1 1 per cent of the Israeli Jews.
The basic tenets of the two groups of religious Jews need some
introductory explanation. The word "hared" is a common Hebrew
word meaning "fearful." During early Jewish history, it meant
"God-fearing" or exceptionally devout. In the mid-nineteenth
century it was adopted, first in Germany and Hungary and later
in other parts of the diaspora, as the name of the party of religious
Jews that opposed any modern innovation. The Ashkenazi Haredim
emerged as a backlash group opposed to the Jewish enlightenment
in general and especially to those Jews who refused to accept the
total authority of the rabbis and who introduced innovations into
the Jewish worship and life style. Seeing that almost all Jews
accepted these innovations, the Haredim reacted even more
extremely and banned every innovation. The Haredim to date
have insisted upon the strictest observance of the Halacha. An
illustrative example of opposition to innovation is the previously
mentioned and still current black dress of the Haredim; this was
the dress fashion of Jews in Eastern Europe when the Haredim
formed themselves into a party. Before that time Jews dressed in
many different styles and were often indistinguishable in dress
from their neighbors. After a brief time, almost all Jews except for
the Haredim again dressed differendy. The Halacha, moreover, does
not enjoin Jews to dress in black and/or to wear thick black coats
and heavy fur caps during the hot summer or at any other time.
Yet, Haredim in Israel continue to do so in opposition to innovation;
they insist that dress be kept as it was in Europe around 1850. All
other considerations, including climatic ones, are overridden.
In contrast to the Haredim, the religious-nationalist Jews of the
NRP made their compromises with modernity at the beginning of
the 1920s when the split between the two large groupings in
religious Judaism first appeared in Palestine. This can be
immediately observed in their dress, which, with the exception of
a small skullcap, is conventional. Even more importantly, this is
evident in their selective observance of the Halacha, for example,
in their rejection of many commandments regarding women. NRP
members do not hesitate to admit women to positions of authority
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 9
in many of their organizations and in the political party itself.
Before both the 1992 and 1996 elections the NRP published and
distributed an advertisement, containing photographs of various
public figures including some women supporting the party, and
boasted more broadly on television of female support. Haredim did
not and would not do this. Even when Haredim, who ban television
watching for themselves, decided to present some television election
programs directed to other Jews, they insisted that all participants
be male. During the 1992 campaign the editors of a Haredi weekly
consulted the rabbinical censor about whether or not to publish
the above-mentioned NRP advertisement. The rabbinical censor
ordered the paper to publish the advertisement with all photographs
of the NRP women blotted out. The editors did what the censor
ordered. Outraged, the NRP sued the newspaper for libel and
sought damages in Israeli secular courts, disregarding the rulings
of Haredi rabbis prohibiting using secular courts to settle disputes
among Jews.
The religious-nationalist Jewish compromises with modernity
regarding women are exceedingly complicated in many ways. The
Halacha forbids Jewish males to listen to women singing whether
in a choir or solo regardless of what is sung. This is stated directly
in the halachic ruling that a voice of a woman is adultery. This is
interpreted by later halachic rulings stipulating that the word
"voice" here means a woman's singing not speaking. This rule,
originating in the Talmud, occurs in all codes of law. A Jewish male
who willingly listens to a woman's singing commits a sin equivalent
either to adultery or fornication. The great majority of NRP faithful
members, nevertheless, listen to women singing and thus commit
"adultery" routinely. Some of the most strict NRP members,
especially among the religious settlers in the West Bank, have not
only puzzled over this problem but at times have tried to solve the
problem of how to adjust by developing creative approaches. In
the early 1990s some of the settlers founded a new radio station,
Arutz, or Channel, 7. For their station to become successful and
to appeal as broadly as possible to Israeli Jews, the settlers
understood that the songs of the fashionable singers of the day, some
of whom were women, would have to be broadcast. The rabbinical
censor, however, has refused to allow a breach of the Halacha
whereby male listeners would hear female singers and thus commit
"adultery." After further consultation with the censor, the setders
devised an acceptable solution that is still being employed. Men
sing the songs, made popular by women; the male voices are then
electronically changed to the female pitch and are broadcast
accordingly over Arutz 7. A part of the traditional public is satisfied
by this expedient, and the learned NRP rabbis insist that no
adultery is committed when men listen to the songs being sung.
10 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
The Haredim obviously have rejected and condemned this accom-
modation and to date have refused to listen to Arutz 7. Even more
importantly, the Haredim, after increasing somewhat their political
power in the 1988 elections, were able to impose their position in
this regard upon the whole state by forcing a change in the opening
of the new Knesset session. The opening ceremony previously
began with the singing of "Hatikva," the Israeli national anthem,
by a mixed male-female choir. After the 1988 election, in deference
to Haredi sensitivities, a male singer replaced the mixed choir. After
the 1992 election, won by Labor, an all-male choir of the Military
Rabbinate sang "Hatikva."
How can the Haredim, who altogether constitute only a small
percentage of Israel's Jewish population, at times, either alone or
even with the help of the NRP, impose their will upon the rest of
society? The facile explanation is that both the Labor and Likud
parties kowtow to the Haredim for political support. This
explanation is insufficient. The kowtowing continued between
1984 and 1990 during the time that Labor and Likud had formed
a coalition. Currying favor from the Haredim for alignment purposes
was then politically unnecessary. The offered explanation,
furthermore, does not adequately take into account the special
affinity of all the religious parties, perceived since 1980 as funda-
mentalist, to Likud and other secular right-wing parties. This
affinity, especially between Likud and the Haredi religious parties,
based upon a shared world outlook, is at the crux of Israeli politics.
(This affinity is analogous to that existing between Christian and
Muslim fundamentalists and their secular right parties.) The
relatively simple case of the NRP illustrates this well. The NRP
recognizes, although does not always follow, the same halachic
authorities as do the Haredi parties. The NRP also adheres to the
same ideals relating to the Jewish past and, more importantly, to
the future when Israel's triumph over the non-Jews will allegedly
be secure. The differences between the NRP and the Haredim stem
from the NRP's belief that redemption has begun and will soon
be completed by the imminent coming of the Messiah. The Haredim
do not share this belief. The NRP believes that special circumstances
at the beginning of redemption justify temporary departures from
the ideal that could help advance the process of redemption. NRP
support in some situations for military service for talmudic scholars
is a relevant example here. These deviant NRP ideas have been
undermined since the 1970s by the expanding Haredi influence
upon increasing numbers of NRP followers who have resisted
departures from strict talmudic norms and have favored Haredi
positions. This process has been counter-balanced to some extent
by the growth in prestige of the NRP settlers who are esteemed as
pioneers of messianism even though the assassination of Prime
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 1 1
Minister Rabin by a messianist may have momentarily increased
Haredi prestige.
The religious influence upon the Israeli right-wing of Israel B is
attributable both to its militaristic character and its widely shared
world outlook. Secular and militaristic right-wing, Israeli Jews
hold political views and engage in rhetoric similar to that of religious
Jews. For most Likud followers, "Jewish blood" is the reason why
Jews are in a different category than non-Jews, including, of course,
even those non-Jews who are Israeli citizens and who serve in the
Israeli army. For religious Jews, the blood of non-Jews has no
intrinsic value; for Likud, it has limited value. Menachem Begin's
masterful use of such rhetoric about Gentiles brought him votes
and popularity and thus constitutes a case in point. The difference
in this respect between Labor and Likud is rhetorical but is
nevertheless important in that it reveals part of a world outlook.
In 1982, for example, when the Israeli army occupied Beirut,
Rabin representing Labor, although advocating the same policies
as favored by Sharon and Likud, did not explain the Sabra and
Shatila Camp massacres by stating, as did Begin: "Gentiles kill
Gentiles and blame the Jews." Even if Rabin had himself been
capable of saying this, he knew that most of his secular supporters
in Labor, who distinguish between Gentiles who hate Jews and those
who do not, would not have tolerated such a statement. They would
have repudiated such rhetoric as being both untrue and harmful.
Religious influence is evident in the right's general reverence for
the Jewish past and its insistence that Jews have an historic right
to an expanded Israel extending beyond its present borders. More
than other secular Israelis, members of the Israeli right insist upon
Jewish uniqueness. During many centuries of their existence, the
great majority of Jews were similar in some ways to the present-
day Haredim. Thus, those Jews who today revere the Jewish past
as evidence of Jewish uniqueness respect to some extent religious
Jews as perpetuators of that past. An essential part of the right's
emphasis upon uniqueness is its hatred of the concept of
"normality," that is, that Jews are similar to other people and have
the same desire for stability as do other nations. Some cultural
affinities between secular and religious Jews of the Israeli right are
not primarily ideological. Many Likud supporters, whether
Sephardic or Ashkenazi in origin, are traditionalists; they view
rabbis as glamorous figures and are affected by childhood memories
of the patriarchal family in which education was dominated by the
grandfather and the women "knew their place." Although most
pronounced in those of the religious vanguard, such considerations
also affect secular Jews of the right. The right often exaggerates the
beauty and superiority of the Jewish past, especially when arguing
for the preservation of Jewish uniqueness.
12 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
The religious and secular members of the right share fears as well
as beliefs. In an October 6, 1993, article, published in Haaretz,
Israel's most prestigious daily Hebrew-language newspaper, Doron
Rosenblum, relying upon varied sources, illustrated this by quoting
pronouncements of Likud leaders that were designed to show
Israelis the grave nature and risks of the peace process and at the
same time to continue the boasting that likud had initiated the
process.
Rosenblum quoted the following statement by Likud Member
of the Knesset (MK) Uzi Landau, who after the 1996 elections was
appointed chairperson of the Knesset Committee for Defense and
Foreign Affairs:
If Rabin's policies toward Syria are followed, one morning they
[Israeli Jews] will awaken to see columns of Syrian tanks
descending from the Golan Heights like herds of sheep ... The
settlements of the Galilee will then be attacked by fire-power
stronger than that used in [the war of] 1973 ... Since the idea of
extermination of Israelis remains a topic in the Syrian con-
sciousness ... any [Israeli] withdrawal from the Golan Heights
will only precipitate the moment that the Syrian knife will
approach the throat of every inhabitant of the Galilee ... Syrian
policies are fixed by a genetic code not subject to rapid changes.
Apparently keeping to its double-standard approach, the Western
media, which would almost certainly have blasted any non-Jewish
politician for attributing Israeli policies to a Jewish genetic code
not subject to rapid changes, avoided commenting upon the landau
statement.
Rosenblum also quoted MK Benny Begin, a major Likud leader,
who expressed the fear that Syria would make a frontal attack
upon Israel. This fear is commonly expressed by members of most
Israeli political parties. What is characteristic of Israel B, however,
is that, as Benny Begin specifically declared, the aims of a Syrian
invasion will be the same as "the aims of Pogromists of Kishinev
to cut Jewish throats." 2 Begin added that this time nuclear scientists
would help in the Syrian venture. Comparing the unarmed Jewish
community, a small minority in the Russian Empire, with Israel
and its army illustrates a common attitude to the Jewish past held
by the secular right-wing Israeli parties and the religious Jews.
This attitude takes no cognizance of historical development. Jews
in whatever condition are always the real or potential victims of
Gentiles.
Rosenblum, who is a member of Israel A, perceived all such
imagery as incongruous. Observing that Landau regarded the
Syrians as sheep, he asked: "Can it be that he [Landau] means to
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 1 3
say that we are wolves?" Rosenblum then offered his analysis of
why this rhetoric has nevertheless been so persuasive:
The suspicion is long-standing that members of the national
camps [that is, the secular right] use power-mad rhetoric to
cover their subliminal existential fear of the entire world. This
fear was not dispelled in the slightest when the state of Israel was
founded. Labor, in spite of all its faults, has succeeded by
whatever means to cast aside such fear and replace it with a
constructive and pragmatic world outiook. Likud, which resumed
its historical note with ease, has not.
Those chauvinistic Jews who speak with utmost confidence about
Israel's power and ability to impose its will upon the Middle East
are most susceptible to such fears. The same people who predict
that a second Holocaust will almost immediately occur if Israel
makes any concession to the Arabs also often state categorically
that the Israeli army, if not restrained by politicians, by Americans,
or by leftist Jews, could conquer Baghdad within one week. (Ariel
Sharon actually made this claim a few months before the outbreak
of the October 1973 war.) The fear and the self-confidence co-exist
harmoniously. The belief in Jewish uniqueness enhances this co-
existence. Most foreign observers do not realize that a sizeable
segment of the Israeli Jewish public holds these chauvinistic views.
The schizophrenic blend of inordinate fears and exaggerated self-
confidence, common to the Israeli secular right and religious Jews,
resembles ideas held by anti-Semites who usually view Jews as being
at the same time both powerful and easy to defeat. This is one of
the reasons why attitudes of Israeli right-wing individuals toward
the Gentiles, especially toward the Arabs, resemble so closely the
attitudes of anti-Semites toward the Jews.
The secular right and the religious Jews also share other fears.
They fear the West and its public opinion. They fear and condemn
Jewish leftists, a term sufficiently broad to include most Labor
followers, for not being sufficiently Jewish, for preferring Arabs to
Jews and for living lives of delusion. They view the left as dangerous
because of its ability to attract new recruits, especially from the ranks
of the country's intellectual elite.
The issue of normalcy most divides the Israeli right from the left.
The left longs for normalcy and wants Jews to be a nation like all
other nations. The entire Israeli right, on the other hand, is united
in its resentment of the idea of normalcy and its belief, along the
lines of the Jewish religion, that Jews are exceptional - different
from other people and nations. Reverence for the national past
allegedly solidifies this uniqueness. Religious Jews believe that
God made the Jews unique; many of the secular right believe that
14 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Jews are doomed to be unique by their past and have no free
choice in this matter.
Another, but somewhat less important, reason for the affinity
between the secular right and religious Jews is that the latter are
capable of providing "convincing" arguments for perpetual Jewish
rule over the land of Israel and for the denial of certain basic rights
to the Palestinians. These arguments are not only put in terms of
national security but more importantly in terms of the God-given
right to these territories. The secular Likud scholars and politicians
are often far too alienated from the Jewish past and Jewish values
to talk competently, or indeed even to understand properly, such
matters. Only the religious can provide an in-depth rationale for
Likud's policies, which are grounded not in short-term strategic
considerations but rather in the long history of the special
relationship between God and his chosen people.
Although far more intense among members of Israel B, these same
sentiments can be discerned among members of Israel A. This fact
provides the explanation for the political concessions made to the
religious parties. (Foreign observers have too often incorrectly
attributed these concessions merely to the size and/or the lobbying
power of the religious parties.) These sentiments have also affected
Jewish historiography and education. Since the late 1950s, and
especially after the 1967 war, Israeli Jewish historians, scholars in
allied fields and popularizers, although generally less dishonest in
their writings than most of their diaspora colleagues, have too
often unduly beautified and romanticized past Jewish societies and
have carefully avoided normal criticism. This type of apologia
constituted a new trend. From the late nineteenth century until the
mid- twentieth century, early Zionists and others in modern Jewish
movements were severely critical of many aspects of their own
religious cultural tradition and tried to change, in many cases even
to destroy, parts of that tradition. Since the late 1980s, some
younger Israeli historians, perhaps prompted by a growing
polarization of Israeli Jewish society, have written and published
some critical works that have shaken to some extent the still current
apologetic trend.
The comparison of the world outlook and fears of the secular
right with those of the Haredim requires more explanation. Standard
Haredic perceptions of the world can only be understood as relics
of pre-modern times. Menachem Friedman, a Westernized
observant Jew, a highly regarded authority on the Haredim in both
mandatory Palestine and the state of Israel and a professor at the
religious Bar-Han University, provided an excellent description of
these Haredic perceptions in a Davar article published on November
4, 1988. Friedman wrote this article to explain the electoral fiasco
that developed from the unsuccessful attempt of some candidates
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 1 5
on the religious list of 1988 to advocate some moderation regarding
the treatment of Palestinians. Friedman explained:
The Haredi world is Judeocentric. The essence of Haredi thought
is the notion of an abyss separating the Jews from the Gentiles.
This is why any coalition between Labor and Haredi doves is
impossible. There actually is no such thing as a Haredi dove.
People who speak about the Haredi world usually do not know
how to read its signs. They do not understand that world nor its
prominent personalities. The distance between Haredi doves and
hawks is not great. Haredi doves and hawks share a common point
of departure. Both see the relationship between non-Jews and
Jews as they had seen them before Israel was established. They
assume that non-Jews and Jews are poles apart. Non-Jews want
to kill and destroy the Jews; the rightful differences between Jews
should only be about how they should react to the ever-present
non-Jewish desire. Currently, these are two alternative Haredi
reactions to that common assumption. Rabbi Shach [the spiritual
leader of one of the two Haredi factions] says that since the non-
Jews hate us we need to keep quiet and refrain from provoking
them by not reminding them of our existence. The Lubovitcher
Rebbe says that we should be strong. [The Lubovitcher Rebbe,
Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, died in 1992.] Those are two
alternative answers, both arising from the common concept that
a gap separates Jews from non-Jews. Rabbi Shach is not a dove
in the same sense as Shulamit Aloni [a former Meretz Party
leader] is a dove. Aloni is a dove, because she believes in a
humanism that emphasizes the fundamental equality of all human
beings and nations and the capability of different human beings
and nations to communicate. Rabbi Shach believes that com-
municating with non-Jews is not possible and that they may
only be able to forget that Jews exist. The Lubovitcher Rebbe
states that we should be strong in order to defend ourselves
against the non-Jews who always want to destroy us. [The
difference between the two leaders] can be illustrated by their
respective attitudes toward the peace [treaty] with Egypt. They
both say that there is no peace and there can never be one,
because the Egyptians want to exterminate us. Rabbi Shach,
however, adds that we should try to minimize [Jewish casualties]
by keeping quiet. The Lubovitcher Rebbe says that, because the
peace does not exist in any case, we should refuse to make any
concessions. The Haredi dove does not believe in any kind of
peace, and, therefore, all the talk about a narrow coalition,
headed by Labor [and including Haredim] is completely baseless.
16 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Subsequent political developments in Israel, including the election
of Netanyahu in May 1996, have confirmed the truth of Professor
Friedman's analysis. From another Haredi perspective Rabbi
Ovadia Yoseph, the spiritual authority of the Shas Party,
corroborated this article. Rabbi Yoseph argued in a September 1 8,
1989 article in Yated Ne'eman that since Israel is too weak to
demolish all Christian churches in the Holy Land it is also too weak
to retain all the conquered territories. Using this reasoning, Rabbi
Yoseph advocated that Israel make territorial concessions in order
to avert a war in which Jewish lives will be lost. Rabbi Yoseph did
not mention Palestinians nor even their most rudimentary rights.
The Haredi world view is similar to the view held by the Israeli
secular right. The world view of Likud politicians, enthusiastically
supported by followers, is basically the classic world view of religious
Jews; it has undergone significant secularization but has kept its
essential qualities.
The alliance between the religious and secular parties of the right
produced the Netanyahu victory in the 1996 election. This alliance
was forged in spite of two deep political differences between the
parties. The first difference concerns democracy, especially as
illustrated by the structure of Israeli parties; the second difference
revolves around Zionism.
All Israeli political parties except for the Haredi were and remain
structured along the lines of parties in Western countries, especially
those in the United States. Most of the Israeli parties, for example,
introduced primaries in order to choose their candidates for the
Knesset elections. The Haredi party structure, however, is different
and peculiar, perhaps analogous only to what has happened in Iran.
All the Haredi parties have a two-tier structure. The tier that is lower
in importance includes the acting politicians, who, even if they are
ministers or Knesset members, humbly profess in public that they
are merely serving the party's rabbinical sage councils whom they
consult for directions before making any decisions. None of the
Haredi politicians of any one party accept direction from rabbinical
councils of other Haredi parties. The councils' deliberations are
kept secret; their decisions are not subject to any appeal since they
are regarded as divinely inspired. The council members are not
elected either by rabbis or lay people. If a council member dies,
his successor is appointed by the remaining members. The rabbinical
members of Haredi party councils, usually referred to by their
followers as sages, make all decisions and view with suspicion the
usual party structure, because it is viewed as innovative and modern.
The modern political party structure, including membership,
branches, internal elections and a host of other items that exist in
the NRP, is totally absent in the Haredi parties. The disagreement
and sometimes even hatreds of one another by Haredi parties stem
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 1 7
from recognition of different rabbinical "sages" as final authorities.
The Haredi political structure has preserved a male monopoly. To
date, there have been no female Haredi politicians. Haredi disunity
has prevented more rapid Haredization of parts of Israeli society.
Structure similar to the Haredi was common in Jewish communities
from the second century of the common era until the abolition of
Jewish communal autonomy in modern nation states. The aim of
Haredi practices has been and still is to preserve the Jewish way of
life as it existed prior to modern times. Haredi parties, in their
attempt to preserve an ancient Jewish regime, have to date
constituted a political backlash directed against the tide of modernity
that engulfed the NRP. The Haredi reaction, like many others, is
often disguised as a romantic desire to return to a past that was
allegedly happier and more emotionally secure for Jews than the
modern life with its doubts and uncertainties. The Haredi-indoc-
trinated community strives to suppress all doubts of members and
believes that happiness is thus achieved.
The disagreement between Haredim and most other Israeli
Jews over Zionism is complex. The Haredim and the Zionists agree
about the centrally important Zionist principle that anti-Semitism
is an eternal quality common to all non-Jews and is different from
xenophobia and/or any hatred of other minorities. This view is,
of course, similar to that held of Jews by anti-Semites. (This
similarity probably accounts for the political contact between
some Zionists, beginning with Herzl, and "moderate" anti-Semites,
who only wanted to rid their societies of Jews or limit the numbers
of Jews in their societies without killing them.) The views
concerning and the fears of anti-Semitism shared by the secular
right and the Haredim accord with this central principle of Zionism
better than do the views currendy held by the left Labor and
Meretz parties, which are frequently accused by Likud of not
being sufficiently Zionist.
Haredi ideology nevertheless clashes with Zionism on certain
other principles. Two major examples are the Zionist aims to
concentrate all Jews, or as many as possible, in and to establish a
Jewish state in Palestine. These aims or dogmas contradict the
Haredi interpretations of the Talmud and talmudic commentaries.
Because of the perceived contradiction, Haredim have consistently
proclaimed, and still proclaim, their strong opposition to Zionism;
they claim that the state of Israel is merely another diaspora for Jews,
and they avoid using Zionist symbols. Every Israeli political party
other than the Haredi, including the NRP, end or begin their
conventions with the singing of "Hatikva," the Israeli national and
the world Zionist movement anthem; the Haredi parties and orga-
nizations do not do this but instead recite Jewish prayers. The media
often condemns the Haredim for not singing "Hatikva" on official
18 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
occasions. At all international Zionist conventions held in Israel
only the Israeli flag is displayed. At Haredi conventions held in Israel
all flags of the nation states from which delegates came, including
Israel, are displayed in alphabetical order.
The Haredi objection to Zionism is based upon the contradic-
tion between classical Judaism, of which the Haredim are the
continuators, and Zionism. Numerous Zionist historians have
unfortunately obfuscated the issues here. Some detailed explanation
is therefore necessary. In a famous talmudic passage in Tractate
Ketubot y page 111, which is echoed in other parts of the Talmud,
God is said to have imposed three oaths on the Jews. Two of these
oaths that clearly contradict Zionist tenets are: 1) Jews should not
rebel against non-Jews, and 2) as a group should not massively
emigrate to Palestine before the coming of the Messiah. (The third
oath, not discussed here, enjoins the Jews not to pray too strongly
for the coming of the Messiah, so as not to bring him before his
appointed time.) During the course of post-talmudic Jewish history,
rabbis extensively discussed the three oaths. Of major concern in
this discussion was the question of whether or not specific Jewish
emigration to Palestine was part of the forbidden massive
emigration. During the past 1,500 years, the great majority of
traditional Judaism's most important rabbis interpreted the three
oaths and the continued existence of the Jews in exile as religious
obligations intended to expiate the Jewish sins that caused God to
exile them.
In recent years, a number of Israeli Jewish scholars, who in
general have developed a more honest Jewish historiography, have
focused upon the essence of rabbinical interpretations of the three
oaths. In his highly regarded scholarly book, Messianism, Zionism
and Jewish Religious Radicalism (published in Hebrew in Israel in
1993), Aviezer Ravitzky, for example, provided a good summary
of rabbinical interpretations of the three oaths from the fifth century
ad (or CE - Common Era). In his analysis Ravitzky noted that in
the ninth century Rabbi Shmuel, son of Hosha'ana, an important
leader of Palestinian Jewry, in a poetic prayer quoted the following
as God's words. "I took the oath of my people not to rebel against
Christians and Muslims, told them to be silent until I myself will
overturn them as I did in Sodom." In the thirteenth century during
the time that some rabbis and poets emigrated to Palestine for
religious reasons, 3 Ravitzky continued, other rabbis in many parts
of the world quoted the three oaths theory to warn against the spread
of this potentially dangerous phenomenon. Rabbi Eliezer, son of
Moshe, the spiritual leader of a Jewish congregation in Wurtzburg,
Germany, in the thirteenth century warned Jews who wrongly
emigrated to Palestine that God would punish them with death.
At about the same time, Rabbi Ezra of Gerona, Spain, a famous
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 19
cabbalist, wrote that a Jew emigrating to Palestine forsakes God
who is only present in the diaspora, where a majority of Jews live,
and not in Palestine. In his book Ravitzky stressed that similar and
even more extreme views continued to be expressed until the
nineteenth century. The celebrated German rabbi, Yehonathan
Eibshutz, wrote in the mid-eighteenth century that massive
immigration of Jews to Palestine, even with the consent of all the
nations of the world, was prohibited before the coming of the
Messiah. In the early nineteenth century, Moses Mendelsohn and
other supporters of the Jewish Enlightenment, as well as their
opponents such as Rabbi Rafael Hirsch, the father of modern
orthodoxy in Germany, agreed and continued to derive this
prohibition from the three oaths. Hirsch wrote in 1837 that God
had commanded Jews "never to establish a state of their own by
their own efforts." Rabbis in Central Europe were even more
extreme. In 1837, the same year that Hirsch prohibited Jews from
declaring a Jewish state, an earthquake in northern Palestine killed
a majority of the inhabitants of Safad, of which many were Jews,
some of whom had recently immigrated. Rabbi Moshe Teitelbaum,
a leading Hungarian rabbi, attributed the earthquake to God's
displeasure with excessive Jewish emigration to Palestine.
Teitelbaum stated: "It is not God's will that we should go to the
land of Israel by our own efforts and will." Rabbi Moshe
Nachmanides, who died in 1270, was the one exceptional Jewish
leader who opined that Jews should not only emigrate to but should
also conquer the land of Israel. Other important rabbis of that time
and for many centuries thereafter ignored or strongly disagreed with
the view of Nachmanides.
In the 1970s, seven centuries after his death, Nachmanides
became the patron saint of the NRP and the Gush Emunim settlers.
NRP rabbis also have claimed that the three oaths do not apply in
messianic times and that, although the Messiah has not yet
appeared, a cosmic process called the beginning of redemption has
begun. During this period some of the previous religious laws
should allegedly be disregarded; others should be changed. Thus,
the dispute between the NRP and the Haredim has centered upon
the issue of whether Jews are living in normal times or in the period
of the beginning of redemption. Having made some political gains
and becoming more self-confident after the 1988 national election,
the Haredim strengthened their principled opposition to Zionism
and to the NRP. In 1989, the two most important Haredi rabbis,
Rabbi Shach and Rabbi Yoseph, held an anti-Zionist convention
in Bnei Brak, Israel. Their speeches, devoted to expressions of
principled opposition to Zionism and the beginning of redemption
doctrine, were published in the Haredi newspaper, YatedNe'eman,
on September 18, 1989. The two rabbis from an halachic
20 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
perspective also addressed the vital Israeli political issue of whether
some areas of the land of Israel should be given to non-Jews, that
is, to Palestinians. They refuted the NRP and Gush Emunim view
that in accordance with the beginning of redemption no land of
Israel should be given to non-Jews. Rabbi Yoseph and Shach
argued that Jews still live in normal times when visible help of God
cannot always be expected to save Jewish lives.
Rabbi Yoseph, renowned for his halachic erudition, presented
in-depth analysis and correctly noted that Rabbi Shach here agreed
fully with him. Rabbi Yoseph began by disagreeing with the NRP
and Gush Emunim rabbis who argued that the beginning of
redemption and God's commandment to conquer the land of
Israel were more important than the saving of Jewish lives that would
be lost in the war of conquest. Rabbi Yoseph acknowledged that
in messianic times Jews would be more powerful than non-Jews
and would then be obligated to conquer the land of Israel, to expel
all non-Jews and to destroy the idolatrous Christian churches.
Rabbi Yoseph, however, asserted that the messianic time of
redemption had not yet arrived. He wrote:
The Jews are not in fact more powerful than the non-Jews and
are unable to expel the non-Jews from the land of Israel because
the Jews fear the non-Jews ... God's commandment is then not
valid . . . Even non-Jews who are idolaters live among us with no
possibility of their being expelled or even moved. The Israeli
government is obligated by international law to guard the
Christian churches in the land of Israel, even though those
churches are definitely places of idolatry and cult practice. This
is so in spite of the fact that we are commanded by our [religious]
law to destroy all idolatry and its servants until we uproot it from
all parts of our land and any areas that we are able to conquer
... Surely, this fact continues to weaken the religious meaning
of the Israeli army's conquests [in 1967].
The quotation cited above illustrates well a part of Israel's realpolitik.
Before the 1996 election, both Peres and Netanyahu regarded
Rabbi Yoseph as an important political figure and often courted
him openly. This was done in spite of Yoseph's publicly declared
doctrine that Jews, when sufficiently powerful, have a religious
obligation to expel all non-Jews from the country and destroy all
Christian churches. Leftists and most peace advocates in Israel
lauded Yoseph and Shach for agreeing to withdrawal from the
occupied territories but neglected to mention and actually
suppressed the major thrust of the Yoseph and Shach position. For
the most part the Western media avoided reporting the most
essential points of the Yoseph speech. The reality here is that the
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM WITHIN JEWISH SOCIETY 21
Yoseph-Shach view constitutes one part of the hawkish heart of
Israeli politics.
In his speech Rabbi Yoseph also acknowledged the halachic
prohibition of selling real estate to non-Jews in the land of Israel,
but he limited this prohibition to a time when doing so would not
cause the loss of Jewish life. In the same manner he dealt with the
issue of whether Jews should trust only in the hope of God's help
or should take their own precautions against danger or war. Yoseph
contended that this issue is analogous to the question of whether
a Jew who is ill on Yom Kippur should be given food to save his
or her life. In the latter case, according to Rabbi Yoseph, the Jew
who is ill should be given food even if the medical experts disagree
with one another about the danger to life that would exist if the
fast were observed. Following this line of reasoning, Rabbi Yoseph
opined that, even if the military experts disagreed with one another
as to whether withdrawal from the territories would avert war, the
government should order withdrawal. Rabbi Yoseph, not influenced
by the trusting-in-God argument, pointed out that Jews had been
killed in previous wars and that the miraculous coming of the
Messiah establishing God's rule over the world would occur without
the loss of a single Jewish life. Rabbi Yoseph also noted that the
state of Israel is filled with Jewish sinners who provoke God. He
quoted numerous rabbinical authorities who agreed with him that
the three oaths were still valid.
Rabbi Yoseph's view did not interest Rabin, Peres or Netanyahu.
His dazzling display of erudition, occupying three large pages of small
print, moreover, did not convince a single NRP rabbi. Rabbis
Yoseph and Shach, who a bit later became enemies, continued to
oppose Zionism and the beginning of redemption doctrine; they
continued to advocate their variety of Jewish fundamentalism and
to command the allegiance in 1 996 of fourteen members of the 1 20-
member Knesset. Rabbi Shach, who is more extreme in his
opposition to Zionism than is Rabbi Yoseph, prohibited the Knesset
members of his political party, Yahadut Ha'Torah, from becoming
ministers in Netanyahu's Zionist government. Shach, however,
ordered his party's Knesset members to support the Netanyahu
government. Netanyahu rewarded Yahadut Ha'Torah by creatively
giving it control of the ministry of housing. Netanyahu made himself
the housing minister and signed almost blindly anything submitted
by Deputy Minister Ravitz of the Yahadut Ha'Torah Party. This
procedure was obviously employed to obviate the necessity of
Yahadut Ha'Torah's formally joining a Zionist government while
nevertheless enjoying its benefits. Contrary to Rabbi Shach, Rabbi
Yoseph ordered members of his party to become ministers in the
Netanyahu government. These facts illustrated the political
importance of Rabbis Yoseph's and Shach's views.
22 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Rabbi Yoseph's clearly expressed views on the territories not only
reflect the Haredi view but also clearly resemble a great part of the
actual foreign policy of the state of Israel. Rabbi Yoseph has argued
that Jews have a religious duty to expel all Christians from the state
of Israel only if doing so would not endanger Jewish life. Rabbi
Yoseph has postulated that any Jewish concessions to non-Jews in
the state of Israel has to be based solely upon the consideration of
whether denial thereof could prove harmful for Jews. Rabbi Yoseph
would almost certainly have favored a permanent occupation of all
the territories if he were convinced that this would not provoke Arabs
to harm Jews. Israeli governmental leaders with almost full support
of Israeli Jews believed after the June 1967 war that the Arabs were
incapable of harming Israel and therefore refused to make any
concessions. Only after suffering grievous losses in the October 1973
war, and fearing another war, did the government of the state of
Israel, again with almost the full support of Israeli Jews, agreed to
return the Sinai to Egypt. In 1983, even after the massacres at Sabra
and Shatila, the Israeli leaders contemplated permanent occupation
of one-third of Lebanon and domination of the remaining two-
thirds. Sharon concluded a peace treaty, based upon those terms,
with the then puppet Lebanese government. The guerilla warfare,
conducted by the Lebanese in 1984 and 1985, which resulted in
consistent Israeli casualties, caused the Israeli leaders to abandon
those plans and to retreat. Israeli foreign policy, although usually
conceived and conducted by secular Jews, has to date displayed
an essence derived in part from the Jewish religious past. Indeed,
the Zionist movement, which underwent a partial secularization,
also kept many basic Jewish religious principles. Rabbi Yoseph, Ben-
Gurion, Sharon and all major Israeli politicians share a common
ground in policy advocacy.
The Rise of the Haredim in Israel
Although expanding steadily from the early 1970s, Jewish religious
fundamentalism in Israel attracted relatively little interest in the
dominant secularly oriented Israeli society until 1988. Members
of the various Haredi sects, generally self-contained in residentially
segregated areas of Israeli cities, led lives absorbed by concerns and
preoccupations that appeared exotic at best to outsiders. Although
some members of these sects clashed sharply over specific issues
with the secular part of Israeli society and at those times acquired
a bit of public attention, they were mostly ignored. The sensational
Haredi political success in the Israeli parliamentary elections of
1988, predicted by none of the professional pollsters, surprised
many people. Because of their continued political successes in
succeeding elections through the 1990s, the Haredim put
themselves into a position at various times to be able to dictate to
the Israeli secular majority.
The Haredi political successes not only caused many Israeli
Jews to look more closely at and to be more concerned with the
Haredim but also sparked increased attention abroad, especially
in the United States. The interest generated in the United States
prompted the writing and publication of many new books and
articles in English that focused upon the folkloristic aspects of the
Haredim but unfortunately largely ignored their basic ideology
and world oudook. The following discussion will attempt to analyze,
particularly for those readers who are not literate in Hebrew, the
political importance of the Haredi upsurge. A crucial part of this
analysis is the acceptance of the well-documented proposition that
an understanding of the entire Israeli political right is to some
extent dependent upon an understanding of the basic elements of
Heredi politics, apart from the disagreements, splits and reunifi-
cation efforts of many Heredi individuals and sects. The two major
questions to be analyzed are:
• How have the Haredi parties secured their political influence?
• What organizational structure have the Haredi employed for
maximum political success?
Concern with education has provided the major answer to both
questions. The Haredi have on balance successfully educated their
23
24 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
own children and other Jewish children, over whom they have
obtained custody, in a manner guaranteeing maximum continuity.
The Haredi have influenced many Israeli Jews in addition to their
own by acquiring direct authority over several school networks and
by indirectly influencing numbers of other schools.
Throughout the twentieth century, the Haredim have attempted
to continue Jewish education as it had mostly existed in the diaspora
before the Enlightenment influenced Jewish society. The
governments in the countries in which the Haredim lived, however,
have at times insisted upon some modernized curricular content
that was inconsistent with and in opposition to what had previously
been taught in Jewish schools. This was the case in Israel until 1980.
Since 1 980, helped by generous Israeli governmental subsidies, the
Haredim have attempted with some success to reimpose the earlier
type of Jewish education and the earlier school networking system
in many poorer provincial Israeli towns and in slum areas of larger
Israeli cities. The Haredi goal has obviously been to perpetuate their
educational influence upon an increasing segment of younger-
generation Israelis.
Historically, Jewish schooling began with the heder for Jewish
male children aged three or four. (The heder, a word meaning
'room' in Hebrew, was the name of the traditional Jewish elementary
school as it existed from talmudic times in the earliest centuries of
the Common Era until the formation of the first modern nation-
states at which time many Jews strove to modify or abolish the
heder.) The heder was previously for males only. According to the
Talmud and the Halacha, females do not need education and are
explicitly forbidden from some forms of study. Until modern times,
most Jewish women received no formal education and were mostly
illiterate. This stood in striking contrast to Jewish males. Faced with
governments of modern nation states and with many Jews
themselves reacting against and abolishing the exclusion of females
from formal education, the Haredim established special institutions
to train, more precisely to indoctrinate, young Haredi girls to
accept and to agree to inferior education. Heder education consists
only of sacred, Jewish studies. Secular subjects, including arithmetic,
foreign languages, science, literature and Hebrew grammar are
excluded. Most of the Bible is included among subjects not taught.
After studying the Pentateuch with the help of a commentary by
Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki who died in 1099), the students
proceed directly to study of the easier parts of the Talmud. After
studying about eight years, the less capable students are sent to
various places to learn a craft, trade or some other occupation; the
more capable are admitted to an institution of higher learning
called a yeshiva. (Yeshiva in Hebrew means sitting or meeting.)
Usually, several levels of "yeshivot" (plural) exist. The weeding-
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 25
out process of students continues at each level. Those students who
are found to be less capable are directed to moneymaking pursuits
and somewhat later to involvement in religious services as minor
rabbis or as supervisors of religious kashrut rules in restaurants,
hospitals, the army and other institutions. The more capable
students proceed in their learning by going from one yeshiva level
to another. After graduating from the highest yeshiva and marrying,
the best of the students spend their lives in an institution called a
kollel (a term derived from the word meaning "entire") and spend
their time studying only talmudic literature. A few of the most
capable are later appointed to high rabbinic positions or become
heads of yeshivot or kollels.
As mentioned previously, traditional Jewish education, described
above, does not include any secular or humanistic studies. It is worth
re-emphasizing that this exclusion of secular subjects includes not
only mathematics, all sciences and foreign languages but also
Hebrew literature, which includes poetry dealing with religious
subjects, grammar and Jewish history. It is thus no surprise that
Hebrew religious poetry, even the medieval masterpieces, are
unknown to the Haredim. Only the sacred studies (a pre-modern
term in Judaism) are taught with the greatest possible intensity. The
sacred studies consist mostly of the Talmud and some subsequent
talmudic literature. At the highest yeshiva level, one out of twelve
to fourteen hours per day of sacred studies may be devoted to the
study of morality, which primarily consists of lurid descriptions of
the punishment, inflicted by God either in the life of this world or
in hell, for even the smallest deviations from religious
commandments. The teachings of the biblical prophets, the books
of Job and Ecclesiastes and numerous other parts of the Bible are
studied neither in the heders nor the yeshivot and are therefore
unknown to the Haredim. Except for the Pentateuch, Haredim
know only those parts of the Bible quoted in the Talmud and then
only within the context of talmudic interpretation. Haredim
generally lack knowledge of major parts of the Bible; this lack of
knowledge constitutes one source of the differences between the
Haredim and some other religious as well as most secular Israeli
Jews. Yeshiva students are often deprived of sleep. After reaching
the age of sixteen, Yeshiva students devote at least twelve to
fourteen hours per day to study. The classes are noisy, because the
students shout about what they are studying. Studying in silence
is considered to be a sin. Chaos is often the result in the classroom;
different students often shout about different passages of texts.
Students may ask questions about the internal matters of what is
being studied but never about the assumptions upon which inter-
pretations are made or about the external world. Students are
most often isolated from the outside world, especially from the
26 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
secular world. Students are prohibited from contact with
unbelievers. The teacher's authority is extensive and almost absolute.
The main teacher or the head of the yeshiva usually will select the
wives for students.
The type of education described above has shaped human
character. It also inevitably has produced dissenters. The first
Jewish dissenters from Judaism in modern times rebelled against
this type of education and became principled opponents of the
religion that from their perspectives tried to subject them to such
totalitarian controls. Other individuals, schooled in the Haredi
tradition, have ultimately yielded to temptations of modernity, such
as watching television and attending movies. This usually has
resulted in a weakening of commitment to Haredi Judaism but
seldom to its renunciation. In Israel such persons have been and
still are called "traditional" or "Mesorati." These people have
usually remained - and still are - outwardly uncritical of what they
learned; they have continued to worship the charismatic rabbis
without paying any price for renunciating the prohibition of
forbidden secular pleasures. Others who have strayed but have
not undergone self-emancipation have after a temporary break
returned to sacred studies to be again indoctrinated by their
education.
The Haredim emphasize the sanctity and predominant
importance of the sacred studies; they believe that the virtue
emanating from those engaged in sacred studies is responsible for
all good happenings for Jews. For that reason those who engage in
sacred studies are not required to make their own livings, are
granted numerous privileges and are exempted from communal
duties. All of this originated and became universal among Jews in
talmudic times. Living in autonomous communities, in which they
retained local rule, Jews could and did determine that individuals
engaged in sacred studies be exempted from paying taxes and
from most other obligations and burdens for which members of
the community were responsible. Additionally, the disciples of the
sages, those who reached a specified high degree of proficiency in
the sacred studies, were granted special privileges in many areas
of life over which the Jewish community had control. During
talmudic times (c. ad 200-500) in Iraq, for example, the disciples
of the sages, who also were merchants, were granted the privilege
of selling their merchandise before ordinary Jews were allowed to
do so in the markets of Jewish towns. That meant that these
disciples of the sages had no competition.
A burning issue in Jewish history, and in Israeli politics, is how
rabbis and rabbinical students earn their livelihoods. In Israel the
constantly increasing burden of support weighs heavily upon
taxpayers, most of whom are not religious. This has provoked and
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 27
continues to provoke resentment, especially when combined with
the fact that a majority of rabbinical students do not have to serve
in the army. Most Israeli religious Jews, especially the Haredim,
attempt to justify state support and freedom from army service by
arguing that the Jews and the Jewish state of Israel exist by virtue
of their support of talmudic study. Their support is supposedly
responsible in turn for God's support, which includes God's
allowing Israel to win its wars. This argument, similar to arguments
made by clergy of other religions and frequently emphasized in the
Israeli media, alleges that God's help not soldiers win wars. This
argument specifies that God provides other benefits as well. He,
for example, grants good weather because of rabbis and students
who spend most of their time studying Talmud. Engaging in such
study is the best way, better than reciting prayers, giving charity
or performing other good deeds, to gain entrance into paradise.
Those who engage in talmudic study make it possible for themselves,
their families, their financial supporters and, to some extent, other
Jews to enter paradise.
Direct financial support of rabbis and students of Talmud is,
nevertheless, a relatively new innovation in Judaism. During the
lengthy period of Talmud composition, approximately 50 bc to ad
500, and for centuries thereafter, rabbis and students received no
salaries or any other forms of financial support for talmudic study.
(Elementary teachers who taught Bible to small children were
paid.) Indeed, the Talmud itself prohibited payments for talmudic
study. Some talmudic sages were working-class people who had
well-known professions and earned their livelihoods from their
labors. The only form of financial reward that was allowed for a
talmudic sage was a recompense for not working. This can be
illustrated by a talmudic anecdote about one of the most important
sages, Abaye, who lived in Babylonia in the fourth century ad. Abaye
was a farmer and cultivated his farm by himself. If asked a question
by someone while working, he told the questioner: "Work on this
irrigation canal for me while I ponder your question." The last
important rabbi who fully supported such behavior was
Maimonides, who died in 1204. Maimonides' ruling in his Learning
Torah Laws (chapter 3, verse 10) is often quoted by secular, Jewish
Israelis:
Anyone supposing that he will engage in Torah [talmudic study]
and not engage in labor, thus taking his livelihood from charity,
should be considered a person who has extinguished the light of
religion, put Torah to shame, caused evil to himself and lost his
chance to enter paradise, since it is forbidden to make profit form
the sayings of Torah in this world. The sages said: "Everyone
who makes profit from the sayings of Torah loses his life." They
28 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
[the sages] have also ordered and said: "Do not make it [Torah]
either a crown in which to boast or an axe with which to work."
And they [the sages] have further ordered and said: "Love labor
and hate the rabbinate." All Torah not accompanied by labor
will be nullified, and the end of such a person [so engaged] will
be that he will rob the people.
Many Israeli secular Jews use this statement of Maimonides to
document their contention that all rabbis, especially rabbis in
Israel, are robbers.
Why for centuries have almost all religious Jews not paid attention
to the opinion of Maimonides, which is solidly based on many
talmudic passages? The answer is that religious Jews read any
sacred text, including the Talmud and the writings of Maimonides,
only with the help of the most sacred commentaries that become
the accepted religious opinions. Regarding the above-quoted
passage of Maimonides, the most important, subsequent
commentary is "Kesef Mishne" ("an addition of silver"), written
by Rabbi Joseph Karo, who died in 1575. Karo, the author of
ShulhanAruch which to date is the most authoritative compendium
of the Halacha, opposed the opinion of Maimonides on this issue.
Almost all subsequent rabbis accepted the opposing position of
Karo. In the beginning of his "Kesef Mishne," Karo mentioned
that Maimonides in his commentary on Mishne wrote at length
against salaries of rabbis and presented a sizeable list of talmudic
rabbis who were laborers receiving no salaries for talmudic studies.
Karo wrote:
He, let his memory be blessed [Maimonides], brought the
example of Hillel, who was a wood-cutter while a talmudic
student. This is not proof. We must assume that he [Hillel]
engaged in labor only at the beginning of his studies. In his
[Hillel's] time there were thousands of talmudic students;
perhaps, they gave financial support only to the most famous
among them . . . But how can we assume that when Hillel became
famous and was teaching the people they did not give him
financial support?
Religious Jews in Israel use this form of reasoning, which without
adequate proof attributes customs of current rabbis to the hallowed
past. Secular Israeli Jews often have satirized such reasoning by
telling a joke that is known to almost every Israeli Jew. This joke
is based upon the fact that, although no halachic reference exists
concerning an obligation of a male Jew to wear a head covering,
there is no other visible custom to which religious Jews are
universally so faithful. Indeed, the popular Hebrew saying for a
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 29
formerly religious male that became secular is "He took off his
skullcap." The joke centers upon a rabbi's being asked to provide
the proof for the obligation that male Jews must wear head coverings.
The rabbi in the joke answers: "The Bible says: 'And Abraham went'
[to a certain place] . Can you imagine that he went without a head
covering?" The joke's ridiculing of the usual mode of rabbinic
reasoning is obvious.
Karo argued that all famous sages, described in the Talmud itself
as laborers or craftsmen, must have been given financial support.
Karo concluded by arguing that priests in the temple were paid for
their work and that, therefore, rabbis, who are equivalent to priests,
should be paid. Talmudic students should be paid, Karo
maintained, because without students there would be no rabbis.
"Those in control of the usual expenditures [in Jewish congrega-
tions] should be compelled to pay the rabbis," he stated. "The
current custom is that all Jewish rabbis receive their salaries from
the [Jewish] public." This was the general custom in the sixteenth
century, except in some distant communities such as Yemen. The
salaries of rabbis continually increased as did the occasions on which
they took fees from their captive public. Evidence of rabbinic
corruption in Jewish communities since the latter part of the
seventeenth century is abundant. The rabbinate's alliance with rich
people in oppressing poor people, especially in Ashkenazi
communities, and the use of bribery and other undue influence in
the appointments of rabbis are but two of the many aspects of this
corruption. Corrupt practices of many Israeli rabbis, both Haredi
and NRP, have been well-documented by the Israeli Hebrew press
and are widely known in Israel. This corruption is a continuation
of a long-term trend.
The granting of special privileges for pursuing sacred studies exists
in modern Israeli society. One of the most controversial issues in
the State of Israel has been, and continues to be, the deferments
from military service for most students and graduates of yeshivot.
These students and graduates first receive a draft deferment on the
basis of declarations from heads of yeshivot. When their deferments
expire, the students or graduates are either entirely exempted from
army service or are inducted directly into the army reserve forces
after undergoing only brief and cursory recruit training. They are
disqualified from serving in any dangerous or even unpleasant
capacities. Their chances of being killed or wounded in wartime
are thus greatly reduced. Their deferments mean that these students
or graduates do not have to serve in the army for the period of three
years, which is compulsory for all other Israeli Jewish males who
are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. In his analysis
of this situation, Ehud Asheri reported in his August 22, 1996 article,
30 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
published in Haaretz, that at that time 5 per cent of all Jewish males
were so deferred.
The vehement passions aroused by and the debates over this issue
have antagonistically deepened the split between Israeli Jewish
secularists and the Haredim. Currently, many secular Jews
complain, as they and others have in the past, that the Haredim
do not share equally with other Israeli Jews the tasks and burdens
imposed upon society. The Haredim argue, as they continually have
in the past, that such reasoning is fallacious. Influenced by their
education, the Haredim are convinced that all victories as well as
defeats of the Israeli army are due to God's intervention and that
without doubt God takes into consideration the numbers, progress
in study and commitment of those Jews who engage in talmudic
study. The Haredim cite numerous passages in the Talmud and
in subsequent talmudic literature that are emphatic on this point.
Not only the privileged students and graduates of yeshivot but also
traditional Israeli Jews support the Haredim and the cited sacred
Jewish writings on this point.
The attitude of many secular Israeli Jews towards sacred studies
and the Talmud is the exact opposite of that held by the Haredim.
Secularly oriented parodies of the Talmud have remained popular
and still abound in Israeli society. Many of these parodies revolve
around the Haredi rationale underlying the deferment and exclusion
from military service. In December 1988, for example, during one
of the recurrent disputations about the deferment from service of
yeshiva students, the Haredim pointed to the talmudic version of
the biblical account of the victories of Yo'av, the general of King
David. The Haredim quoted the talmudic interpretation that these
victories were attributable to David's sacred studies, since in their
view Talmud in an oral form dated back to Moses and perhaps to
Abraham and was written later. Some secular writers responded
publicly that David rather remained at home and sent Yo'av to fight,
because he was occupied in committing adultery with Bathsheba
and causing the death of her husband, Uriah. One columnist in
the Israeli press, certainly not Haredi-oriented, opined that David
was probably more keen about studying Bathsheba's bodily
curvature than he was about studying the Talmud. Such debate
has had, and continues to have, a bearing upon Israel similar in
some ways to the effect upon politics that similar debate had in
Christian Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. What many
foreign observers of Israeli Jewish society have not grasped is that,
even with the scientific and technological accomplishments in
Israel, the Haredim and most other Israeli Jewish fundamentalists
live figuratively in a time period that corresponds closely to European
Christian societies many generations ago. These fundamentalists
have not made the quantum leap, as have secular Israelis, into
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 3 1
modern times. The tension between fundamentalist and secular
Israelis, therefore, stems mostiy from the fact that these two groups
live in different time periods.
Haredim often propound theories even more extreme than those
mentioned previously. Many Haredi rabbis, for example, assert that
the Holocaust, including most particularly the deaths of one-and-
a-half million Jewish children, was a well-deserved divine
punishment, not only for all the sins of modernity and faith
renunciation by many Jews, but also for the decline of Talmudic
study in Europe. The Haredim and their traditional Jewish followers
attribute the death of every Jew, including each innocent child, not
to natural causes but to direct action of God. The Haredim believe
that God punishes each Jew for his or her sins and sometimes
punishes the entire Jewish community, including many who are
innocent, because of the sins committed by other Jews. In 1985,
when twenty-two children, twelve and thirteen years of age, were
killed in the town of Petah Tikva in a traffic accident involving their
bus, Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, one of the heads of the Shas Party and
the then Minister of the Interior, stated in a television appearance
that the children were victims, because a movie house was allowed
to remain open on the Sabbath eve. Many members of the Hebrew
press, predominantly representing secular Jews, attacked Rabbi
Peretz mercilessly for making this statement. The Shas Party,
nevertheless, in the next election did not lose but rather gained votes
in various places, including Petah Tikva. The Haredim held and
advocate similar beliefs about God's punishing and rewarding Jews
in many areas of life on the basis of Jews' either committing sins
or following God's word.
In the late 1990s, the primary concern of the Haredim is to expand
their educational system, especially in poorer localities wherein they
successfully offer material inducements such as hot meals. The
Haredim strongly lobby the non-Haredi public schools with their
propaganda. In some places these lobbying efforts are successful.
In other areas the fierce opposition by parents who are educated
and politically effective thwarts the Haredi propaganda and lobbying
efforts. Haredi influence is sometimes extreme in specific places.
In Netivot, one of the most religious towns in Israel, for example,
the Haredim have successfully opposed any public high school,
because it would be obligated to provide instruction in secular
subjects. Netivot is the only Jewish town in Israel without a high
school.
In order to proselytize and to spread their superstitions, Haredim
often exploit the distress of people. Relatives of terminally ill
hospital patients, especially if they are traditional, are often
approached by messengers of a charismatic rabbi, who first reiterate
that the doctors cannot help and then suggest that the relatives buy
32 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
some sacred water, consecrated by a certain rabbi, and smear the
patient with it. The messengers relate stories about miracles that
occur after the use of this sacred water, which is never distributed
without a non-returnable payment. The messengers, of course, never
mention the failure of sacred water miracles. The secular Hebrew
press at times will report on the failure of these miracles, especially
when a large amount of money is known to have been spent for
the sacred water. Such reporting, however, most often only deepens
the chasm between those who read and those who do not read but
loathe the secular Hebrew press. In their own press the Haredim
not only attack the secular press but also display their general
hostility towards secular Israeli Jews. Until the later part of the 1 980s,
most of the Israeli Jewish public paid little attention to the Haredi
press. Since then, general public attention has increased
considerably. Dov Albaum, one of Israel's foremost experts on
Haredi affairs, focused upon this point in two Hebrew-language
articles, one published in the August 30, 1996 issue of the
newspaper, Yediot Ahronot, the other published in the July-August
issue of the bi-monthly periodical, Ha'ain HashviHt {The Seventh
Eye), which is published by the Israeli Democracy Institute and is
devoted to analyzing the Israeli press. Albaum discussed the
structure of the Haredi press in Yediot Ahronot and then proceeded
to a discussion in Ha'ain HashviHt of the Haredi attitude as a
whole towards secular Israeli Jews. According to Albaum, the
violent attacks in the Haredi press upon Aharon Barak, the president
of the Israeli Supreme Court, attracted increased public attention.
The Haredi press called Barak "the most dangerous enemy ever
to face the Haredi public." Albaum pointed out that the earlier
Haredi press attacks upon the left-wing kibbutzim, the Israeli army,
the secular media and many other secular institutions and figures
aroused little general interest. The attack upon the Supreme Court,
long regarded as the holiest symbol of Israeli secular democracy,
piqued the interest of many secular Jews. The violent Haredi press
attacks upon Yitzhak Rabin, while he was prime minister, did not
have the same effect. Shortly before Rabin's assassination an article
in one of the most popular Haredi weekly publications, Ha'Shavua
{The Week) predicted:
The day will come when the Jews will bring Rabin and Peres to
the defendant's bench in court with the only two alternatives being
the noose or the insane asylum. This insane and evil pair have
either gone mad or are obvious traitors. Rabin and Peres have
guaranteed their place in the Jewish memory as evil Jews of the
worst kind. They resemble the apostates or the Jews who served
the Nazis.
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 33
Reiterating that secular Jewish interest in Israel heightened after
the attack upon Barak and the Supreme Court, Albaum observed
that increasing numbers of secular Israelis are insulted when they
read in the Haredi press that their lives are garbage and their
children are hallucinating, lifeless drug addicts. Albaum explained:
Haredi journalists deliberately exaggerate all marginal phenomena
in secular society. They describe all murders, cases of alcoholism
and hard drug situations as characteristics of secular Jewish
society. In addition, they allege as facts incorrect statements,
engage in the wildest forms of slander and often use the most
derogatory terminology. Their aim is to condemn absolutely
the secular, Jewish lifestyle.
It is difficult to avoid considering such depiction as analogous to
the Nazi methodology.
The structure of the Haredi press is significant. Albaum
pinpointed as the main Haredi ideological trendsetter Yated Ne'ernan
{Faithful Tent-Peg)> the official newspaper of the Degel Ha'Torah
faction, headed and controlled by Rabbi Shach. Albaum explained
that Yated Ne'eman is strictly monitored by a committee of five
rabbis, all appointed by Rabbi Shach and headed by Rabbi Natan
Zohavsky. At least one of the committee's rabbis is in the
newspaper's office each evening except the Shabbat. Every word
of every article, advertisement and announcement must be approved
for publication by the rabbi(s) on duty. Certain words and
expressions, such as aids or television, are not allowed to be printed.
The term "Red Cross," supposedly associated with Christianity,
is especially prohibited from usage.
Yated Ne'eman articles often ferociously attack rival Haredi
factions. One example is that all advertisements about social events
of the Shas Party, which is despised by Rabbi Shach, are not
allowed to be printed. The importance of this prohibition was
highlighted when, after an apparent lull in the spiritual war between
Rabbi Shach and Shas, one of the newspaper's editors dared to
publish an advertisement announcing the bar-mitzvah of Aryeh
Der'i's son. (Aryeh Der'i is a Member of the Knesset and an
important Shas leader.) Upon learning of this, Rabbi Shach strongly
reprimanded Rabbi Zochovsky, the head of the overseeing
committee of rabbis.
Spiritual censorship committees exist and monitor everything
printed in other Haredi newspapers. Albaum asserted: "Freedom
of the press is an unknown concept in the Haredi press." Haredi
editors, according to Albaum, proclaim a different kind of freedom:
"the right of our public not to know certain things." The censoring
rabbis decide what the public should not know.
34 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
In reflecting the general Haredi attitude towards secular Jews,
Haredi press articles often present arguments reminiscent of anti-
Semitic statements about all Jews. Albaum pointed to a February
1996 article, for example, in which Israel Friedman reiterated the
position that the land of Israel belongs only to the Haredim and
that secular Jews and Palestinians should leave it. In addressing
secular Jews, Friedman in his article stated: "Go away from here
. . . We tell you this in a friendly manner. Go away. American crime
will easily absorb the criminal secular youth who are all enchanted
by alcohol, drugs and earrings. They are bloodsuckers who drink
our blood. They dare to live on land that belongs to us." In another
article Albaum quoted Nathan Ze'ev Grossman, the editor of
Yated Ne'eman, as attributing the rise of neo-Nazism in European
countries "to the influence of the Rabin government." Grossman
described all kibbutzim as Nazi institutions and proposed "to put
them on trial according to the precedent of the Nuremberg trials."
The Haredim demand that other Jews should, at least in public
and especially in regard to matters of symbolism, behave according
to their dictates. Haredi demands, often supported by traditional-
ist Jews, so frequently cause political scandals that they can be
described as a staple of Israeli politics. More Israeli government
crises have occurred because of religious scandals than for any other
reasons. To further their political interests, the Haredim insist
upon employing certain symbols. This insistence has played an
important role in Israeli politics. Many Israeli Jews, together with
a much greater number of diaspora Jews, in deference to what they
believe is Jewish tradition and the commandments of Judaism,
support Haredi demands to keep and display symbols of religious
observance. Such support has produced scandal. One particularly
illustrative scandal occurred in Autumn 1 992 and occupied Israeli
politics for many months. During the time of this scandal, the Haredi
Shas Party threatened to leave the Rabin government, not because
of Rabin's plans to deal with the Palestinians nor because of
possible concessions to the Syrians but rather because the then
Minister of Education Shulamit Aloni, on a visit to Nazareth was
photographed eating in a non-kosher, Arab restaurant and thus
violating the religious symbol of the ritual purity of food. Only six
months prior to the Aloni affair another scandal involving a Member
of the Knesset had occurred; MK Yael Rayan was photographed
on a Tel Aviv beach, dressed in a swimsuit and reading a book on
Yom Kippur. All the religious political parties then protested
furiously against what they termed this "profanation of Judaism."
After hearing traditionally religious Labor Party Knesset members
echo the same sentiments, Prime Minister Rabin, who was not tra-
ditionally religious, reinforced the accusation.
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 35
During her tenure as minister of education, Shulamit Aloni
made numerous statements that were viewed as being in opposition
to symbols in Judaism and thus blasphemous; these statements
resulted in scandals. One month before arousing scandal by eating
in an Arab restaurant, for example, Aloni publicly acknowledged
that the denial of the world's being created in six days was a tenable
hypothesis. She also publicly struck the controversial, although
hardly earth-shattering, position that the teaching of Judaism in the
state's secular schools should be slightly changed. (She was content
to leave as it is the teaching of Judaism in the state's religious
schools.) Aloni caused even more furore when she publicly slighted
some biblical figures. Ranny Talmor, a respected Israeli journalist,
rightly observed in her October 14, 1992 article in the newspaper,
Hadashot;
[Aloni] scarcely escaped Galileo's fate after he persisted in
maintaining that the earth moved around the sun. Some
supposedly enlightened, secular Jews whispered to one another:
"Of course she is right, but why does she need to say this in
public?" The Jewish Grand Inquisitors were delighted in their
realization that they had scored another victory against the weak-
minded infidels.
The Jewish Inquisitors harassed Aloni even more after Rabin forced
her to apologize publicly in an open letter to Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph,
the spiritual head of the Shas Party. Yoel Markus, a well-known
Israeli journalist, reflected widely held opinion when he observed
in his October 13, 1992 Haaretz article:
As is well known, each concession in such matters only encourages
the demand for more. This is why the abject surrender to Jewish
religious demands by members of the Labor and Meretz Parties
makes us wonder. Rabin has solemnly undertaken to check
closely an intelligence report, submitted to him by the National
Religious Party [NRP] , describing how Aloni violated the Sabbath
and ate non-kosher food in Israel and abroad. The Chairman of
the Labor Party faction in the Knesset [Elie Dayan] publicly
rebuked Aloni and Member of the Knesset Yael Dayan.
The NRP hired detectives to spy on ministers in order to discover
what transgressions of Jewish religious commandments they
committed. Such spying continued while the Rabin and Peres
governments were in power. Rabin and Peres, while prime
ministers, obtained all the findings of the detectives and continually
attempted to keep their ministers from transgressing any religious
laws in public.
36 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
In his Haaretz article, Yoel Markus articulated many fears,
shared by a sizeable segment of the Israeli Jewish public:
We can also expect demands that each minister and member of
the Knesset be accompanied by a kashrut inspector, who holds
a full-time job for this purpose and that similar inspectors be
appointed to insure that kashrut is observed in every
neighborhood and on every street in Israel. A demand may also
be made to establish vice squads, authorized to raid private
homes in order to ascertain whether kashrut is being observed
and whether, God forbid, a wife does not by chance have sex
with her husband in the period of impurity during and after the
time of menstruation [lasting eight to fourteen days.]
Other Israeli journalists expressed similar fears and went further
than did Markus in their published articles. Some attacked not only
the religious but also the secular Jews who remained silent about
the attacks upon them and their behavior and who would allow
continual efforts by religious surveyors to brainwash systematically.
Many Israeli Jews, whose opinions were represented by certain
journalists, saw the activities and actual victories by religious
factions as advancements towards a full-scale Jewish "Khomeinism"
in Israel.
The discussion of the Aloni scandal continued for weeks in the
Israeli press and became increasingly political. Nahum Barnea
wrote in his October 23, 1992 Yediot Ahronot article:
Rabin encouraged the torrents of anti-Aloni propaganda by
advancing the slogan "either Aloni or peace." What connection
can there be between Aloni's dietary preferences and peace ...
On four separate occasions Rabin summoned the leaders of
Meretz [Aloni 's party] to his office in order to convey to them
the complaints about Aloni made by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the
spiritual head of the Shas Party.
In his October 23, 1992 Davar article, Amir Oren censured Rabin
for being subservient to Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph and for equating the
rabbi's power to be equal to that of Stalin's in his time. Oren
opined that the Shas Party had begun to fulfil in Israel a role
analogous to that of the Shi'ites in Lebanon. In Oren's view Israel,
"far from being the only democracy in the Middle East was imitating
Lebanon and Iran, becoming in effect half a state of anarchy and
half a theocracy."
Amnon Abromovitz in his October 23, 1992 Maariv article put
a somewhat different spin on the Aloni scandal. He wrote: "The
vicious use of Aloni as a scapegoat by the religious Jews generated
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 37
public support for her. A repelling stench of religious zeal, funda-
mentalism and sexism is emanating from the harassment of Aloni."
Abromovitz blamed Rabin for encouraging this harassment, but
he added that despite all her talk and non-kosher eating, Aloni had
granted religious institutions, especially those of the Shas, more
money than had any previous Minister of Education. Abramovitz
concluded: "Aloni may talk blasphemously about God, but she has
been foremost in generosity to those who believe in Him."
The leaders of the Labor Party and their non-traditionalist
sympathizers answered the above expressions of fear, especially after
Oslo, by arguing that concessions to the demands of the Haredim
were necessary to ensure backing for the peace process. This stock
answer did not satisfy many secular Israelis. What Markus concluded
represented broad secular opinion:
The reason for Rabin's servility to Shas is supposed to be politics.
Labor experts in skullduggery assure us that the Shas Party may
leave the coalition if it finds it no longer able to withstand
pressure from the other Haredi circles . . . The conclusion is that
Labor must do its best to placate them . . . Politics is important,
but freedom of conscience and everyone's right to follow one's
creed are even more important. Jewish secularism is a creed. The
crude hypocrisy, with which the ministers fake religious devotions,
leads nowhere but only damages their government's integrity.
If Shas wants to leave Rabin's coalition, it will do so by order of
its rabbis. It will then not help if Rabin puts on an Haredi garb
and/or if Aloni shaves her head to cover it with a coif. [The
reference here is to a commandment of traditional Judaism that
a woman, before marrying, has to shave her head and cover it
with a coif. The Haredim attempt to enforce this rule strictly.
Many Jewish, religious women cut only some of their hair and
cover the remainder with wigs. Many secular, Jewish women are
enraged by this rule.]
By design, Haredi rabbis and politicians select secular women in
politics as the primary targets of their attacks, even though they
could pinpoint secular men as much, if not more, for transgres-
sions of religious law. The Haredim repeatedly refer to Jewish
women, engaged in politics, as witches, bitches or demons. Although
a bit crude at times in the use of descriptive language, the Haredim
approach mirrors to a great extent traditional Judaism's broadly
based position regarding women. This position not only restricts
the rights of women but in many ways holds women in contempt.
Rule 8 in Chapter 3 of the Kitzur Shulhan Aruch (Abridgment of
ShulhanAruch), an elementary textbook for Jews with little talmudic
education, for example, dictates: "A male should not walk between
38 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
two females or two dogs or two pigs. In the same manner the males
should not allow a woman, dog or pig to walk between them." All
Haredi boys between the ages of ten and twelve study and are
required to observe this rule. (Few dogs and no pigs can be found
in Haredi neighborhoods.) Traditional Judaism also prohibits
women from playing even insignificant roles in politics and/or in
any public activities in which they may appear to be leading males.
Women are forbidden to drive buses or taxis; they can drive private
cars only if no males apart from those in their own families or other
women are passengers. These and many rules are followed in
Haredi neighborhoods. In these neighborhoods women who are
"dressed immodestly" are often insulted and/or assaulted. Many
traditionally religious Jewish males in other than Haredi neigh-
borhoods, who do not observe inconvenient religious
commandments, take the lead of the Haredim in resenting and
opposing participation of women in politics. These traditionally
religious males regard such participation by women as a threat to
their domination of their own families.
The numerous misogynistic statements in the Talmud and in
talmudic literature constitute a part of every Haredi male's sacred
study. The statement in Tractate Shabat, page 152b, defining a
woman is exemplary: "A woman is a sack full of excrement." The
learned Talmudic Encyclopedia (volume 2, pages 255-7), written in
modern Hebrew and thus understandable to all educated Israeli
Jews, devotes a section to the "nature and behavior of women." In
this section the proposition appears that the urge for the sexual act
is greater among men than among women. The evidence presented
for this is that men tend to hire women prostitutes because their
urge for sex is greater than the urge of women. For that reason the
Halacha punishes a wife who refuses to have sexual relations with
her husband much more severely than it punishes a husband who
refuses to have sexual relations with his wife. For the same reason
a prospective husband is obliged to see his wife-to-be before
marrying her but a prospective wife is not obligated to see her
husband-to-be before marriage. After seeing his prospective bride,
moreover, the prospective husband can send a messenger and
conduct the marriage through the messenger. Jewish folklore
contains stories describing the utilization of this procedure.
The halachic prohibition of teaching talmudic literature and/or
the Bible to women has been in the past and is currently still of
great importance. Studying "Torah Sheba'al Pen" (the oral law)
is for the Halacha a supremely important commandment. It is
equivalent in importance to all the other commandments put
together. (The law, according to belief, was given by God orally
to Moses and was handed down orally for many centuries before
being written.) This obligation, termed "Talmud Torah" or
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 39
"learning the Torah" is viewed as independent of time. Every
pious male Jew is obligated to devote a portion of all days and nights,
including holidays and working days, to this study. A basic talmudic
rule frees women from positive obligations that are dependent on
special times and obliges women only with positive obligations that
are independent of time. Women, for example, are obliged to keep
the Sabbath and the holidays that last more than twenty-four hours
and are thus considered to be independent of time. Women, on
the other hand, are not obliged to hear the shofar (ram's horn) blown
on the New Year, which only takes a short time and is thus
considered to be dependent on time. (There are a few exceptions
to this rule.) A woman is permitted to fulfill what she is not obliged
to do; hence she can choose to hear the ram's horn blown on the
New Year. This rule underlines the women's religious inferiority
to men, since another talmudic dictate is that a person who fulfills
a commandment because he is obliged to do so is greater and
receives a greater reward from God than a person who fulfills a
commandment he is not obliged to fulfill. A Jewish woman that
comes to the synagogue on the New Year and hears the ram's horn
being blown, according to traditional Judaism, will receive a smaller
reward from God than a male who does the same, because she is
not obliged to hear whereas he is so obliged. Tractate Kiddushin (page
34a) of the Talmud, however, ruled that women are not obliged
to fulfill "Talmud Torah," even though it is an obligation
independent of time. This ruling is part of Halacha. The rule was
later amended to mean that women should learn only the special
obligations that they must keep to the extent that they know what
to do and what to avoid. The issue, therefore, arose: What parts
of sacred studies are women permitted to learn or to be taught?
The talmudic answer to this question, based upon many quotations,
was given by Maimonides. In his work, Talmud Torah Laws
(chapter 1, rule 13), Maimonides wrote:
A woman who has studied Torah receives a reward [from God],
but it is an inferior one when compared to man's reward. This
is because she is not obligated [to do so], and everyone who does
what he is not obliged to do gets an inferior reward compared
to [the reward given to] one who does what he is commanded
to do. The woman nevertheless receives some reward. The sages
commanded a father not to teach his daughter Torah, because
most woman never intend to learn anything and will, because
of the weak understanding, convert the pronouncements of
Torah into nonsense. The sages said: "Everyone who teaches his
daughter Torah can be compared to one who teaches her insipid
matters." This rule, however, applies only to talmudic studies.
40 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Although a woman should not be taught the Bible, she, if taught,
would not have been taught insipid matters.
A somewhat shortened version of this is given in the authoritative
compendium of the Halacha, Shulhan Aruch (Yorah Dean, rule 246,
paragraph 6). In modern times the Haredim have attempted to
modify those rules to some extent. They have taught and still do
teach girls the easier parts of the Talmud, in which arguments
between the rabbis, that are considered to be dangerous for the
"weak female mind", do not occur. Similarly, the Haredim have
taught and do teach girls the Pentateuch but reserve the highest
level and most serious commentaries for the boys. The Haredim
maintain in their schools a strict separation of girls from boys and
do not allow the girls to observe boys playing in the schoolyard.
Many Israeli Jews, who in their youth received thorough talmudic
educations, have later in their lives reacted antagonistically against
Orthodox Judaism's depiction and treatment of women. Some of
these Jews in reaction have written articles that are often published
in the Israeli Hebrew press but are almost never translated into
English. Kadid Leper, for example, a well-known Israeli journalist
who as a youth studied in a yeshiva for years before becoming a
secularist, wrote in his April 18, 1997 Hai'r article under the title
"Woman is a sack full of excrement," the following:
Beatings, sexual brutality, cruelty, deprival of rights, use of a
woman as merely a sexual object; you can find all of this there
[in the Talmud] . . . For two thousand years women had a well-
defined place in the Jewish religion [Orthodox Judaism]; this place
is different from what the rabbinical establishment describes;
according to the Halacha, the place of women is in the garbage
heap together with cattle and slaves. According to the Jewish
religion [Orthodox Judaism] a man buys for himself a slave
woman for her entire life simply by providing food and dress and
granting to his wife the sexual act.
This kind of published article, together with the many published
reports of rabbinical harassment of women, have not only firmed
polarization in Israeli Jewish society but have contributed signifi-
cantly to the growing secular enmity towards Haredim.
In many areas of Israeli Jewish society, the Haredim continue
to maintain their separateness and at the same time assert that other
Jews accept Haredi dicta. This is well illustrated by an example from
the area of medicine. In his December 25, 1995 Yediot Ahronot
article, Dov Albaum discussed the request submitted two weeks
previously by the Haredim to the Israeli Ministry of Health:
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 41
Rabbi Yehoshua Sheinberger, the head of the Medicine by Law
Organization, requested what seemed to be an innocent request
that, as a concession to the religious Jews, personal blood
donations be permitted. Previously, a person who donated a unit
of blood for a patient undergoing surgery received a document
entitling the recipient of the donation to one unit of blood from
the general reserves of the Blood Bank. This new request, if
accepted, would create a situation in which blood donors would
be able to demand that hospitals or first aid stations give their
blood donations only to specific recipients.
Rabbi Sheinberger, supported by two other important rabbis,
argued that Haredim usually refuse to donate blood but might
change their attitude if this demand were accepted. Albaum in his
article discussed the additional motivation behind this request:
Beneath the surface there is a completely different problem that
led to the rabbis' approaching the [Israeli] Ministry of Health.
Haredi religious law authorities have in recent years dealt with
the following issue: "Is it permissible for a pious Jew to receive
a blood transfusion from non-Jews or from Jews who do not
observe Jewish religious laws?" Haredi rabbis fear that, receiving
"tainted," secular blood, or non-Jewish blood might cause a
pious Jew to behave badly and even, heaven forbid, harm his
observance of the Jewish religious laws.
Several months before the above-mentioned request, Rabbi Ovadia
Yoseph addressed this problem at length in his new book, Questions
and Answers - Statements: "Blood that comes from forbidden [that
is, non-kosher] foods may cause a negative effect upon its Jewish
recipients. It may produce bad qualities, such as cruelty and/or
boldness ... Therefore, a pious Jew, who does urgently need a
transfusion and who faces no danger in waiting to receive blood
from a strictly religious Jew, should wait." Rabbi Yoseph offered
similar advice for those pious Jews needing organ transplants; he
advised them only to accept such donations from other pious Jews.
This dictate erupted into a serious dispute among rabbis in Israel
and astonished many secular Jews. In another published article,
Albaum reported that Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, a former chief rabbi
of Israel, disagreed with Rabbi Yoseph and stated: "When a secular
Jew is born, he is born with kosher blood and all the forbidden foods
that he later eats are dissolved and made marginal in his blood."
In regard to non-Jews, however, Rabbi Eliyahu mostly agreed with
Rabbi Yoseph and held that religious Jews should attempt to avoid
blood donations from them. Rabbi Eliyahu did not totally forbid
blood donations for Jews from non-Jews. He stated:
42 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
It is permitted at certain times that Jews receive blood, or in the
case of sucklings mother's milk, from non-Jews, in spite of the
fact that such blood is detrimental to their Jewish characteris-
tics and spirit. This is because blood is transferred slowly and is
made marginal in the cycling of Jewish blood in the body.
Nevertheless, when possible, a Jew should avoid receiving such
blood.
Rabbi Sheinberger finally admitted that such rulings constituted
the primary reason for his request: "The Haredi community has a
problem in this area. For the Haredim blood from a Jew who eats
only kosher food is preferable to blood from a Jew who does not
observe dietary laws." Other Haredi rabbis agreed. Rabbi Levy
Yitzhak Halperin, the head of the Scientific Religious Institute for
Jewish Law Problems explained: "Blood donations from non-Jews
or from Jews who eat forbidden foods are a problem. Jewish
religious law holds that a Jewish child should preferably not be breast
fed by a non-Jewish woman because her milk consists of forbidden
food and contaminates the Jewish child." Such positions and
statements antagonized secular Jews and met great opposition
from the great majority of members of the Israeli medical profession.
In 1994 Rabbi Sheinberger ignited another controversy and
created scandal with a similar request. He met with senior physicians
from the Israel Transplants Association and discussed with them
the Jewish religious prohibition on organ donations. In Israel
Haredi Jews refuse organ transplants from their and/or their relatives'
corpses. On this issue the Haredi position influences many people
for superstitious as well as religious reasons. Organ transplants in
Israel are thus difficult to arrange. Surgeons frequently request
Haredi rabbis to appeal to their followers to agree to organ
transplants from corpses of their relatives in order to save lives. The
surgeons' argument is based upon the Jewish religious law giving
priority to saving Jewish lives. In his discussion Rabbi Sheinberger
put the condition that only a Haredi rabbi could authorize such
transplants. He explained: "Jewish religious law states that it is
forbidden to transplant Jewish organs into either non-Jews or Jews
who are not pious. It is obvious that it is prohibited under any cir-
cumstances to transplant Jewish organs into Arabs, all of whom
hate Jews." Rabbi Sheinberger, when asked for his definition of a
Jew who is not pious, replied that a rabbi must determine the
status of every Jew. Sheinberger's request caused a huge commotion
and was rejected.
Many non-Haredi rabbis allow an organ of a non-Jew to be
transplanted into a body of a Jew in order to save the life of the
Jew. They, however, oppose the transplant of an organ from a Jew
into the body of a non-Jew. Some important rabbis go much further
THE RISE OF THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL 43
in discussing and ruling about differences between Jews and non-
Jews on medical matters. Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburgh, an influential
member of the Habad movement and the head of a yeshiva near
Nablus, for instance, opined in an April 26, 1996 Jewish Week article,
reproduced in Haaretz that same day: "If every single cell in a Jewish
body entails divinity, and is thus part of God, then every strand of
DNA is a part of God. Therefore, something is special about
Jewish DNA." Rabbi Ginsburgh drew two conclusions from this
statement: "If a Jew needs a liver, can he take the liver of an
innocent non-Jew to save him? The Torah would probably permit
that. Jewish life has an infinite value. There is something more holy
and unique about Jewish life than about non-Jewish life." It is
noteworthy that Rabbi Ginsburgh is one of the authors of a book
lauding Baruch Goldstein, the Patriarchs' Cave murderer. In that
book Ginsburgh contributed a chapter in which he wrote that a
Jew's killing non-Jews does not constitute murder according to the
Jewish religion and that killing of innocent Arabs for reasons of
revenge is a Jewish virtue. No influential Israeli rabbi has publicly
opposed Ginsburgh's statements; most Israeli politicians have
remained silent; some Israeli politicians have openly supported him.
The Haredi demand to establish the Halacha as the law of the
state of Israel has in recent years received increased support from
the more pious members of the NRP. Briefly summarized, the
specifics of this demand are:
• God's political authority must be formally and juridically
recognized. Ordained rabbis, God's certified agents, must be
the decision makers.
• Rabbis must oversee all social institutions, adjudicate all
issues that arise, make final judgements about all social
services and censor all printed, pictorial and sound matter.
• Sabbath, other religious laws, physical separation of women
from men in public places and "modesty" in female conduct
and dress must be enforced by law.
• Individuals must be obligated legally to report all noticed
offenses of others to rabbinical authorities.
The theocratic, totalitarian nature of the Haredi demand for the
Halacha to be the binding law of the State of Israel is obvious.
The Two Main Haredi Groups
A brief consideration of the historical background should provide
a basis for understanding the differences between the two major
Haredi groups: the Ashkenazi and the Oriental, formerly called
Sephardi. Throughout most of their history, Jews lived scattered
in different countries. Not surprisingly, separate Jewish communities
emerged, comprised of Jewish residents of a single country, of a
cluster of countries or sometimes of different parts of a single
country. Until about AD 1050 one particular community existed
as a Jewish center, recognized by other communities as the authority
for dictating rules and issuing instructions binding upon Jews
throughout the world. The last such center was the Jewish
community of Iraq. After the collapse of the last center in Iraq, the
differences between Jewish communities deepened considerably.
Different communities, for example, although keeping and using
some of the ancient prayers common to all Jews, composed new
prayers, used only in their own services. Even the chanting of
prayers in different communities changed and thus varied. Religious
rules of conduct in almost every conceivable area of life, to which
pious Jews adhered, also changed to some extent and varied from
one community to another.
The Ashkenazi community that emerged in northern France and
western Germany between the tenth and twelfth centuries became
more innovative and began to deviate more from previously
established patterns than any other community with the possible
exceptions of small communities in remote countries, such as
Georgia. The Ashkenazi divergences became embedded and
persisted. Until this day, for example, most pious Ashkenazi Jews
refuse to eat meat or any foods containing meat that are prepared
under supervision of non-Ashkenazi rabbis; pious members of
other Jewish communities are content with dietary supervision of
rabbis not belonging to their community. Thus, a pious Sephardi
Jew, visiting a pious Ashkenazi Jew will eat food prepared by the
latter, but a pious Ashkenazi Jew visiting a Sephardi Jew will refuse
to eat any foods containing meat or often any food whatsoever.
Ashkenazi exclusiveness is evident in many other aspects of their
religious conduct. Sephardi Jews, on the other hand, developed as
early as the twelfth century an exclusiveness of their own, based
44
THE TWO MAIN HAREDI GROUPS 45
upon the consideration that they were superior in some ways to
other Jews. The Spanish and Portuguese Jews, a part of Sephardi
Jewry, especially developed a pride in the supposed "purity of
descent." (In Hebrew Sephardi means Spanish.) Most of them not
only refused to marry but also often despised being together with
Ashkenazi Jews. Moses Maimonides, who lived until 1204 and was
both a rabbi and the greatest medieval Jewish philosopher, moralized
in a testament addressed to his son:
Guard your soul by not looking into books composed by
Ashkenazi rabbis, who believe in the blessed Lord only when they
eat beef seasoned with vinegar and garlic. They believe that the
vapor of vinegar and the smoke of garlic will ascend to their
nostrils and thus make them understand that the blessed Lord
is near to them . . . You, my son, should stay only in the pleasant
company of our Sephardi brothers, who are called the men of
Andalusia [or southern Spain, then ruled by the Muslims]
because only they have brains and are clever.
Similar statements, in which members of a Jewish community
express feelings of their superiority over other Jews, abound in Jewish
literature and are common. Even as late as the 1960s older Sephardi
rabbis and other Jewish men in Jerusalem, when signing their
names, would invariably add the Hebrew initials meaning "pure
Spanish." Ashkenazi exclusiveness, as it developed and deepened
over centuries, however, became more all-encompassing and
extreme than Sephardi exclusiveness.
The developing exclusiveness had geographical, social and
political causes. Prior to the formation of the Ashkenazi community,
almost all Jews lived in the Mediterranean basin or in countries,
such as Iraq, connected with the basin by trade routes. In the
tenth century most Mediterranean countries were under either
Muslim or Byzantine rule. The communications between this
region and the emerging feudal Europe were tenuous largely
because of the language barriers: Greek and Arabic, spoken on the
one side, were largely unknown in Western Christian areas, while
Latin was largely unknown in the Orient. Jews, who almost always
spoke the language(s) of the people among whom they lived,
encountered the same communication obstacle as did other people.
The Ashkenazi community, therefore, framed its own life style
without knowledge about or guidance from the older, Jewish
communities. The Ashkenazi Jewish life style developed within the
context of the emerging feudalism in Europe, which differed in many
crucial respects from other regimes in other areas in that time
period. In spreading eastward into the emerging states in central
46 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
and eastern Europe, the Ashkenazi community solidified its
cohesiveness and its identity: these have persisted to date but in
more pronounced forms among religious rather than secular
Ashkenazi Jews.
Expelled from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1498, Sephardi
Jews not only settled in but also transformed other Jewish
communities. In these communities the new Sephardi immigrants
tended to maintain an exclusiveness and to remain aloof from
other Jews. Having come from the relatively developed society of
the Spain of the Renaissance and having settled in less developed
countries, they soon became the wealthiest, best educated and
most politically connected Jews in Mediterranean countries. The
Sephardi Jews that settled in Saloniki (now in Greece but then part
of the Ottoman Empire) received privileges from the Ottoman
Sultan, because they manufactured the best cloth and provided
textiles for the uniforms worn by members of elite units of the
Ottoman army. The Saloniki Sephardi Jews kept this monopoly for
1 30 years, losing it only when more modern textiles were imported
from England and the Netherlands. Spanish Jews mostly and
Italian Jews to a lesser extent actually did most of the creative work
in all areas of medieval Jewish culture. Largely because of their
wealth and education, Sephardi Jews imposed their customs,
language and name upon Jewish communities in all the countries
to which they emigrated. One good illustration of this occurred in
Jewish communities in the Balkans and what is now Turkey. The
Jews in these communities called themselves "Romaniole," taken
from the popular name of the Byzantine Empire "Romania." They
spoke Greek until about 1550 at which time, influenced by the
effects of the Sephardi immigration, began to call themselves
"Sephardi" and to speak Ladino, an ancient form of Spanish. The
fact is that no Sephardi communities existed other than those
made up of the immigrants from the Iberian Peninsula, their
descendents or those who assimilated themselves into Sephardi
communities. European travelers and some Ashkenazi Jews have
referred, and still refer, mistakenly to all non-Ashkenazi Jews as
Sephardi. This is because the real Sephardi Jews established a
lasting hegemony over other Jewish communities. Many other
than Sephardi, non-Ashkenazi members of Jewish communities have
more correctly defined themselves not only as Jews but also as Iraqis,
Moroccans, Italians or another nationality.
Until the end of the seventeenth century, Ashkenazi Jews
constituted a small minority of world Jewry. Their cultural
advancement trailed far behind other Jewish communities, especially
the Sephardi and Italian. Since the eighteenth century, the
populations of Mediterranean countries, especially those in the
Ottoman Empire, steadily declined economically and demo-
THE TWO MAIN HAREDI GROUPS 47
graphically. This trend greatly affected Jewish communities of
those countries. Between 1700 and 1850, Jewish populations in
these countries steeply declined and became increasingly
impoverished. The modest increase in Jewish population between
1850 and 1914 did not to a significant extent offset the decline.
From the beginning of the eighteenth century the political and tech-
nological advancements in Europe affected the Ashkenazi
community. From the mid-eighteenth century the Ashkenazi
population began to increase rapidly; by 1 800 Ashkenazi Jews had
become the majority of world Jewry; this increase and the majority
percentage accelerated in the nineteenth century. Jews living in the
European part of the Russian Empire, nearly all of them Ashkenazi,
proliferated sevenfold between 1795 and 1914. Ashkenazi Jews
developed a variety of innovations in Judaism, some of them
secularist. By the first half of the twentieth century, Ashkenazi Jews
had surpassed the relatively small, non-Ashkenazi minority in every
major respect, including Talmudic studies. The current split
between religious Ashkenazi Jews and non-Ashkenazi Jews stems
from the fact that during the past two centuries, in contrast to what
had previously been the case, almost all rabbis of distinction have
been Ashkenazi. In non-Ashkenazi communities during this time
period the quality of talmudic study, of books published and even
of older books being reprinted has disastrously declined.
Until 1948, Zionism and the emigration of Jews to Palestine were
predominantly Ashkenazi inventions. Most religious Jews viewed
Zionism as being in opposition to Judaism; hence, only Jews
emancipated from their religious past could become Zionists. Even
so, few Ashkenazi Jews immigrated to Palestine because of Zionist
convictions. The great majority of those who immigrated did so
only because their lives were so difficult in their own countries of
origin. The great majority of Jews in Israel in 1 948 were those who
had immigrated to Palestine after the increase in anti-Semitism in
Europe after 1932 and especially after Hitler came to power in
Germany. The number of non-Ashkenazi Jews in Israel at the time
of the state's creation was relatively small. For most Jews in non-
Ashkenazi communities, the religious influence, especially the
messianic strain, was in the 1950s and early 1960s still potent. Living
standards in Israel in the 1950s, although below those throughout
Europe, were superior to those in most of the Arab Middle East.
The Israeli government, therefore, could easily persuade Jews from
many countries, for example, Morocco, Yemen and Bulgaria, to
immigrate to Israel. The Israeli government induced Jewish
immigration from Iraq by bribing the government of Iraq to strip
most Iraqi Jews of their citizenship and to confiscate their property.
By contrast, few Jews immigrated to Israel from the more advanced
countries of the eastern Mediterranean, such as Greece or Egypt.
48 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
The majority of the Israeli Jewish population shifted to the non-
Ashkenazi. During the period from 1949 to 1965, Ashkenazi Jews
in Israel declined to a minority that stabilized at about 40 per cent
of Israel's population. The substantial immigration of Jews from
the former Soviet Union thereafter increased the Ashkenazi
population to about 55 per cent. By virtue of their having come
from more advanced countries, the bulk of Ashkenazi Jews were
relatively modern in outlook and secular.
The non-Ashkenazi Jews, increasingly referred to as "Orientals"
instead of "Sephardis," remained predominantly religious. Upon
their arrival in Israel many Oriental Jews and their children were
put through a cultural socialization directed by veteran Ashkenazi
residents and advocated by members of the Zionist Labor Party
then in power. This socialization included a considerable amount
of coercive modernization and attempts to secularize the young.
The results of this coercion were mixed during most of the first
two decades of Israel's existence. The majority of Oriental Jews
remained traditionalists, meaning that these people ignored the more
exacting commandments of Judaism, such as the ban of Sabbath
travel, but followed other commandments, especially those dealing
with synagogue attendance. Even more importantly, it meant that
they retained belief in the magical powers of rabbis and "holy
men." To date, only a few Oriental politicians dare criticize a rabbi
in public, even when the rabbi strongly opposes or curses them.
Ashkenazi Jews of all political views in contrast criticize rabbis
freely. Most Ashkenazi politicians despise any kowtowing to rabbis.
Almost all Oriental politicians, including the Black Panthers of the
early 1970s and the members of tiny Oriental peace movements,
commonly bow to and kiss the hands of rabbis in public.
The Ashkenazi religious minority, particularly its Haredi
segment, has resisted secularization of Oriental Jews. They have
succeeded to some extent, most particularly in persuading a
minority to retain the strict observance of Judaism's
commandments. They have established separate religious schools
and yeshivot for the Orientals and have admitted, although in
strictly controlled numbers, some of the most qualified Oriental
youngsters to their own schools and yeshivas. After the passage
of time, an Oriental Haredi elite group of rabbis and talmudic
scholars emerged in Israel. Almost without exception, Ashkenazi
Haredi rabbis trained members of this elite group.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the confrontation between the
unbending Haredi version of Ashkenazi exclusiveness and Oriental
traditionalism, which previously was potentially explosive, erupted.
The Ashkenazi Haredi movement insisted upon completely freezing
the situation that existed in central and eastern Europe around 1860.
The Oriental Jews, trained by Ashkenazi Haredi Jews, were forced
THE TWO MAIN HAREDI GROUPS 49
to discard their traditional garb, wear the black Ashkenazi clothing
and learn and speak Yiddish. Yiddish was the language of oral
instruction in the Haredi yeshivot; Hebrew was reserved for writing.
The Oriental traditionalists were also forced to adopt the Ashkenazi
manner of praying, which differed in numerous ways from their
former method. Revered rabbis, who commanded authority and
encountered almost no opposition, imposed those radical changes.
By contrast, the various attempts by the Labor movement to impose
modernizing constraints upon the Orientals in the 1950s sparked
furious opposition among the Oriental masses, who would often
criticize politicians but hardly ever criticize rabbis.
The Oriental students in Ashkenazi Haredi yeshivot, after years
of docile submission to demands and after being ordained as rabbis,
were not granted status equal to that of their fellow students and
rabbis. They have continued to accept and even today seem to be
content with their inferior treatment. An excellent illustration of
this is the inequality in intermarriage with their Ashkenazi peers.
All Jewish communities share the time-honored custom that the
head of the yeshiva arranges all marriages of yeshiva students. He
carefully picks the daughters of rich and pious Jews as wives for
students. The better students are matched with the daughters of
the wealthiest parents. (The head of the yeshiva also matches
daughters of rabbis with sons of the wealthiest parents.) Yeshiva
students have selflessly complied with this matchmaking; resisting
has been - and still is - considered to be a grave sin. This practice
was instituted so that yeshiva students, who had no marketable skills,
and their families would be supported. Students could continue
their sacred studies, and the entire supporting family would
supposedly then be able to enter paradise. More recently, yeshiva
heads, when unable to find wealthy, prospective fathers-in-law for
students, find prospective wives that are previously trained in
skilled professions suitable for Haredi women and are willing to
support husbands engaged in "sacred studies." (Such support will
supposedly bring the wives to paradise.) By being matchmakers,
yeshiva heads have most often been able to control the livelihoods
and thus the lives of yeshiva students and their families.
Ashkenazi Haredi Jews have never formally prohibited marriages
with pious Jews from other communities. Such marriages,
nevertheless, often have been - and still are - considered disgraces.
Because of this, the heads of Ashkenazi Haredi yeshivot adopted
the custom, still followed, of matching Oriental students, however
distinguished in their studies, with either physically handicapped
Ashkenazi brides or ones from poor families.
Not surprisingly, an unwritten rule developed whereby Oriental
students, however distinguished, would not be appointed to any
responsible teaching positions even in lower-rank yeshivot, attended
50 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
solely by Oriental students. These teaching jobs were reserved for
Ashkenazi rabbis, the underlying assumption being that Oriental
Jews were not yet sufficiently mature to hold responsible religious
positions. When Rabbi Shach, one of the foremost Haredi leaders,
explicitly reiterated this assumption shortly before the 1992
elections, he was denounced as being racist by many Ashkenazi
secular Jews; neither Oriental rabbis nor Oriental political activists
uttered one word of public criticism.
No Oriental initiative was responsible for the creation of the
Haredi political party, Shas. Rabbi Shach formed Shas before the
1988 elections, because he, in his rivalry with other prominent
Ashkenazi Haredi rabbis, needed to have Knesset members that
would be subservient only to him. He, therefore, ordered those
rabbis that were his students and retained personal allegiance to
him to form two new, separate, Haredi political parties: Degel
Ha'Tora (Banner of the Law) would be purely Ashkenazi; Shas (an
acronym for Sephardi List for Tradition) would be purely Oriental.
After the formation of both parties, the party leaders publicly
regarded Rabbi Shach as their highest spiritual authority and vowed
to obey him unconditionally. In order to make Shas also attractive
to non-Haredi Orientals, Shach handpicked a non-Haredi Oriental
rabbi upon whom he could rely - Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, the former
chief rabbi of Israel - to act as the nominal party head. Shach, of
course, retained authority. For Shach, Yoseph's greatest virtue
was that, after failing to win re-election as chief rabbi due to the
NRP's refusal to exert influence on his behalf, Yoseph hated the
NRP as fiercely as did Shach himself. As is well known in Israel,
hatred between secular Jews cannot match in intensity the mutual
hatred between diverse groups of religious Jews, especially in the
quarrels between rabbis representing those diverse groups. Shach
had good reason to expect that, because of his wish to retaliate
against NRP rabbis, Yoseph would remain loyal to him and be
content with his subordinate role.
For a while everything worked as Shach had planned. The two
parties, controlled by Shach, obtained eight Knesset seats altogether
in the 1988 elections; Degal Ha'Tora had two seats; Shas, six
seats. The Haredi party, Agudat Israel, against which Shach formed
his parties, obtained only five seats. Degel Ha'Tora and Shas
preferred a Likud government and after the 1988 elections
supported Yitzhak Shamir as the prime minister. Their support may
have been decisive. After 1990 Shamir would not have had a
Knesset majority without their support. The self-demeaning
attempts by the Labor Party leader, Shimon Peres, to reverse this
situation failed. Peres spent months attending lessons of Talmud,
given in his home by Rabbi Yoseph. Peres attempted unsuccess-
fully to be received by Rabbi Shach; Shach received many petty
THE TWO MAIN HAREDI GROUPS 51
secular politicians but not Peres. Peres made repeated, public pro-
nouncements about how deeply he respected Judaism in general
and the Haredi rabbis in particular. Everything Peres attempted
was in vain. Shach and his rival Haredi rabbis did not bend in their
support for Shamir. Yitzhak Rabin's victory over Peres for the
leadership position in the Labor Party primaries preceding the
1992 elections was largely due to Labor's rank-and-file disillu-
sionment with Peres' attempts to ingratiate himself with Haredi Jews
and to win their support. In spite of this experience, Peres repeated
the same attempts that resulted in the same results in the 1996
elections.
The Haredi parties wielded political power after 1988, most
especially in the 1988-90 period. Peres, still in the government after
1988, supported their demands; Shamir, while Prime Minister, was
even more resolute with support. Haredi political success can best
be measured by the amounts of money the two Haredi parties were
able to obtain from the state through so-called "special money"
grants, not subject to fiscal controls of the state. These special money
grants were made through a voluntary association, formed to
remain under the real control of a Haredi Knesset member or his
friends. The ministry of finance made grants from the state budget
to such associations, most often on the basis of flimsy purpose
statements and with no control exerted over expenditures. The
resultant corruption was enormous, reaching a scale unprece-
dented in the entire history of the State of Israel and finally causing
the withdrawal of such special money grants.
The extensive corruption involved in the obtaining of this special
money did not necessarily mean that the money itself was used
illicitly. Shas spent most of this money to establish a network of
institutions designed to exert a lasting influence and to train cohorts
of militants that in the future could enable the party to maximize
its control over its public. This network consisted of a chain of
educational institutions designed to revive traditional Jewish
education for boys with only sacred and not secular subjects taught.
(Shas largely ignored the education of girls.) Adult males between
the ages of 40 and 50 were encouraged to leave their professions
or give up their businesses in order to enroll in institutions and study
sacred subjects with guaranteed remuneration. The remuneration,
that is, salaries for studying, were admittedly low, but numerous
individuals considered the life of study preferable to their persisting
to do menial work or to maintain decaying businesses. The recruits
did more than study Talmud. They were required to do political
work for Shas. These recruits soon constituted Shas' political
cadre, which has been and remains instrumental in turning Haredi
neighborhoods into electoral constituencies under almost any
conceivable circumstances.
52 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Informed Israeli political commentators have recognized the
public and political impact of such Haredi political activity. In his
June 26, 1992 article in Al-Hamishmar, Professor Gideon Doron,
Rabin's major advisor on strategy during the 1992 elections,
explained after Rabin's victory why the Labor Party refrained from
canvassing votes in Shas-dominated neighborhoods:
This is a party that keeps its public under continuous influence
during election and other times ... Shas' method is to turn
electoral outcomes into sources of monetary revenues and spend
the money obtained during the four years [between one election
and another]. The method succeeds. True, they also use magic
spells, amulets and vows that greatly influence their public, but
their role is secondary.
According to Doron, the best way to appeal to the Shas constituency
is to do so through those of the salaried elite whose role anyway is
to keep the constituency under control. Doron pointed out that,
with the exception of the previously mentioned elite, Shas' followers
are essentially the same as the "Oriental tradition-minded segment
of Likud supporters." By acquiring political power, Shas leaders,
particularly Rabbi Yoseph, gained self-confidence and began to seek
emancipation from the tutelage of Ashkenazi Haredi rabbis. In each
Shas-dominated neighborhood, Rabbi Yoseph rather than Rabbi
Shach was acclaimed to be the greatest rabbi in the world. After
some years of continual adulation by the masses, Rabbi Yoseph
almost certainly came to believe that he no longer needed to be
subordinate to Rabbi Shach.
The split between Shas and Rabbi Shach came after the 1992
elections and was sparked by a triviality. The split in reality was
over the rival claims by Shach and Yoseph to be regarded as the
spiritual head of Shas. Rabin, when forming his coalition,
approached and accepted the demands of Shas. Before signing an
agreement, Shas asked Rabbi Shach for approval. Shach refused,
because, as discussed in another chapter, Shulamit Aloni was to
be named Minister of Education. Shach's newspaper, Yated
Ne'eman, editorialized that this appointment was worse than the
killing of one million children during the Holocaust. The reasoning
employed here was that the Nazis killed the children but did not
prevent their souls from going to paradise, whereas the appointment
of Aloni could corrupt Jewish souls and deprive them of paradise.
Rabbi Yoseph and the Shas Party, nevertheless, decided to risk the
souls of Jewish children and joined Rabin's government. Rabbi
Shach and his followers reacted negatively in a furious manner that
persisted thereafter.
THE TWO MAIN HAREDI GROUPS 53
The confrontation between the two Haredi movements has been
waged in the magical area over the contest of spiritual authority.
In keeping with commonly held and magical Haredi beliefs, the
Shas leaders' sin of resisting Rabbi Shach's will could be punished
by a few curses resulting in either the deaths or sicknesses of those
leaders and/or their family members. The result would allegedly
restore heavenly equilibrium. In order to further this magical result,
Rabbi Shach's supporters resorted to conduct previously employed
in similar situations. They published fake announcements of deaths,
hospitalizations and/or traffic accidents of Shas leaders and then
either notified the families accordingly by telephone or sent
ambulances to their homes. As noted above, internecine hatred
between religious Jews, and especially between Haredi rabbis, is
often virulent. The existence of such hatred has continually resulted
in disunity within ranks that limits Haredi political power. The
methods of internecine infighting have been so customarily
employed within Haredi culture that, unfortunately for Rabbi
Shach's followers, the impact is severely limited. In the domain of
magic, moreover, Shas has on its side the great authority and
renowned miracle worker, Rabbi Kaduri, who announced that he
would shield all Shas leaders by casting cabbalistic spells. Rabbi
Kaduri also claimed that God revealed to him that harassment by
other Haredi Jews would qualify Shas leaders for the greatest
Jewish virtue, sanctification of the Lord's name through martyrdom.
In the contest of spiritual authorities, debate ensued over whether
Rabbi Yoseph 5 s spirituality was sufficiently great to validate his
challenge to Shach's rabbinical authority, especially in light of
Yoseph's former allegiance to Shach. Following the debate all the
Shas rabbis decided to obey Rabbi Yoseph. Shas rabbis and
followers then began to extol Rabbi Yoseph as "the greatest rabbi
of his generation," greater even than any Ashkenazi rabbi. This
honor had previously been awarded to Rabbi Shach. Shas had won
its independence. The Ashkenazi Haredi Jews thus could not defeat
but did sever all connections with Shas. No Ashkenazi rabbi
distanced himself from Shach's pronouncements; some added
even more venom. The leader of the largest Hassidic sect, the Gur
Hassids, reiterated his previously expressed view that Israel lost the
Yom Kippur War (of October 1973) because a woman, Golda Meir,
was prime minister. He implied that Israel would lose its next war
because of Shulamit Aloni. Ashkenazi rabbis and their followers
used weapons more hurtful than their curses and pronouncements.
They desecrated Shas synagogues, usually just before the beginning
of the Sabbath, thus making it difficult to clean in time without
desecrating the Sabbath. Many Shas leaders, who had been educated
in Ashkenazi institutions and who continued to pray in Ashkenazi
synagogues, were harassed or beaten during the reciting of prayers.
54 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
One Shas leader, Rabbi Pinhassi, was spat upon and beaten in an
Ashkenazi synagogue in the Haredi town of Bnei Brak during a
Sabbath prayer session. Some children of Shas leaders were terribly
abused. The then Minister of the Interior, Yitzhak Der'i, had to
remove his sons from an Ashkenazi yeshiva after they were publicly
humiliated. Der'i was repeatedly harassed, often when attempting
to pray in synagogues, by Shach's followers and by religious settlers.
Shas followers fought back. On several occasions they beat up
those who had harassed Der'i; they also desecrated Ashkenazi
synagogues in retaliation. Shas retaliations ultimately served their
opponent's cause by escalating the conflict.
The split and conflict within Haredi ranks illustrate the religious
transformation of Oriental Jews. For over two decades many secular
Oriental groups were founded; they all failed to obtain the support
of the populations they claimed to represent and, as a result,
collapsed ignominiously. Their failure can be attributed to their
obstinate refusal to recognize that the Oriental Jewish communities
define themselves primarily in religious terms. The Haredi Shas
Party will in the foreseeable future likely remain the sole Oriental
political party in Israel. This particular case study may help illustrate
the nature of religious transformation of a not fully modernized
population.
The National Religious Party and the
Religious Settlers
The ideology of the NRP and Gush Emunim, the group of religious
settlers in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, is more
innovative than the ideology of Haredi Jews. Rabbi Abraham
Yitzhak Kook, who was the chief rabbi of Palestine and a most
prominent rabbinical supporter of Zionism, devised this ideology
in the early 1 920s and developed it thereafter. Rabbi Kook the elder,
as he was called, was a prolific author. His followers considered
him to be divinely inspired. After his death in 1935 he achieved
the status of a saint in NRP circles. His son and successor as NRP
leader, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook the younger, who died in 1981
at the age of 91, also achieved saintly status. Rabbi Kook the
younger wrote no books and did not achieve the talmudic
competency of his father, but he possessed a strongly charismatic
personality and exerted great influence upon his students. He
elaborated orally the political and social consequences of his father's
teachings. The rabbis who graduated from his yeshiva in Jerusalem,
Merkaz Harav, or Center of the Rabbi, and remained devoted
followers of his teaching established a Jewish sect with a well-
defined political plan. In early 1974, almost immediately after the
shock of the October 1973 war and a short time before the cease-
fire agreement with Syria was signed, Rabbi Kook's followers with
their leader's blessing and spiritual guidance founded Gush Emunim
(Block of the Faithful). The Gush Emunim aims were to initiate
new and to expand already existent Jewish settlements in the
Occupied Territories. With the help of Shimon Peres, who in the
summer of 1974 became the Israeli defense minister and thus the
person in charge of the Occupied Territories, Gush Emunim in the
remarkably short time of a few years succeeded in changing Israeli
settlement policy. The Jewish settlements, which continue to spread
throughout the West Bank and to occupy a large chunk of the Gaza
Strip, provide testimony of and documentation for Gush Emunim's
influence within Israeli society and upon Israeli governmental
policies.
Gush Emunim's success in changing Israeli settlement policy in
the 1970s is politically explicable. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
55
56 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
determined Israeli settlement policy from the end of the 1967 war
until 1974. He did not allow the establishment of Jewish settlements
in the bulk of the territories. The only exception he made was to
allow a tiny group of Jewish settlers to live near Hebron. Dayan
wanted to envelop the densely inhabited parts of these areas by
creating a settlement zone in the almost uninhabited Jordan Valley
and northern Sinai (the Yamit area). In order to preserve the Israeli
alliance with the feudal notables who were in firm control of the
villages (although not of the larger towns), Dayan promised not to
confiscate village lands; he mostly kept his promise. Gush Emunim
demonstrated its strength by organizing enormous demonstrations
in 1974 and 1975 opposing the Dayan promise. These demon-
strations were also directed against United States Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger for backing the Dayan policy. Peres, who
became defense minister after Dayan in 1974 in the first Rabin
government (1974-77), initiated a new policy which he called
"functional compromise" and for which he acquired Gush Emunim
support. According to this policy all the land inside the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip that was not being used by the inhabitants could
be confiscated for the exclusive use of the Jews. Palestinian political
leaders who accepted this new policy arrangement would be offered
absolute rule over Palestinians. The government of the State of Israel
would control only certain essential functions in Palestinian areas.
Prime Minister Rabin at first opposed this policy. In 1975, Peres
conspired with Gush Emunim and planned strategy to combat
Rabin's opposition. Gush Emunim organized a mass rally in
Sebastia, a disused railway station near Nablus. Rabin forbade the
demonstration, but Gush Emunim demonstrators succeeded in cir-
cumventing the army roadblocks and assembled in Sebastia. During
the period of the ensuing lengthy negotiations Peres lent some
support to Gush Emunim. More demonstrators arrived on the
scene. Finally, a compromise settlement that favored Gush Emunim
was reached. Gush Emunim members were allowed to settle in what
is now the flourishing settlement of Kedumim. Operating in much
the same manner, Gush Emunim in 1976 with the help of Peres
founded the settlement Ofra as a temporary work camp and the
settlement Shilo as a temporary archaeological camp. Gush Emunim
also pursued similar policies and initiated settlement beginnings
in the Gaza Strip. The Gush Emunim settlements, agreed to by
Peres in 1975 and 1976, still exist and are flourishing. Following
the 1977 election of Menachem Begin as prime minister, a "holy
alliance" of the religious Gush Emunim and successive secular Israeli
governments occurred and has remained in place to date.
Having achieved settlement policy successes, Gush Emunim
rabbis cleverly conducted a number of political intrigues and were
able to achieve domination of the NRP. From the mid-1980s the
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 57
NRP has followed the ideological lead of Gush Emunim. After the
death of Rabbi Kook the younger, the spiritual leadership of Gush
Emunim became centered in a semi-secret rabbinical council,
selected by mysterious criteria from among the most outstanding
disciples of Rabbi Kook. These rabbis have continued to make policy
decisions based upon their belief in certain innovative elements of
ideology not openly advocated or detailed but derived from their
distinct interpretation of Jewish mysticism, popularly known as
Cabbala. The writings of Rabbi Kook the elder serve as the sacred
texts and are perhaps intentionally even more obscure than other
cabbalistic writings. In-depth knowledge of talmudic and cabbalistic
literature, including modern interpretations of both, and special
training are prerequisites for understanding Kook's writings. The
implications of Kook's writings are theologically too innovative to
allow for a popularized presentation to an otherwise educated
Jewish public. This is probably the reason why so few analyses of
the Gush Emunim ideology have appeared. The one significant and
learned analysis is an essay by Professor Uriel Tal, published
originally in Hebrew in Haaretz on September 26, 1984, and
published in English in The Jerusalem Quarterly (No. 35, Spring
1985) under the title: "Foundations of a Political Messianic Trend
in Israel." The Tal essay, although marred to some extent by
sociological jargon and by some analogies not well adapted to its
theme, is the most valuable analysis to uate. Several relatively good
studies in Hebrew of the more mundane aspects of Gush Emunim
have appeared as books. The one study in English is Ian Lustick's
book, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel
( 1 988) . The initiative for the Lustick book was apparently connected
to Lustick's personal reaction to the Jonathan Pollard espionage
affair 1 and began as a paper written for the United States
Department of Defense. This may explain the book's excessive con-
centration on the changing political stances of Gush Emunim and
its relative neglect of important parts of ideology. Contrary to what
the title suggests, the book contains little description or explanation
of Jewish fundamentalism. To some extent, moreover, this book
is apologetic; the more extreme aspects of Gush Emunim dogmas
and beliefs are not accurately revealed. Some of what is missing in
the Lustick book can fortunately be found in the chapter titled
"Nationalistic Judaism," in Yehoshafat Harkabi's book, Israel's
Fateful Hour (1988). The ensuing discussion of Gush Emunim ideas
and politics will take cognizance of the Lustick and Harkabi analyses
but will rely more upon Tal's study and other Hebrew writings.
The status of non-Jews in the Cabbala as compared to that in
talmudic literature is a good beginning point for discussion. Most
of the many Jewish authors that have written about the Cabbala
in English, German and French have either avoided this subject
58 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
or have hidden its essence under clouds of misleading generaliza-
tions. These authors, Gershon Scholem being one of the most
significant, have employed the trick of using words such as "men,"
"human beings" and "cosmic" in order to imply incorrectly that
the Cabbala presents a path leading towards salvation for all human
beings. The actual fact is that cabbalistic texts, as opposed to
talmudic literature, emphasize salvation for only Jews. Many books
dealing with the Cabbala that are written in Hebrew, other than
those written by Scholem, present an honest description of salvation
and other sensitive Jewish issues. This point is well illustrated in
studies of the latest and most influential school of Cabbala, the
Lurianic School, founded in the late sixteenth century and named
after its founding rabbi, Yitzhak Luria. The ideas of Rabbi Luria
greatly influenced the theology of Rabbi Kook the elder and still
underlie the ideologies of Gush Emunim and Hassidism. Yesaiah
Tishbi, an authority on the Cabbala who wrote in Hebrew,
explained in his scholarly work, The Theory of Evil and the (Satanic)
Sphere in Lurianic Cabbala (1942, reprinted in 1982): "It is plain
that those prospects and the scheme [of salvation] are intended only
for Jews." Tishbi cited Rabbi Hayim Vital, the chief interpreter of
Rabbi Luria, who wrote in his book, Gates of Holiness: "The
Emanating Power, blessed be his name, wanted there to be some
people on this low earth that would embody the four divine
emanations. These people are the Jews, chosen to join together the
four divine worlds here below." Tishbi further cited Vital's writings
in emphasizing the Lurianic doctrine that non-Jews have satanic
souls: "Souls of non-Jews come entirely from the female part of
the satanic sphere. For this reason souls of non-Jews are called evil,
not good, and are created without [divine] knowledge." In his
illuminating Hebrew-language book, Rabbinate y Hassidism,
Enlightenment: The History of Jewish Culture Between the End of the
Sixteenth and the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century (1956), Ben-
Zion Katz explained convincingly that the above doctrines became
part of Hassidism. Accurate descriptions of Lurianic doctrines
and their wide influence upon religious Jews can be found in
numerous other studies, written in Hebrew. In books and articles
written in other languages, and thus read by most interested non-
Israeli Jews and non-Jews, such descriptions and analyses are most
often absent. The role of Satan, whose earthly embodiment
according to the Cabbala is every non-Jew, has been minimized
or not mentioned by authors who have not written about the
Cabbala in Hebrew. Such authors, therefore, have not conveyed
to readers accurate accounts of general NRP or its hard-core,
Gush Emunim politics.
A modern and influential expression of the attitudes derived above
is evident in the teachings and writings of the late "Lubovitcher
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 59
Rebbe," Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who headed the
Chabad movement and wielded great influence among many
religious Jews in Israel as well as in the United States. Schneerson
and his Lubovitch followers are Haredim; nevertheless, they
involved themselves in Israel's political life and shared many
concepts with Gush Emunim and the NRP. The ideas of Rabbi
Schneerson that appear below are taken from a book of his recorded
messages to followers in Israel, tided Gatherings of Conversations and
published in the Holy Land in 1965. During the subsequent three
decades of his life until his death, Rabbi Schneerson remained
consistent; he did not change any of the opinions. What Rabbi
Scheerson taught either was or immediately became official,
Lubovitch, Hassidic belief.
Regarding the non-Jew the Lubovitcher Rebbe's views were
clear even if a bit disorderly: "In such a manner the Halacha,
stipulated by the Talmud, showed that a non-Jew should be
punished by death if he kills an embryo, even if the embryo is non-
Jewish, while the Jew should not be, even if the embryo is Jewish.
As we [the talmudic sages] learn from Exodus 22:21, beginning
with the words 'and if any mischief will follow.'" This quoted
verse is a part of a passage beginning in verse 21, describing what
should be done "if men strive and hurt a woman with child," thus
damaging the embryo. Verse 22, whose beginning is quoted by the
Lubovitcher Rebbe, says in full: "And if any mischief will follow,
then you shall give soul for soul." (Some English translations use
the wording "life for life" instead of "soul for soul.") The above
stated difference in the punishment of a Jew and a non-Jew for the
same crime is common in the Talmud and Halacha.
The Lubovitcher Rebbe continued:
The difference between a Jewish and a non-Jewish person stems
from the common expression: "Let us differentiate." Thus, we
do not have a case of profound change in which a person is merely
on a superior level. Rather, we have a case of "let us differenti-
ate" between totally different species. This is what needs to be
said about the body: the body of a Jewish person is of a totally
different quality from the body of [members] of all nations of
the world ... The Old Rabbi [a pseudonym for one of the holy
Lubovitch rabbis] explained that the passage in Chapter 49 of
Hatanya [the basic book of Chabad] : "And you have chosen us"
[the Jews] means specifically that the Jewish body was chosen
[by God], because a choice is thus made between outwardly
similar things. The Jewish body "looks as if it were in substance
similar to bodies of non-Jews," but the meaning ... is that the
bodies only seem to be similar in material substance, outward
look and superficial quality. The difference of the inner quality,
60 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
however, is so great that the bodies should be considered as
completely different species. This is the reason why the Talmud
states that there is an halachic difference in attitude about the
bodies of non-Jews [as opposed to the bodies of Jews]" "their
bodies are in vain." ... An even greater difference exists in regard
to the soul. Two contrary types of soul exist, a non-Jewish soul
comes from three satanic spheres, while the Jewish soul stems
from holiness.
As has been explained, an embryo is called a human being,
because it has both body and soul. Thus, the difference between
a Jewish and a non-Jewish embryo can be understood. There is
also a difference in bodies. The body of a Jewish embryo is on
a higher level than is the body of a non-Jew. This is expressed
in the phrase "let us differentiate" about the body of a non-Jew,
which is a totally different kind. The same difference exists in
regard to the soul: the soul of a Jewish embryo is different than
the soul of a non-Jewish embryo. We therefore ask: Why should
a non-Jew be punished if he kills even a non-Jewish embryo while
a Jew should not be punished even if he kills a Jewish embryo?
The answer can be understood by [considering] the general
difference between Jews and non-Jews: A Jew was not created
as a means for some [other] purpose; he himself is the purpose,
since the substance of all [divine] emanations was created only
to serve the Jews. "In the beginning God created the heavens
and the earth" [Genesis 1:1] means that [the heavens and the
earth] were created for the sake of the Jews, who are called the
"beginning." This means everything, all developments, all
discoveries, the creation, including the "heavens and the earth
- are vanity compared to the Jews. The important things are the
Jews, because they do not exist for any [other] aim; they
themselves are [the divine] aim."
After some additional cabbalistic explanation the Lubovitcher
Rebbe concluded:
Following from what has already been said, it can be understood
why a non-Jew should be punished by death if he kills an embryo
and why a Jew should not be punished by death. The difference
between the embryo and a [baby that was] born is that the
embryo is not a self-contained reality but rather is subsidiary;
either it is subsidiary to its mother or to the reality created after
birth when the [divine] purpose of its creation is then fulfilled.
In its present state the purpose is still absent. A non-Jew's entire
reality is only vanity. It is written, "And the strangers shall stand
and feed your flocks" [Isaiah 61:5]. The entire creation [of a non-
Jew] exists only for the sake of the Jews. Because of this a non-Jew
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 61
should be punished with death if he kills an embryo, while a Jew,
whose existence is most important, should not be punished with
death because of something subsidiary. We should not destroy
an important thing for the sake of something subsidiary. It is true
that there is a prohibition against [hurting] an embryo, because
it is something that will be born in the future and in a hidden
form already exists. The death penalty should be implicated
only when visible matters are affected; as previously noted, the
embryo is merely of subsidiary importance.
Comments concerning and partial summaries of the above opinions
have appeared, but with insufficient emphasis in the Israeli Hebrew
press. In 1965, when the above was published, the Lubovitcher
Rebbe was allied in Israel to the Labor Party; his movement had
already acquired many important benefits from the government then
in power as well as previous Israeli governments. The Lubovitchers,
for example, had obtained autonomy for their own education
system within the context of religious state education. In the mid-
1970s the Lubovitcher Rebbe decided that the Labor Party was
too moderate and thereafter shifted his movement's political support
sometimes to Likud and sometimes to a religious party. Ariel
Sharon was the Rebbe's favorite Israeli senior politician. Sharon
in turn praised the Rebbe publicly and delivered a moving speech
about him in the Knesset after the Rebbe's death. From the June
1967 war until his death the Lubovitcher Rebbe always supported
Israeli wars and opposed any retreat. In 1974 he strongly opposed
the Israeli withdrawal from the Suez area, conquered in the October
1973 war; he promised Israel divine favors if it persisted in occupying
that land. After his death thousands of his Israeli followers, who
continued to hold the views expressed in the above quoted passage,
played an important role in Netanyahu's election victory by demon-
strating at many cross-road junctions before election day; they
chanted the slogan: "Netanyahu is good for the Jews." Although
subsequently strongly criticizing Netanyahu for meeting with
Arafat, signing the Hebron agreement and agreeing to a second
withdrawal, the Rebbe's followers continued their overall preference
for the Netanyahu government.
Among the religious settlers in the Occupied Territories the
Chabad Hassids constitute one of the most extreme groups. Baruch
Goldstein, the mass murderer of Palestinians, was one of them
(Goldstein will be discussed in Chapter 6.) Rabbi Yitzhak
Ginsburgh, who wrote a chapter of a book in praise of Goldstein
and what he did, is another member of their group. Ginsburgh is
the former head of the Yoseph Tomb Yeshiva, located on the
outskirts of Nablus. Rabbi Ginsburgh, who originally came to
Israel from the United States and has good connection to the
62 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Lubovitcher community in the United States, has often expressed
his views in English in American Jewish publications. The following
appeared in an April 26,1 996 Jewish Week (New York) article that
contained an interview with Rabbi Ginsburgh:
Regarded as one of the Lubovitcher sect's leading authorities on
Jewish mysticism, the St. Louis born rabbi, who also has a
graduate degree in mathematics, speaks freely of Jews' genetic-
based, spiritual superiority over non-Jews. It is a superiority that
he asserts invests Jewish life with greater value in the eyes of the
Torah. "If you saw two people drowning, a Jew and a non-Jew,
the Torah says you save the Jewish life first," Rabbi Ginsburgh
told the Jewish Week "If every simple cell in a Jewish body entails
divinity, is a part of God, then every strand of DNA is part of
God. Therefore, something is special about Jewish DNA." Later,
Rabbi Ginsburgh asked rhetorically: "If a Jew needs a liver, can
you take the liver of an innocent non-Jew passing by to save him?
The Torah would probably permit that. Jewish life has an infinite
value," he explained. "There is something infinitely more holy
and unique about Jewish life than non- Jewish life."
Changing the words "Jewish" to "German" or "Aryan" and "non-
Jewish" to "Jewish" turns the Ginsburgh position into the doctrine
that made Auschwitz possible in the past. To a considerable extent
the German Nazi success depended upon that ideology and upon
its implications not being widely known early. Disregarding even
on a limited scale the potential effects of messianic, Lubovitch and
other ideologies could prove to be calamitous.
The difference in the attitudes about non-Jews in the Halacha
and the Cabbala is well illustrated by the difference expressed
specifically in regard to non-Jews who have converted to Judaism.
The Halacha, although discriminating against them in some ways,
treats converts as new Jews. The Cabbala is unable to adopt this
approach because of its emphasis upon the cosmic difference
between Jews and non-Jews. The Cabbala explains that converts
are really Jewish souls consigned firstly to non-Jewish bodies as
punishments and later redeemed by conversion to Judaism either
because the punishment ended or because a holy man interceded.
This explanation is part of cabbalistic belief in metempsychosis,
which is absent in the Halacha. According to the Cabbala, a satanic
soul cannot be transformed into a divine soul by mere persuasion.
The ensuing discussion of Gush Emunim ideas and politics
takes cognizance of the Lustick and Harkabi studies but relies
primarily upon primary source material and upon analyses by Tal
and other Hebrew-language writers. Tal described and analyzed
Gush Emunim principles by quoting extensively from writings of
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 63
Rabbi Yehuda Amital, an outstanding Gush leader who was
appointed minister without portfolio in the Israeli government in
November 1995, by then Prime Minister Peres and who served in
that capacity until June 1 996. Peres described Amital as a moderate.
In explaining Amital's views, Tal relied heavily upon Amital's
published article, "On the significance of the Yom Kippur War
[1973]." To illustrate Amital's emphasis upon spiritual yearning
and the political-messianic stream of thought, Tal quoted the
following:
The war broke out against the background of the revival of the
kingdom of Israel, which in its metaphysical (not only symbolic)
status is evidence of the decline of the spirit of defilement in the
Western world . . . The Gentiles are fighting for their mere survival
as Gentiles, as the ritually unclean. Iniquity is fighting its battle
for survival. It knows that in the wars of God there will not be a
place for Satan, for the spirit of defilement, or for the remains
of Western culture, the proponents of which are, as it were,
secular Jews.
Tal further interpreted Amital's and thus Gush Emunim's basic
views:
The modern secular world, according to this approach, "is
struggling for survival, and thus our war is directed against the
impurity of Western culture and against rationality as such." It
follows that the alien culture has to be eradicated because "all
foreignness draws us closer to the alien, and the alien causes
alienation, as is the position of those who still adhere to Western
culture and who attempt to fuse Judaism with rationalist empiricist
and democratic culture." According to Amital's approach, the
Yom Kippur War has to be comprehended in its messianic
dimension: a struggle against civilization in its entirety.
Tal proceeded in his discussion to ask Amital a multi-faceted,
serious question: "What is the point of all the affliction? Why do
wars continue, if the Messiah has already come and if the Kingdom
of Israel has already been established?" Amital replied: "The war
initiates the process of purification, of refinement, the purifying and
cleaning of the congregation of Israel." Tal continued to discuss:
"We thus learn that there is only one explanation of the wars: they
refine and purify the soul. As impurity is removed, the soul of Israel
- by virtue of the war - will be refined. We have already conquered
the lands; all that now remains is to conquer impurity."
The followers of the two Rabbi Kooks have applied the above
concepts to all other Israeli wars. Rabbi Shmaryahu Arieli, for
64 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
example, explained, according to Tal, that the 1967 war was a
"metaphysical transformation" and that the Israeli conquests
transferred land from the power of Satan to the divine sphere. This
supposedly proved that the "messianic era" had arrived. Tal also
quoted the teachings of Rabbi E. Hadaya: "[The conquests of
1967] liberated the land from the other side [a polite name for
Satan], from a mystical force that embodies evil, defilement and
moral corruption. We [the Jews] are thus entering an era in which
absolute sovereignty rules over corporeality." Tal emphasized that
these statements constituted a warning that any Israeli withdrawal
from conquered areas would have metaphysical consequences that
could result in restoring to Satan sovereignty over that land. Other
Gush Emunim leaders directly and indirectly expressed the same
ideas in their public statements and writings.
There can be little doubt that Gush Emunim has seriously
affected Israeli Jewish religious leaders and lay people. During the
time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, for example, the military
rabbinate in Israel, clearly influenced by the ideas of the two Rabbi
Kooks, exhorted all Israeli soldiers to follow in the footsteps of
Joshua and to re-establish his divinely ordained conquest of the land
of Israel. This exhortation of conquest included extermination of
non-Jewish inhabitants. The military rabbinate published a map
of Lebanon in which the names of Lebanese towns had been
changed to the names of cities found in the Book of Joshua. Beirut,
for example, was changed to Be'erot. The map designated Lebanon
as land belonging to the ancient northern tribes of Israel, Asher and
Naphtali. As Tal wrote: "Israel's military presence in Lebanon
confirmed the validity of the Biblical promise in Deuteronomy
1 1:24: 'Every place on which the sole of your foot treads shall be
yours; our border shall be from the wilderness, from the river
Euphrates, to the western sea.'" The followers of the two Rabbis
Kook viewed Lebanon as being delivered from the power of Satan
with its inhabitants being killed in the process." Such a view is not
exceptional; it has numerous ancient and modern parallels, both
religious and secular. The idea of a murderous purification of land
from the evil and defilement that provoke God is common. In her
chapter, "The Rites of Violence," in the book, Society and Culture
in Early Modern France, Natalie Z. Davis, for example, presented
the same idea as being the rationalization for the massacres
perpetrated by France in the second half of the sixteenth century.
In his excellent book. The Pursuit of the Millennium, to cite another
example, Norman Cohn discussed Christian religious movements
that sought to bring about the millennium by the use of force
resulting in the deaths of many people.
Three interpretative and interrelated comments about Tal's
analysis of Gush Emunim should be made. First, the rabbis, cited
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 65
as authorities by both Tal and the authors of this book, are not
obscure or fringe rabbis but are important Israeli figures. As
previously noted, Shimon Peres, when prime minister, regarded
one of them, Rabbi Amital, as a moderate and appointed him
minister without portfolio. Second, Tal was able to comprehend
the real essence of what he termed the "political messianic trend."
His expertise in German Nazism, particularly in Nazi ideology and
its sources, almost certainly helped him in his study of Gush
Emunim. (See Tal's book in Hebrew, Political Theology and the Third
Reich, Tel-Aviv University Press, 1989.) The similarities between
the Jewish political messianic trend and German Nazism are glaring.
The Gentiles are for the messianists what the Jews were for the
Nazis. The hatred for Western culture with its rational and
democratic elements is common to both movements. Finally, the
extreme chauvinism of the messianists is directed towards all non-
Jews. The 1973 Yom Kippur War, for instance, was in Amital's
view not directed against Egyptians, Syrians and/or all Arabs but
against all non-Jews. The war was thus directed against the great
majority of citizens of the United States, even though the United
States aided Israel in that war. This hatred of non-Jews is not new
but, as already discussed, is derived from a continuous Jewish
cabbalistic tradition. Those Jewish scholars who have attempted
to hide this fact from non-Jews and even from many Jews have not
only done a disservice to scholarship; they have aided the growth
of this Jewish analogue to German Nazism.
The ideology of the Rabbis Kook is both eschatological and
messianic. It resembles in this respect prior Jewish religious doctrines
as well as similar trends in Christianity and Islam. This ideology
assumes the imminent coming of the Messiah and asserts that the
Jews, aided by God, will thereafter triumph over the non-Jews and
rule over them forever. (This, it is alleged, will be good for the non-
Jews.) All current political developments will either help bring this
about sooner or will postpone it. Jewish sins, most particularly lack
of faith, can postpone the coming of the Messiah. The delay,
however, will not be of long duration, because even the worst sins
of the Jews cannot alter the course of redemption. Sins can
nevertheless increase the sufferings of Jews prior to the redemption.
The two world wars, the Holocaust and other calamitous events
of modern history are examples of punishment. The elder Rabbi
Kook did not disguise his joy over the loss of lives in World War
I; he explained that loss of lives was necessary "in order to begin
to break Satan's Power." The followers of the elder Rabbi Kook's
pronouncements often have detailed in depth such explanations.
Rabbi Dov Lior, one of the best-known rabbis of the aforemen-
tioned Gush Emunim rabbinical council and the rabbi of Kiryat
Arba, for instance, argued that Israel's failure in its 1982 invasion
66 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
of Lebanon was due to the lack of faith manifested in the signing
of the peace treaty with Egypt and the returning of "the inheritance
of our ancestors [Sinai] to strangers." Lior also explained in an article
about him, published in the Hadashot Supplement of December 20,
1991, that the capture by the Syrians of two Israeli diplomats
stationed in Junieh, Lebanon, in May 1 984, was "a just punishment
for the maltreatment in detention of our boys from the Jewish
underground." In the Hadashot article Lior added "I do not know
what sufferings can yet befall all the Jews" for this crime.
Explanations that may appear to the uninitiated to be outlandish
and bizarre are sometimes the most readily acceptable to Gush
Emunim followers. This is especially the case when these followers
believe redemption is near at hand. They believe that Satan, as
described in the Cabbala, is rational and well-versed in logic; they
believe further that the power of Satan and of his earthly manifes-
tation, the non-Jews, can at times only be broken by irrational action.
Gush Emunim thus founded settlements on the exact days of
United States Secretary of States James Baker's recurrent arrivals
in Israel not merely to demonstrate Gush Emunim power but also
as part of a mystical design to break the power of Satan and its
American incarnation. In the past, different Jewish religious
movements, for example, the movement of the false Messiah
Shabtai Zvi in 1 665 and 1 666 and early Hassidism, had employed
similar logic. Certain Christian and Islamic movements also
employed analogous logic at certain times.
Gush Emunim ideologues, especially Rabbi Kook the elder, not
only derived their ideas largely from Jewish tradition but were also
innovative. How they developed the Messiah concept is illustrative.
The Bible anticipated only a single Messiah. Jewish mysticism
anticipated two Messiahs. According to the Cabbala the two
Messiahs will differ in character. The first Messiah, a militant
figure called "son of Joseph," will prepare the material precondi-
tions for redemption. The second Messiah will be a spiritual "son
of David" who will redeem the world by spectacular miracle-
making. (Gush Emunim followers believe that miracles occur at
various times.) The cabbalistic conception is that the two Messiahs
will be individuals. Rabbi Kook the elder altered this idea by
anticipating and advocating that the first Messiah will be a collective
being. Kook identified his group of followers as the collective "son
of Joseph." Gush Emunim leaders, following the teaching of Rabbi
Kook the elder, continue to perceive their rabbis, and perhaps all
followers as well, as the collective incarnation of at least one and
perhaps two divinely ordained Messiahs. Gush Emunim members
believe that this idea should not be revealed to the uninitiated
until the right time. They believe further that their sect cannot err
because of its infallible divine guidance.
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 67
Rabbi Kook's second innovation concerned the relationship of
the first Messiah to ignorant non-believing Jews, both secular and
religious. Rabbi Kook derived this concept from the biblical
prophecy that the Messiah "bringing salvation" will be "riding
upon an ass and upon a colt, the foal of an ass" [Zechariah 9:9],
The Cabbala regarded this verse as evidence for two Messiahs: one
riding upon an ass and the other upon a colt. The question here
was: How could a collective Messiah ride upon a single ass? Kook
answered the question by identifying the ass with Jews who lacked
wisdom and correct faith. Kook postulated that the collective
Messiah would ride upon these Jews. This meant that the Messiah
would exploit them for material gains and would redeem them to
the extent that they could be redeemed. The idea of redemption
through contact with a spiritually potent personality has been a major
theme common to all strands of Jewish mysticism. It has been
applied not only to humans and their sins but also to animals and
inanimate objects. In Israel this idea is still a part of religious
education. Popular books for religious children contain many
stories that allegedly illustrate this point. One of the most repeated
stories is about a virtuous wild duck that is caught, killed and
made into a succulent dish for a holy rabbi. This duck is considered
to be redeemed by its being eaten by the holy man. The Gush
Emunim innovation here has been to apply this not only to non-
believing Jews who are redeemed by following the collective Messiah
but also to all conceivable material objects, ranging from tanks to
money. Everything can be redeemed if touched or possessed by Jews,
especially messianic Jews. Gush Emunim members apply this
doctrine to the conflict in the Holy Land. They argue that what
appears to be confiscation of Arab-owned land for subsequent
settlement by Jews is in reality not an act of stealing but one of sanc-
tification. From their perspective the land is redeemed by being
transferred from the satanic to the divine sphere. Gush Emunim,
so its followers believe, is by virtue of exclusive access to the total
and only truth more important than the remainder of the Jewish
people. Gush Emunim rabbis utilize the following analogy of the
messianic ass: given its lowly status in the hierarchy of beings, the
ass must remain ignorant of the noble purpose of its divinely
inspired rider. This is the case in spite of the fact that the ass
surpasses the rider in size and sheer power. The divine rider in this
analogy leads the ass toward its own salvation. Because of his
noble purpose the rider may have to kick the ass during the course
of the journey in order to make sure that the ass does not stray from
the ordained path. In the same way, the Gush Emunim rabbis assert,
this one messianic sect has to handle and lead the ass-like Jews,
who have been corrupted by satanic Western culture with its
rationality and democracy and who refuse to renounce their beastly
68 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
habits and embrace the true faith. To further the process, the use
of force is permitted whenever necessary.
The final innovation of Rabbi Kook the elder contributed most
decisively to the popularity and political influence of his early
followers and subsequently of Gush Emunim. During the period
of redemption this innovation affected the conduct of the elect in
relation to worldly concerns and contacts with other Jews and
non-Jews. Rabbi Kook taught that the elect should not stand aloof
from the rest of the world, as Jews had often done in the past.
Realizing that other people were sinful and even satanic in nature,
the elect had to attempt to bridge the gap between themselves and
the others by actively involving themselves in society. Only by so
doing would the elect have any chance to sanctify others. The elect
should provide an example, exert influence politically and
increasingly make contact with other people. Since the 1920s this
doctrine has greatly influenced the behavior of those affiliated with
the NRP. After being established in 1 974, Gush Emunim vigorously
reasserted this doctrine in spite of great resentment of the public.
Unlike Orthodox Jews previously, Rabbi Kook's followers began
to dress like secular Jews and only distinguished themselves
outwardly by wearing skullcaps. To date they have followed the
Israeli secular clothing fashions of the 1950s. In their schools they
introduced portions of secular teaching into their curricula. They
permitted their people to enroll in Israeli secular universities. They
additionally established the religiously oriented Bar-Ilan University.
Although restricting the Bar-Ilan teaching staff to religious Jews,
Gush Emunim sought to expand the university's scope of instruction
to include all the usual academic disciplines. The Haredim have
consistently resented and viewed with abhorrence these pursuits
of what they regard as secularization. Rabbi Kook insisted that each
Jew had a religious duty to fight and to train to fight. NRP members
have faithfully followed this teaching. Many Gush Emunim
members have been and still are officers of the Israeli army's select
units; their proportion in such units has continually increased.
Gush Emunim religious school students have gained renown for
their excellent combat qualities, their high motivation to fight,
their relatively high casualty rate during the Lebanon war and
their willingness to beat up Palestinians during the Intifada.
Gush Emunim has won broad public sympathy in Israeli Jewish
society because of its attitude towards army service. This contrasts
sharply with the societal antagonism directed against the Haredim
for their dodging of military service. The doctrine of sanctity,
attributed by the two Rabbi Kooks to almost every Zionist
enterprise, contributed even more to the widespread public
sympathy for and support of Gush Emunim. Tal contrasted the
religious Zionist outlook of Rabbi Kook the younger and Gush
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 69
Emunim with that of the secular left. Tal defined the secular left's
Zionist outlook as a "poetic, lyrical notion, according to which the
return to the soil, life within nature, the agricultural achievements,
the secular creativity [are essential parts] ." The two Rabbi Kooks,
while acknowledging that the secular left's notion unwillingly
served the coming of messianic redemption, emphasized "the
military victories upon holy soil and the Jewish blood spilled on
this soil." Rabbi Kook the younger, together with other Gush
Emunim leaders, went further, according to Tal, by defining "the
State of Israel as the kingdom of Israel and the kingdom of Israel
as the kingdom of heaven on earth." Followers of Rabbi Kook still
refer to Israel as the "earthly support of the Lord's throne." Israel
Harel, one of the most important Gush Emunim leaders, used this
expression to make a political point in his weekly column in Haaretz
on September 1 2, 1 996. Quoting an early essay by Rabbi Kook the
elder, Harel wrote that the State of Israel was "the base of the Lord's
throne in this world" and thus is and should be completely different
from states "considered by Locke, Rosseau and others." For such
people as Harel, total holiness envelops and justifies everything Israel
does within the context of divinely inspired guidance. Tal wrote
that from this vantage point "every action, every phenomenon,
including secularism, will one day be engulfed by sacredness, by
redemption." It is not inconceivable that this type of sacredness
could lead to the exploding of nuclear bombs in order to end the
power of Satan and to establish "the base of the Lord's throne in
this world."
In many respects Gush Emunim members and the majority of
NRP supporters have continued to resemble the early Zionist
pioneers. This fact has boosted their public image. They have
helped to promote this image by presenting themselves to the
uninitiated as successors of the pioneers of the 1920s and 1930s
who are still cherished in the Jewish national memory and lauded
in Israeli education. As previously indicated, Gush Emunim
members, except for their miniscule skullcaps, continue consciously
to emulate the dress and mannerisms of the early pioneers. The
almost exclusively Ashhenazi background of both the early pioneers
and the Gush Emunim settlers help this emulation. All Gush
Emunim rabbis are Ashkenazi. The accepted Israeli standards of
religious education, discussed in Chapter 3, are largely responsible
for the absence of Oriental Jews among Gush Emunim rabbis.
Although unwillingly to join, many Oriental Jews have supported
and continue to support Gush Emunim. The Likud constituency
has to date consistently supported Gush Emunim. By contrast, most
members of the Labor Party supported Gush Emunim until the
end of the 1970s but changed after Gush Emunim opposed the
peace treaty with Egypt and demanded that Lebanon be annexed
70 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
"as a part of the heritage of our ancestors, the tribes of Asher,
Naphtali and Zebulun." Gush Emunim infuriated many Labor
supporters by continuing to advocate other extreme hawkish policies
and by fiercely opposing Sharon's 1982 alliance with the Lebanese
Falangists, who were Christians and therefore considered to be
idolaters. Gush Emunim's position in 1982 was that Jews in their
battles and conquests should only rely upon God's help. Any
alliances with non-Jews could incur God's wrath and lead to His
withholding help. Such ideas were, even for extreme Labor Party
hawks, unacceptable.
Gush Emunim and NRP politics must be understood within the
context of ideology. The ideology makes clear what members of
these groups wish to accomplish. Books written in English have
unfortunately failed to discuss adequately this ideology. Lustick's
book, For the Land and the Lord, which discusses Gush Emunim's
outward political behavior, is the prime example. Lustick relied to
a great extent upon the writings of Harold Fisch for his analysis of
Gush Emunim's political ideology. Fisch, a professor of English
literature who seemingly has only limited competence in the
Talmud and Cabbala, has mostly written for English-speaking
readers and has primarily concentrated upon Christian funda-
mentalists in the United States. Lustick also relied somewhat upon
the writings of Rabbi Menachem Kasher. Kasher was a highly
respected talmudic scholar who wrote in Hebrew and influenced
potential Gush Emunim initiates. His messianic tracts are well-
known to many Gush Emunim and Yeshiva students. Lustick only
briefly quoted Kasher twice and then obfuscated what he did
quote. In our book we have relied more upon what Kasher wrote
and have additionally utilized other Gush Emunim literature.
Gush Emunim activists live in a homogeneous West Bank society
that they control. This society is mostly protected against "conta-
mination" by rival detested ideologies, especially those that stem
from Western culture and have been to some extent influenced the
secular part of Israeli Jewish society. The possibility clearly exists
that the Gush Emunim homogeneous society and its NRP
supporters can increase their political power and influence within
Israeli society. The ideology of the two Rabbis Kook is the
determining force of NRP and Gush Emunim political action.
The fundamental political tenet of Gush Emunim is that the Jewish
people are unique. Gush Emunim members share this tenet with
all Orthodox Jews, but they interpret it somewhat differently.
Lustick discussed this tenet by focusing upon the Gush Emunim
denial of one classical secular Zionist theme. Lustick correctly
pinpointed the two assumptions of this theme, the first being that
"Jewish life had been distorted on both the individual and the
collective levels by the abnormality of diaspora existence." Second,
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 71
only by undergoing a "process of normalization," by emigrating
to Palestine and by forming a Jewish state can Jews become a
normal nation. Quoting Fisch, Lustick stated that for Gush Emunim
this classical idea "is the original delusion of the secular Zionists."
The Gush Emunim argument is that secular Zionists measured that
"normality" by applying non-Jewish standards that are satanic.The
secular Zionists focused upon certain nations that they considered
"normal" and asserted that the non-Jews in these normal nations
were more advanced than were most diaspora Jews. Because of this,
so argued the secular Zionists, Jews should try to emulate those
non-Jews by becoming a "normal" people in a "normal" nation
state. The Gush Emunim counter argument is: "Jews are not and
cannot be a normal people. Their eternal uniqueness ... [is] the result
of the covenant God made with them at Mount Sinai." Lustick
further explained this Gush Emunim position by quoting one of
the group's leaders, Rabbi Aviner: '"While God requires other
normal nations to abide by abstract codes of justice and right-
eousness, such laws do not apply to Jews."' Haredi rabbis often
cited this idea in their writings, but they strictly reserved its glaring
consequences for the yet-to-come messianic age. The Halacha
supports this reservation by carefully distinguishing between two
situations in discussing codes of justice and righteousness. The
Halacha permits Jews to rob non-Jews in those locales wherein Jews
are stronger than non-Jews. The Halacha prohibits Jews from
robbing non-Jews in those locales wherein the non-Jews are stronger.
Gush Emunim dispenses with such traditional precautions by
claiming that Jews, at least those in Israel and the Occupied
Territories, are already living in the beginning of the messianic age.
Lustick failed to explain adequately the messianic age consid-
erations and the distinctions between Jews and non-Jews. Harkabi's
treatment was better. In discussing the halachic teaching and the
Gush Emunim position regarding murders, Harkabi explained
that the murder of a Jew, particularly when committed by a non-
Jews, is in Jewish law the worst possible crime. He then quoted the
Gush Emunim leader, Rabbi Israel Ariel. Relying upon the Code
of Maimonides and the Halacha, Rabbi Ariel stated: "A Jew who
killed a non-Jew is exempt from human judgment and has not
violated the [religious] prohibition of murder." Harkabi noted
further that this should be remembered when "the demand is
voiced that all non-Jewish residents of the Jewish state be dealt with
according to halachic regulations." Gush Emunim rabbis have
continually reiterated that Jews who killed Arabs should not be
punished. Gush Emunim members not only help such Jews who
are punished by Israel's secular courts but also refuse to call those
Jews "murderers." It logically follows that the religious settlers and
their followers emphasize the "shedding of Jewish blood" but show
72 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
little concern about the "shedding of non-Jewish blood." The
Gush Emunim influence on Israeli policies can be measured by the
fact that the Israeli government's policy on this matter has clearly
reflected the Gush Emunim position. The Israeli government
under both Labor and Likud leadership has refused to free
Palestinian prisoners "with Jewish blood on their hands" but has
not hesitated to free prisoners "with non-Jewish blood on their
hands."
Another practical consequence of such attitudes is Gush
Emunim's impact upon the conduct of the Israeli government in
all matters concerning the territories. Gush Emunim continues to
encourage Israeli authorities to deal cruelly with Palestinians in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refusals of Prime Ministers
Rabin, Peres and Netanyahu to advocate the evacuation of even a
single Jewish settlement is attributable primarily to the influence
of Gush Emunim. Gush Emunim's influence upon all Israeli
governments and political leaders of varying political persuasions
has been significant.
The Gush Emunim attitude towards Palestinians, always referred
to as "Arabs living in Israel," is important. Lustick mostly avoided
this subject. Harkabi dealt with it honestly by extensively quoting
the statements of Rabbis Tzvi Yehuda Kook, Shlomo Aviner and
Israel Ariel. Kook, Aviner and Ariel viewed the Arabs living in Israel
as thieves; they based their view upon the premise that all land in
Israel was and remained Jewish and that all property found thereon
thus belonged to Jews. Harkabi, who learned this when doing the
research for his book, expressed his shock: "I never imagined that
Israelis would so interpret the concept of historical right." Harkabi
listed in sub-chapters of his book the numerous applications and
extensions of this doctrine. He pointed out that for Gush Emunim
the Sinai and present-day Lebanon are parts of this Jewish land
and must be liberated by Israel. Rabbi Ariel published an atlas that
designated all lands that were Jewish and needed to be liberated.
This included all areas west and south of the Euphrates River
extending through present-day Kuwait. Harkabi quoted Rabbi
Aviner: "We must live in this land even at the price of war.
Moreover, even if there is peace, we must instigate wars of liberation
in order to conquer it [the land] ." It is not unreasonable to assume
that Gush Emunim, if it possessed the power and control, would
use nuclear weapons in warfare to attempt to achieve its purpose.
For Gush Emunim, as Harkabi made clear and Lustick indirectly
confirmed, the God-ordained inferiority of non-Jews living in the
state of Israel extends to categories other than life and property.
Gush Emunim has developed a foreign policy for the state of Israel
to adopt. This policy stipulates that Arab hostility towards the Jews
is theological in nature and is inherent. The conclusion drawn is
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 73
that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved politically. This
conclusion is supported by Lustick's quoting the prominent Gush
Emunim leader and former Knesset member, Eliezer Waldman:
'"Arab hostility springs, like all anti-Semitism, from the world's
recalcitrance to be saved [by the Jews]"' (pp. 77-9). Lustick also
quoted other Gush Emunim leaders who left no doubt about their
refusal to enter into political agreements with "present-day Jewish
inhabitants of the land who resist the establishment of Jewish
sovereignty over its entirety." Lustick quoted Fisch who argued that
Arab resistance could be attributed to Arabs' seeking "to fulfill their
collective death-wish." Gush Emunim rabbis, politicians and
ideological popularizers have routinely compared Palestinians to
the ancient Canaanites, whose extermination or expulsion by the
ancient Israelites was, according to the Bible, predestined by a divine
design. This genocidal theme of the Bible creates great sympathy
for Gush Emunim among many Christian fundamentalists who
anticipate that the end of the world will be marked by slaughters
and devastation. Gush Emunim has from its inception wanted to
expel as many Palestinians as possible. Palestinian terrorist acts allow
Gush Emunim spokespeople to disguise their real demand for
total expulsion by arguing that expulsion is warranted by "security
needs."
Harkabi quoted the views of Mordechai Nisan, a lecturer at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, that were published in the August
1984 issue ofKivunim, an official publication of the World Zionist
Organization (pp. 151-6). According to Nisan, who relied upon
Maimonides, a non-Jew permitted to reside in the land of Israel
"must accept paying a tax and suffering the humiliation of
servitude." In keeping with a religious text of Maimonides, Nisan,
according to Harkabi, demanded that a non-Jew "be held down
and not [be allowed to] raise his head against Jews." Paraphrasing
Nisan further, Harkabi wrote: "Non-Jews must not be appointed
to any office or position of power over Jews. If they refuse to live
a life of inferiority, then this signals their rebellion and the
unavoidable necessity of Jewish warfare against their very presence
in the land of Israel." Such views about non-Jews, published in an
official publication of the World Zionist Organization, resemble Nazi
arguments about Jews. Harkabi commented: "I do not know how
many Jews share his [Nisan's] belief, but the publication of the article
in a leading Zionist periodical is a cause for grave concern."
The three following examples of other articles that appeared in
Hebrew-language newspapers provide additional analyses of NRP
and Gush Emunim attitudes. One of these articles deals with the
most extreme group within Gush Emunim, named Emunim (Being
Faithful). Established after the formation of the Rabin government
in 1992, Emunim is led by Rabbi Benny Alon, the son of retired
74 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Deputy President of the Israeli Supreme Court Menahem Alon.
Rabbi Alon, quoted by Nadav Shraggai in his September 18,1992
Haaretz article, stated:
The method of the mid-1970s will no longer work under a
government whose moral profile is defined by the Meretz Party
and whose members' hearts and minds are filled with scorn for
the entire land of Israel and for Judaism. They not only want a
Palestinian state without any Jews to be established in the very
midst of the land of Israel. They also want a secular democratic
state to replace the Jewish state of Israel. This government is
spiritually rotten.
Rabbi Alon then contrasted the 1992 government leaders with the
Labor leaders of the mid-1980s and before, who "felt like warm-
hearted Jews feel" and were thus responsive to Gush Emunim's
pressures. Alon continued, "But you cannot apply the same methods
with the likes of [Meretz MK] Dedi Tzuker or [Meretz member]
Moshe Amirav who coordinate their deeds with our enemies." In
preparing his September 18,1992 Maariv article, journalist Avi Raz
questioned Alon further and discovered Emunim's tactics:
"Emunim wants to discredit Rabin [the then prime minister] by
forcing him to rely [for a Knesset majority] on the MKs from the
Arab parties and thus to destroy the legitimacy of his government."
Rabin and Peres made concessions but nevertheless insisted upon
expanding Jewish settlements. In his article Raz quoted Alon
further:
From the spiritual point of view Rafael Eitan is wrong and
should be criticized when he justifies Jewish settlements on the
basis of helping Israeli's security. Security considerations in
favor of the settlements are not the point. As I see it, politics rest
upon spirituality. A body politic needs a soul. Israel's security
and even the survival of the Jewish nation are no more than
material dimensions of the spiritual Jewish depth. When we say
that we must prevent the formation of a Palestinian state in order
to save the Jewish state from extinction, we are not talking about
spiritual things.
As Raz observed: "Blessed with profound spirituality, Alon and his
associates go to the United States for five days in order to request
Christian fundamentalists to support financially their activities."
Alon and his associates succeeded in acquiring some of this
requested funding. As Jewish fundamentalists who abominate non-
Jews, they forged a spiritual alliance with Christians who believe
that supporting Jewish fundamentalism is necessary to support
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 75
the second coming of Jesus. This alliance has become a significant
factor in both US and Middle Eastern politics.
The second example concerns the policies of Gush Emunim itself
under the Labor and Meretz government of the 1990s. In his
October 5, 1992 Haaretz article, Danny Rubinstein quoted Gush
Emunim leaders who believed the goal of Rabin's policies was "to
destroy root and branch the [Jewish] settlements in the territories
and all accomplishments of Zionism." Rubinstein carefully dis-
tinguished between the secular Golan Heights settlers and Gush
Emunim. The Golan Heights settlers claimed that Rabin's policies
were mistaken, because peace with Syria could be reached on
Israeli terms. Gush Emunim claimed that "the Washington
negotiations [with the PLO] amount to nothing else than a dialogue
of human beings with a herd of ravenous wolves, aiming solely at
turning the entire land of Israel into the entire land of the Arabs."
This does not mean that Gush Emunim declined to take money
for its own purposes from the government that negotiated "with a
herd of ravenous wolves."
In his October 14, 1992 Haaretz article, Nadav Shraggai discussed
a symposium, organized and underwritten by the ministry of
religion in conjunction with the ministry of education, headed by
Shulamit Aloni. The symposium's theme was: "Is autonomy for
resident aliens in the Holy Land feasible?" Rabbi Shlomo Goren,
the symposium's major speaker, explained: "'Autonomy is
tantamount to a denial of the Jewish religion.'" According to
Goren, the Halacha considers the denial of Judaism to be the
gravest Jewish sin and enjoins pious Jews to kill those infidels who
deny Judaism. Rabbi Goren likened such infidels to those people
who advocated autonomy. This indicated that an attempt to
assasinate Rabin would occur for religious reasons. Goren argued
further that Judaism prohibits "granting any national rights to any
group of foreigners in the land of Israel." Goren also denied that
a Palestinian nation existed. He asserted: "Palestinians disappeared
in the second century bc, and I have not heard of their being
resurrected." Goren reassured his audience that, undeterred by
widespread infidelities, "the process of redemption, already
underway for one hundred years, cannot be reversed when Divine
Providence awaits us all the time." Another symposium participant,
Rabbi Aviner, concurred with Goren that Judaism forbade granting
even a small amount of autonomy to the Palestinians. Rabbi
Zalman Melamed, chairman of the Committee of the Rabbis of
Judea, Samaria and Gaza, made the same point even more clearly:
"No rabbinual authority disputes that it would be ideal if the land
of Israel were inhabited by only Jews." Rabbi Shlomo Min-Hahar
extended the argument to Muslims and Christians specifically by
claiming: "The entire Muslim world is money-grubbing, despicable
76 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
and capable of anything. All Christians without exception hate the
Jews and look forward to their deaths."
Israeli taxpayers, including Muslim and Christian Arabs, paid
for this symposium, during which rabbinical leaders delivered such
arguments. Prime Minister Rabin and the ministers of religion and
education approved and did not utter publicly negative criticism
of any of the views expressed. Rabin's approval might be understood
as a part of his deliberate encouragement of political programs at
variance with what he claimed to favor. Minister of Education
Aloni's approval can be understood rationally only as another
manifestation of her weakness, carelessness and foolishness. Both
Rabin and Aloni visited Germany shortly before this symposium
and fiercely condemned publicly the "German hatred of foreigners."
They carefully avoided mentioning racist statements and recom-
mendations made by rabbis in Israel about how foreigners should
be treated. They did not mention, let alone condemn, Rabbi
Melamed's advocacy of transfer, that is, the total expulsion of all
non-Jews from the land of Israel. Such mention might have
complemented their denunciation of German xenophobia.
The third example, also taken from the Hebrew press, stems from
a book of responsa, published in 1990. The book, Intifada Responses,
written by the important Gush Emunim rabbi, Shlomo Aviner,
provides in plain Hebrew halachic answers to the questions of
what pious Jews should do to Palestinians during situations that
arise at times similar to the Intifada. The book is divided into brief
chapters that contain answers to questions. The answers do not
relate to Israeli law. Quotations from the first two chapters
(pp. 19-22) illustrate the essence of the questions and answers
contained in this book. The first exemplary question in Chapter 1
is: "Is there a difference between punishing an Arab child and an
Arab adult for a disturbance of our peace?" The answer begins by
cautioning people not conversant with the Halacha that comparisons
should not be made between Jewish and Gentile underage minors;
"As is known, no Halachic punishments can be inflicted upon
Jewish boys below the age of thirteen and Jewish girls below the
age of twelve ... Maimonides wrote that this rule applied to Jews
alone ... not to any non-Jews. Therefore, any non-Jews, no matter
what age, will have to pay for any crime committed." In providing
his answer. Rabbi Aviner proceeded to quote another ruling by
Maimonides that warned Jews not to punish a non-Jewish child who
can be presumed to be "short of wisdom." Aviner concluded that
determining whether a non-Jewish child is to be regarded as an adult
depends upon whether that child, even if younger than thirteen,
has sufficient understanding. According to what Aviner wrote in
his book, any Jew is capable of judging whether a non-Jewish child
should in this sense be considered and punished as an adult. The
THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY 77
second exemplary question is: "What shall we do if an Arab child
intends to threaten a [Jewish] life?" Rabbi Aviner explained that
all prior responsa dealt only with the actual commissions of crimes
by non-Jewish children. He explained in this answer that if a non-
Jewish child intended to commit murder, for example, by throwing
a stone at a passing car, that the non-Jewish child should be
considered a "persecutor of the Jews" and should be killed. Citing
Maimonides as his authority, Aviner maintained that killing the non-
Jewish child in this instance is necessary to save Jewish life.
In the second chapter of his book Rabbi Aviner posed and
answered a single question: "Does the Halacha permit inflicting
the death penalty upon Arabs who throw stones?" His answer was
that inflicting such a punishment is not only permitted but is
mandatory. This punishment, moreover, is not reserved for stone
throwers but can be invoked for other reasons. Aviner asserted that
a rabbinical court or a king of Israel "has the power to punish anyone
by death if it is believed that the world will thereby be improved."
The rabbinical court or king of Israel can alternatively punish non-
Jews and wicked Jews by beating them mercilessly, by imprisoning
them under the most severe conditions and/or by inflicting upon
them other extreme suffering. Gush Emunim spokespeople have
argued that this power of the rabbinical court and king of Israel
can devolve to the Israeli government, provided that government
abides by the correct religious rulings. The punishments, mentioned
here, should be invoked if the authorities believe that such
punishment will deter other wicked people. Aviner made clear his
preference was to invoke the death penalty and /or severe flogging
upon any non-Jew found guilty of intending to throw stones at Jews.
The discussion in this chapter should distinguish qualitatively
the Gush Emunim-NRP form from the Haredi form of Jewish fun-
damentalism. The greater potential danger clearly rests with the
Gush Emunim and the NRP, because their members have involved
themselves in the state in order to sanctify Israel.
The Nature of Gush Emunim
Settlements
Media coverage of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories
has primarily focused upon effects on Palestinians and the threat
posed to peaceful resolution of conflict. From the prospective of
Jewish fundamentalism the religious settlements should be viewed
from three standpoints: their standing as citadels of messianic
ideology, their present and potential influence upon Israeli society
and their potential role as the nuclei of the new society that
messianic leaders want to build.
Such discussion must be preceded by two comments concerning
the settlements, as viewed by Israeli society. The first comment is
that a great majority of Israeli citizens, represented by Knesset
members, favor Israel's retaining all settlements. In early 1999, at
least 100 of the 120 Knesset members, including all the Labor Party
members, almost certainly support this position even though minor
differences exist about the form of retention. All Arab Knesset
members oppose retaining the settlements; hence the percentage
of Jewish Knesset members in favor is still even greater than a mere
counting might indicate. In Israeli Jewish society, nevertheless, a
sharp popular difference in point of view about settlements still
exists. Some small groups on the left oppose all settlements. More
importantly, most Israeli Jews consider it normal that Jews live in
some settlements but abnormal that Jews live in other settlements.
This distinction is usually ignored outside Israel, especially in the
Arab world.
The majority of Israeli Jews regard living in settlements in the
"greater Jerusalem" area as normal. "Greater Jerusalem" is an
Israeli urban and social term, not limited in meaning to the Green
Line or to the municipal borders of Jerusalem, as established during
the 1967 annexation. Living in "greater Jerusalem" means living
in a place with bus connections adequate for Jews to travel by public
transportation to Jerusalem for shopping or evening entertainment
and to return home by midnight. In early 1999, more than 250,000
Israeli Jews, about 5 per cent of the total Israeli population, lived
in "greater Jerusalem." The total population of all other West
Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights settlements is about 100,000.
78
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 79
These 100,000 are not solidly grouped in a small area, closely
connected with a big city, but are divided into many small
settlements. Ariel, the largest West Bank settlement outside of
"greater Jerusalem," for example, has about 15,000 inhabitants;
Kiryat Arba has less than 6000; many settlements have about 100
inhabitants. These numbers show that the majority of Israeli Jews
regard living in those settlements as abnormal and refuse to settle
there. In spite of the money expended and the other forms of
support by Israeli governments for so long a time period, only a
small number of Jews have opted to live in settlements in the
occupied territories outside of "greater Jerusalem."
In the settlements outside of "greater Jerusalem" another
distinction, constantly made by the Israeli Jewish public, must be
noted. Those settlements whose inhabitants are similar socially and
politically to the majority secular segment of Israeli Jewish society
have been and still are viewed differendy than are those setdements
whose inhabitants are mostly or totally religious Jews. (As previously
stated only 20 per cent of all Israeli Jews are religious.) This is seen
in Israeli election results, reported by the media about every four
years for each locality, including each settlement. In the "greater
Jerusalem" settlements, the voting pattern does not differ from the
Jewish average behind the Green Line; in other secular settlements
the pattern is almost the same with only a small tilt to the right.
The Labor and Meretz parties regularly receive good percentages
of the total vote. In the religious settlements, on the other hand,
the inhabitants rarely even vote for Likud or other right-wing
secular parties; they vote instead for religious parties and quite often
only for the NRP. In Kiryat Arba in the 1 992 elections, for example,
the four largest secular parties - Labor, Likud, Meretz and Tsomet
- received altogether less than 5 per cent of the vote. Nationally,
those parties together received about 80 per cent of the national
vote. In the 1 996 election the Likud vote in Kiryat Arba rose to
24.4 per cent because of Netanyahu's promises; in the separate vote
for prime minister that year Netanyahu received 96.3 per cent and
Peres only 3.6 per cent. (In the national vote for prime minister
that year Netanyahu received 50.1 per cent and Peres 49.3 per cent.)
Beit El B is a typical smaller religious settlement in which Netanyahu
received 99.6 per cent of the prime minister's vote in 1996 to only
0.3 per cent for Peres. In the Knesset election that same year in
Beit El B, the NRP received 76.4 per cent and Moledet, the most
right-wing party represented in the Knesset, with strong religious
tendencies, received 14.5 per cent. Thus, NRP and Moledet, the
two parties that garnered together 1 1 of the 1 20 Knesset seats or
9.1 per cent in 1996, received 90 per cent of the Beit El B vote. In
contrast, in the secular settlement, Alfey Menashe, Netanyahu
received 71.5 per cent and Peres 28.4 per cent of the vote.
80 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
The most exposed and isolated settlements are those inhabited
by religious settlers. Although largely ignored by the media outside
of Israel, this is a significant fact. In these exposed and isolated
settlements, only religious messianic Jews are prepared to settle.
To a greater extent, this has been the major reason why all Israeli
governments have supported the religious messianic settlements
regardless of how the inhabitants there have voted. Netzarim,
situated in the middle of the Gaza Strip, is a good example of these
settlements. To the north of Netzarim is Gaza City, to the south,
some of the largest refugee camps. Each conglomeration has about
200,000 inhabitants. In mid 1998, Netzarim had about 120 religious
messianic Jewish settler families. (At the time that the Oslo
agreement was signed, Netzarim had almost 60 families.) Some of
the adult males living in Netzarim spend most of their time studying
Talmud. Near Netzarim is an army base that guards a military road
crossing the Gaza Strip from east to west. This road, which
according to the Oslo agreement is under exclusive Israeli control,
cuts the Gaza Strip into two parts. The army base is strategic in
controlling Gaza but is represented to the Israeli Jewish public and
to the outside world as necessary to protect the settlement of
Netzarim. Secular, traditional and/or Haredi Jews have not opted
to settle in Netzarim and have given no indications of settling
there in the future. Thus, the Israeli government, wishing to
maintain the control of the road, must depend upon the messianic
settlers who are ideologically dedicated to settle in such a place.
Settlements in the Occupied Territories can be correctly
understood only within the context of overall Israeli strategy. The
basic concept, held since 1967 by both Labor and Likud with
different degrees of hypocrisy, has been to oppress Palestinians with
maximum efficiency. Maximum efficiency includes minimal number
of Jewish forces to achieve the specific purpose. The major idea is
that well-trained Jewish soldiers should to the greatest extent
possible be reserved for any major war with one or more of the Arab
states. Soon after acquiring the Occupied Territories in June, 1967,
the Israeli government seriously considered the "Jordanian option."
This idea was that Jordanian forces would come to the West Bank
to do the necessary job for Israel. The government of Jordan,
however, refused to agree to this plan. Hence, the government of
Israel then devised and instituted the "village leagues," composed
of local Palestinians who effectively ruled the West Bank for some
years with only slight support of the Israeli army. The Intifada broke
the "village leagues." Both the "Jordanian option" and the "village
leagues" concepts were devised for the same purpose as was the
Oslo process in the 1990s. Prime Minister Rabin clearly explained
that this purpose was to have Palestinians ruled on Israelis' behalf
by their own people. This was to be accomplished without
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 81
interference from human right organizations and without Israeli legal
hindrances to the arbitrary will of the conquest regime. The Israeli
army, according to this thinking, would be free to concentrate
upon its grand military strategy.
Israeli strategy regarding the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in
the period after Oslo was and still is based upon settlements being
the foci of Israeli military power. This strategy can best be described
by considering the Gaza Strip, where the geography is much clearer
than in the West Bank. The Gaza Strip, as clearly seen on published
maps, is criss-crossed by military roads. In keeping with the Cairo
Accords, these military roads remain under exclusive Israeli
jurisdiction and are patrolled by the army, either jointly with
Palestinian police or separately. The Israeli army has the legal
right to close any section of these roads to Palestinian traffic, even
if the section is within an area ruled by the Palestinian Authority.
The Israeli army uses this right routinely either when a convoy on
route to a settlement is passing or when a decision is made to
embarrass the Palestinian Authority. One of these roads, the Gaza
City bypassing road, traverses the length of the Strip, carefully
bypassing the main cities and refugee camps. Another military
road, joined to a strip of land, cuts off the Gaza Strip from Egypt.
Other roads traverse the Gaza Strip from the Israeli border on its
east side to the sea or to the Jewish settlement block (Qatif) on the
west. One such road, the Netzarim road, meets the Gaza City
bypassing road at Netzarim, thus rendering Netzarim a strategi-
cally important crossroad. Shortly after the signing of the Oslo
Accord, the Israeli Hebrew press reported that large forces of the
border guards and the army were stationed near Netzarim where
a new base had been constructed for them. The official status of
Netzarim allowed Israel to do this legally and to acquire the support
of that part of the Israeli Jewish public that is more devoted to
settlements than to army bases. As the well-known commentator
Nahum Barnea quipped: "Had a Netzarim not existed, it would
have been invented."
The overall effect of all these roads is that the Gaza Strip is sliced
into enclaves controlled by the bypassing roads. The role of the
Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip is to serve as pivots of the road
grid. This is devised to ensure more effectual perpetual Israel
control. This new form of control, labelled "control from the
outside" by Rabin and other Labor politicians, allows the army to
dominate the Gaza Strip with only a minor expenditure of forces.
This is far preferable to the former situation in which huge control
presence had to be expended for direct patrolling of cities and
refugee camps of the Gaza Strip. The Hebrew press has continually
referred to the earlier form of control as the "control from the inside"
and has emphasized that it was less effective and required more
82 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
forces than the "control from the outside." Changing from inside
to outside control continues to depend upon the grid of roads
which in turn depends upon settlements such as Netzarim. As
already stated but worth repeating, only religious Jews who believe
in messianic ideology have been willing to establish and live in such
settlements.
The situation in the West Bank, outside the greater Jerusalem,
is geographically more complicated than the Gaza Strip but is
essentially based upon the same principles of "control from the
outside." This control is centered upon a grid of roads whose foci
are the settlements. A few settlements were founded for sentimental
reasons. Ariel Sharon, wanting to provoke the United States
Secretary of State James Baker during his visits to Israel in 1991
and 1992, helped establish these few settlements. Small groups of
fundamentalist Jews, even more extreme than Gush Emunim, also
helped establish these small settlements. Although given prominent
media coverage, these settlements remained relatively insignifi-
cant, representing only a small proportion of all the settlements.
Settlements, such as Kiryat Arba and the separate Jewish settlement
in Hebron, have been supported by all Israeli governments primarily
for strategic reasons. Although at times creating smokescreens by
making insulting comments about settlers, Prime Minister Rabin
from the time of the Oslo agreement until his death strengthened
most of the settlements, especially those in the West Bank. Yossi
Beilin, one of the chief architects of the Oslo agreement, repeatedly
reassured the Israeli public that the Labor government had not
abandoned the settlers. Beilin, as reported in Maariv on September
27, 1995, rebutted accusations made by Likud members of Knesset:
Their most ridiculous accusation is that we have abandoned the
settlers. The Oslo Accord was delayed for months to guarantee
that all the settlers would remain intact and that the setders
would have maximum security. This entailed making an
immense financial investment in them. The situation in the
settlements has never been better than that created following
the Oslo Accord.
Even more important is that the Labor government had an
opportunity to remove the Hebron settlers, or at least a part of them,
in the period of shock after Goldstein's massacre. The Labor
government refrained from doing so. In his August 18, 1995 Davar
article, Daniel Ben-Simon revealed the following about discussion
of the issue in Prime Minister Rabin's office: "The heads of all Israeli
security services opposed the evacuation of Hebron's settlers."
Such opposition underlined the settlements' strategic importance
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 83
and the dependence of both the Israeli government and army upon
the messianic settlers.
The messianic ideology, described in the prior chapter, and the
many pronouncements of messianic rabbis and lay leaders show
that the aim of Gush Emunim, unlike the aim of Israeli governments,
is not limited to the strategic value of utilizing settlements to keep
control of the Occupied Territories. The more important aim of
Gush Emunim leaders is to create in their homogeneous settlements
models of a new society. They hope this new society will spread
until it finally absorbs the secular, traditional and Haredi Jewish
population of the state of Israel into the collective Jewish identity
that they envision. This identity will, they believe, be the religious,
ethnocentric, anti-liberal and anti-universalist society ordered by
God. In attempting to conceptualize their plan, Gush Emunim
leaders can tolerate democracy only so long as it helps to create
the divine Jewish kingdom. They believe that any values not
consistent with Jewish values, as established by the Halacha and
Cabbala, should be suppressed. Human and civil rights, as well as
the concept of statehood, should be established by a specified
divinely inspired group of rabbis. These views became more widely
acceptable in Israeli society, especially among NRP members, after
the October 1973 war. In that war secular Israeli militarism suffered
a defeat. The widely perceived failure of generals led to the formation
of an esoteric elite that supposedly derived its knowledge from a
higher source than mere strategic considerations. Some of the
leading generals in that war were regarded as hedonists who were
careless with the military affairs entrusted to them; Gush Emunim
rabbis and lay leaders appeared to many Israeli Jews to be endowed
with dedication, a sense of mission, moral superiority, strict honesty
in financial affairs and a sense of their own certitude. This char-
acterization, similar to that of Hamas leaders in Palestinian society,
continued thereafter. Gush Emunim leaders have remained
dedicated to their principles and are financially honest. In a society
pervaded by many kinds of corruption, this is most important. Gush
Emunim has been and still is endowed, moreover, with a territorial
base of its own, replete with dedicated followers who can expertly
handle weapons and execute military operations.
The power of Gush Emunim increased significantly between 1974
and 1992. In addition to its own members it acquired a periphery
of supporters with varying degrees of commitment. Perhaps its
greatest achievement after 1 974 was its ability to influence Israeli
Jewish culture and collective identity during a period when
ethnocentric ideas rose to the fore in Israeli society. Most of the
political right wing, as well as many Labor Party supporters,
remained sympathetic to Gush Emunim so long as Palestinians in
the territories remained relatively docile. This situation lasted until
84 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987. Before the Intifada,
many Israeli Jews felt that the control of Palestinians from the inside
was not too costly and was bearable. Hence, many secular Israeli
Jews felt that they could afford to support the Gush Emunim
version of the conquest rather than the Moshe Dayan version,
which prevailed until 1974 and was based upon cooperation with
conservative Palestinian notables. Cooperation with the traditional
Palestinian notables made it unnecessary to keep large Israeli forces
inside the areas densely inhabited by Palestinians. Because the
notables were alienated by the settling and by the resultant
confiscation of land in those areas, "village leagues" were invented
as a substitute for the traditional forces. The Intifada showed that
this prop was only of temporary value. The settling of the Gaza
Strip and the remainder of the West Bank began in 1975 when
Rabin for the first time was prime minister and Peres was the
defense minister in charge of the territories. These two architects
of the so-called peace process of the 1990s were largely responsible
for one of the major factors preventing peace.
The onslaught of the Intifada changed sentiment within Israeli
Jewish society. The Israeli government deployed more Israeli
soldiers in the territories. This caused many secular Israeli Jews to
reconsider the costs involved in occupying the territories. Many of
these Jews concluded that the cost was unwarranted. A new situation
in Israeli society then developed and continued thereafter. The
coalition of messianists and their various supporters, all ethnocentric
to some extent, joined together and formed one camp. The other
camp consisted of a politically and socially heterogeneous group
of people, united in opposition to the type of Jewish theocracy that
they saw as the inevitable consequence of the continued support
of Gush Emunim and its settlements. The continuing Israeli
domination of the Occupied Territories, dictated to some extent
by Gush Emunim, developed into a major issue in the struggle
between these two Israeli Jewish camps.
The rapid organization of Gush Emunim settlers boosted the
expansion and power of religious settlements after 1974. The
rabbis who became and remained the dominant leaders of the
Gush Emunim settlers in 1991, organized themselves into the
Association of Judea and Samaria Rabbis. The group was founded
after President Bush of the United States pressured the Shamir
government to participate in the Madrid Conference. Lay settler
leaders were afraid of what might develop at the Madrid Conference.
As Dov Albaum wrote in the January 7, 1 994 issue of Yerushalaim:
"The rabbis, trusting in the divine promise, took advantage of that
situation by filling the leadership vacuum." The power of the
rabbinical association increased after the Oslo agreement. Albaum
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 85
continued his analysis by quoting Daniel Shilo, the rabbi of the
Kedunim messianic settlement:
The Judea and Samaria rabbis are now solving the gravest
problems the religious settlers face when they begin to lose faith
in the Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria, as ordered by God,
to be an instrument of the Jewish redemption. Jews who lack faith
even begin to ponder whether the whole idea of settlement in
the territories might not be fundamentally wrong or whether the
process of divine redemption is not in its retrogression stage or
whether the Almighty is not trying to signal to us to halt the
settling. In such a time rabbis have the obligation to provide the
answers. This is why we rabbis have more power than any
conceivable lay Gush Emunim authority.
The rabbis used this power to emphasize that their followers were
obligated to have faith in them. This is often disguised as having
faith in God.
Albaum further observed:
The Judea and Samaria rabbis are not satisfied with being vested
only with spiritual power. They began developing their own
intelligence network, which quickly became extensive, using
information gathered from religious or otherwise sympathetic
officers of the Israeli army's high command. General Moshe Bar-
Kochba, a member of the General Staff who recently died after
retiring from the army, was named by the Judea and Samaria
rabbis as one of their major informants. Bar-Kochba allegedly
informed the rabbis regularly and in advance about the plans for
army operations in the territories. Upon learning about his
actions, other officers followed in his footsteps. Thereupon, the
army command, in order to gain access to the real leadership of
the religious settlers, decided to regularize those relations and
to inform the rabbis officially about its operations. A battalion
commander, for example, did not hesitate to dress a local
settlement rabbi in army uniform, take him to a look-out post
and identify to him the undercover soldiers operating in local Arab
villages. [The commander hoped] that he would thus convince
the Judea and Samaria rabbis to stop blocking the major highways
and thereby obstructing the unit's movements. This was not an
isolated instance. The heads of the Judea and Samaria Settlement
Council, comprised of religious laymen, now confront a rabbinical
council of what is effectively a kingdom of Judea, which arose
before their eyes. The council of laymen derives some consolation
from its solid connections with government agencies. Rabin,
whose top priority interest is to reach a dialogue with religious
86 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
settlers, keeps summoning the Judea and Samaria Council
members for intimate talks. He cannot have the same contact
with the kingdom of Judea rabbis, because they consider it
demeaning to address a sinner like him. They also know that the
lay council members would not dare to make a major decision
without first obtaining their blessing.
The Oslo process shocked Gush Emunim rabbis and lay settlers.
This occurred in spite of the great material support for settlements
that Gush Emunim received in the 1990s from Prime Ministers
Rabin, Peres and Netanyahu. A few messianic rabbis offered
explanations for the occurrence of Oslo and attempted to console
their flock about the process, but they met with almost no success.
Religious symbolism, especially appearing in apocalyptic forms,
blocked acceptance. The sight of Palestinians waving their flags,
the appearance of armed Palestinian police and the proliferating
symbols of the Palestinian Authority constituted visible evidence
for the failure of the messianic vision of quick redemption. This in
turn deepened the hatred of "Jewish traitors," whose treason
allegedly spoiled God's plan and influenced the majority of Jews
to disregard the divine command and to follow the traitors. This
hatred, directed mostly at Rabin and his ministers, was consistent
with the Cabbala, which held that the redemption of the Jews had
almost occurred at various times only to be prevented each time
because a majority of the nation opted to follow a heretic or a traitor.
In Jewish history those who have most strongly believed in the
coming victory of redemption have also most strongly harbored
feelings of betrayal. After Oslo such people were mostly concentrated
in the religious settlements.
Hatred of Arabs and secular Jews has not been solely limited to
members of religious settlements. In his March 11, 1994 article,
published in Shishi, Nerri Horowitz focused upon another group
of extremists, called Hardelim. 1 Horowitz analysed Hardelim's
"twofold hatred of Arabs and secular Jews" and presented docu-
mentation in the form of quotations from their copious and abstruse
literature, filled with cabbalistic references. Although esoteric, the
literature of the Hardelim has influenced a majority of religious Jews.
(A minority of religious Jews have opposed the Hardelim advocacy.)
Nadav Shraggai presented a more popular description of this
"twofold hatred" ideology in his February 18,1 994 Haaretz article.
Shraggai pointed to the renunciation by some religious settlers and
other religious Jews of the traditional prayer for the State of Israel,
which was never accepted by the Haredim but said by NRP
followers on every sabbath and religious holiday since 1948.
Shraggai noted that some religious Jews who had previously
recognized the State of Israel as holy renounced this prayer and
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 87
the holiness of the state; they became convinced that the government
and therefore the state, in accepting Oslo, had "betrayed its sacred
mission." After concluding that Rabin and his ministers were
traitors, the messianists viewed as particularly offensive the following
words of the prayer: "O, God, radiate your light and truth upon
Israel's leaders, ministers and advisers." Shraggai correctly insisted
that his analysis focused upon the relatively moderate antagonists.
These moderates contented themselves with intense ideological
debate but did not, as did the extremists, plan and engage in
murder and other violent acts. Shraggai wrote:
The personal, ideological and religious crisis in which the national-
religious Jewish community in Israel has found itself, generated
doubts about the very foundations of religious Zionism: namely
its historic alliance with secular Zionism and its wholehearted
acceptance of the State of Israel. In the past that alliance revolved
around the perception that the secular State of Israel was the first
stage in the process of redemption. At present, even the moderates
question this assumption. These doubters do not have much in
common with radicals like the admittedly marginal Yehuda
Etzion of the Jewish Underground who opposes any Jewish state
that is not a monarchy ruled by the Davidic dynasty, or Mordechai
Karpel, the founder of the Jewish Nation Exists for Eternity
movement, which also wants to turn Israel into a theocratic
monarchy.
Shraggai noted that several influential rabbis, including Azri'el
Ariel who eulogized the assassin Goldstein, led the "moderates."
Shraggai quoted Rabbi Ariel:
The religious settlements were established not only to create facts
on the ground but also to affect the hearts and minds of the Jewish
people. We believed that, by encountering the holy parts of the
land as if they were alive, the hearts of the Jewish masses would
be united with the heart of the land. We envisaged the process
as reconnecting the national Jewish consciousness with its spiritual
roots.
Rabbi Ariel further opined:
For a majority of Jews the settlements have failed to restore that
sacred linkage. The majority of Jews have renounced the Jewish
roots present in their souls, profaning themselves by [committing
the] sin of choosing the so-called "morality" of Western culture
instead of their own moral values. In the state of that grave sin
their hearts have remained unaffected by the land of Israel . . .
88 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
We now have to build the sacred and observant community
from within. Let us stop looking out. Let us stop to seek paths
[that lead] to the hearts of our sinning Jewish brethren. One day,
those who have effectively abandoned the Jewish religion will find
their dreams shattered. They will become afflicted by a sense of
emptiness. After having faltered on every path, they will come
to seek us. Until then our role will consist of raising a generation
of the truly chosen and holy ones, a generation capable of
receiving Jewish repentant sinners with open arms.
In presenting his argument, Rabbi Ariel did not mention
Palestinians. Although presumably realizing that Palestinians on
all sides surround their sacred and observant communities, Rabbi
Ariel and others like him have consistently considered irrelevant
the existence of Palestinians; they have concerned themselves with
secular Jewish Zionists. Shraggai quoted Ariel: "Historic Zionism
has reached its end in bankruptcy . . . The real Zionism, the holy
one with profound roots, exists only where the really religious Jews
are living; in the mountains of Judea and the valleys of Samaria."
In his article Shraggai additionally quoted the articulate settlement
rabbi, Yair Dreyfus. Maintaining that Israel was committing spiritual
apostasy by making an agreement with the PLO, Rabbi Dreyfus
argued further that the finalization of that agreement would "mark
the end of the Jewish-Zionist era in the sacred history of the land
of Israel." Dreyfus, as quoted by Shraggai, continued:
Historians will record that the Jewish-Zionist era lasted from 1948
to 1993. It ended when most Jews had turned into Canaanites.
Hence, 1993 marks the beginning of the new Canaanite era ...
in that era of sin Jewish political thought, cultural-educational
thought included, will be polluted by a speedy Arabization. The
Jewish left will continue its treacherous practices of dismissing
Jews from key posts and replacing them with Arabs. This will
be done in the government, broadcasting authority, land
authority, editorial boards of newspapers and boards of university
directors. Every important position will be filled by an Arab.
Although his predictions were not fulfilled after 1993, Rabbi
Dreyfus has remained steadfast in his belief about the new Canaanite
era. For him pollution apparently often resulted when Jews had
contact with Gentiles. Rabbi Dreyfus accused secular Jews of
"wanting to create a new Israeli-Canaanite personality and thus
destroying authentic Judaism by blending it with alien elements."
He feared that this new personality would eliminate Jewish-Zionist
motivation. He accused the Meretz Party of blending Communism
into it and by this process polluting Zionism. This blend, Dreyfus
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 89
contended, "has begotten the seed for growth of a new Middle
Eastern ethnicity: the Canaanite-Palestinian pseudo-Jews." He
concluded:
The true Jews, desirous to live as Jews, will have no choice but
to separate themselves in ghettos. The new, sinful Canaanite-
Palestinian state [Israel after Oslo] will soon be established upon
the ruins of the genuine Jewish-Zionist state. It will not be, as
Israel was expected to become by being true to the word of God,
a foundation of God's throne on earth. God may even make war
against this polluted throne of his. The Jews who lead us into
that sin no longer deserve any divine protection. We must fight
those who separated themselves from the true Israel. They have
declared a war against us, the bearers of the word of God. Our
leadership will walk a Via Dolorosa before it understands that
we are commanded to resist the state of Israel, not just its
present government. Our cooperation with its agencies can only
be based upon a new covenant. Without it, we are going to
surrender supinely to a government of sin. Instead of doing so,
we shall pursue a merciless struggle against the Canaanite-
Palestinian entity.
By expressing his opinions openly and forcefully, Rabbi Dreyfus
both represented and influenced the thinking of most religious
settlers before and after the Rabin assassination. Notwithstanding
the hostility to Christianity existent in historical Judaism and
religious Zionism, the parallels here to specific Christian theological
formulations are conspicuous.
For secular Israeli Jews, the most important NRP and religious
settler issue has revolved around the penetration of young NRP
followers into the combat and elite units of the army and its officer
corps. For nearly twenty-five years after the June 1967 war, this
penetration on balance enhanced the image and importance of the
NRP in Israeli society; a kind of partnership between the NRP and
the secular majority emerged. The initiation of the Oslo process,
however, provoked some rethinking by many secular Jews and
raised some tough issues. The Rabin assassination heightened
apprehension of and aroused fears about the NRP's penetration
into the military. All of this occurred because of the strong military
character of Israeli Jewish society. This character developed not
only because Jewish males serve in the military for at least three
years, 2 but also because they, after finishing their time of duty,
continue serving as reservists for one month each year until the age
of fifty-four. The fact that about one-half of all Israeli Jewish
females serve in the military for at least two years additionally
contributes to the shaping of this character. Those who serve in
90 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
the combat and/or elite units or as pilots enjoy tremendous social
prestige when they leave the service and often are able to exert
political influence. The political weakness of religious parties,
especially the NRP, before 1967 was directly related to the relative
absence of religious soldiers in combat and elite units of the army.
This situation changed slowly after 1967. When Gush Emunim
appeared in 1975, its lay leaders and especially its rabbis began
educating and inspiring young NRP followers to adopt the military
profession as a religious duty, to join the combat and elite units of
the army and to become officers. Young NRP followers became
dedicated, disciplined and efficient soldiers, ready, if necessary, to
sacrifice their lives for their country. The army high command and
a large segment of the Israeli Jewish population welcomed this
development with positive enthusiasm. The NRP thus earned
public appreciation, just as the kibbutz movement had done
previously, because of the excellent military performances of its
young members.
The Oslo process initiated a change in the almost unqualified
admiration of Gush Emunim and the NRP. Fears arose that NRP
followers in the army might refuse to carry out government orders
for Israeli withdrawals from parts of the occupied territories and/or
for the removal of one or more Jewish settlements. The fears
expanded following the Rabin assassination. Even before the assas-
sination, Baruch Kimmerling, in his April 6, 1994 Haaretz article,
reflected a bit of the early apprehension and fear. He discussed the
increasing penetration of the Israeli army by religious zealots and
the powerful influence of the religious settlers upon units stationed
in the territories. Kimmerling concluded: "Now it is all important
that the army's command sees to it that every army unit is
supervised. Perhaps those officers and even entire units, which were
for too long involved in negotiations with the religious settlers and
in protecting them and which have in the process developed too
much affinity with them, should be instantly disbanded."
Kimmerling regarded his recommendation as only a stop-gap
solution. The army high command did not accept and most of the
attentive public ridiculed the recommendation at that time.
Kimmerling recognized that "in the long range" the problem that
had arisen would be insoluble without a deep change in society.
He wrote: "On the one hand, it is difficult to see how the army,
having a significant number of officers adhering to ideology of
religious settlers, could evacuate a Jewish settlement. On the other
hand, I find it difficult to imagine how the Israeli army could be
ideologically purified."
Worth noting here are the two unique schemes devised for young
NRP followers in an organized fashion to serve in and penetrate
the combat and elite units. The first scheme was formulated as an
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 91
arrangement, not governed by law, between two independent
parties: the Israeli defense ministry and the rabbinical heads of the
NRP's Hesder Yeshivot religious schools. According to this
arrangement, Hesder Yeshivot students receive a special kind of
draft service. They are not inducted into the army in the normal
way and thus do not serve continuously for three years in units
assigned by the army according to its needs. The regular army units
almost always consist of soldiers holding differing religious and
secular views. The Hesder Yeshivot students instead are inducted
into the army as a group and serve in their own homogeneous
companies, accompanied by their rabbis who are responsible for
and watch over the students' "religious purity." They serve for
eighteen months rather than for the full three years. The eighteen-
month period is not continuous but is rather divided into three
six-month periods. After each period of army service, the Hesder
Yeshivot students leave the army for a six-month period of talmudic
study in a yeshiva wherein the presumably negative influences of
having met secular Jewish soldiers are supposedly countered. The
Hesder Yeshivot soldiers continue to serve in reserve units under
the usual conditions. The political pressure exerted by Gush
Emunim and the sympathy for its members felt by army generals
in the 1970s were partly responsible for this special arrangement.
The major reason for its continuation, however, is the excellent
military quality and record of Hesder Yeshivot students. Their
performance is far above the average of those in the Israeli army
and their dedication is even greater. Not only the generals but also
other soldiers hold this view. During the three years of the Lebanon
War (1982-85) and in the aftermath of fighting in the "security
zone," for example, Hesder Yeshivot students continued fighting
and winning even after a high proportion of Israeli soldiers had been
wounded and killed. Soldiers in Hesder Yeshivot units also dis-
tinguished themselves during the suppression of the Intifada; they
were noted for their cruelty to Palestinians, which was from many
perspectives much more severe than the Israeli army average. The
homogeneous composition of Hesder Yeshivot companies of
soldiers is another reason for the continuation of the special
arrangement. When the army commanding officers have wanted
to inflict especially cruel punishment upon Palestinians or others,
they have most often relied upon and used religious soldiers. In
more ordinary companies, consisting of soldiers holding varying
political views, some members might object to illegal cruelty and
even inform media people of its use. In Hesder Yeshivot units the
religious soldiers, who are anyway more cruel than most secular
Jews, will not object to the orders. 3
From 1 996, when indications appeared that membership in the
Hesder Yeshivot had stopped increasing and may have begun to
92 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
decrease, the religious pre-military academy scheme became the
chief means of organized penetration by NRP supporters into the
Israeli army. By this arrangement the young men, usually eighteen
years of age, who enter religious pre-military academies are given
draft deferments for one or one and one-half years of study.
Afterwards, they serve for three years in ordinary combat or elite
units. This is in contrast to serving, as do Hesder Yeshivot students,
in homogeneous companies or units. The teachers in these
academies are for the most part not rabbis but rather ex-officers
who possess some talmudic knowledge. Only a small amount of
the teaching is devoted to military subjects and training in hiking
and endurance. Most of the teaching and study time is devoted to
those parts of the Talmud and other religious literature that
inculcate dedication to the land of Israel and to other values favored
by Gush Emunim. The ascetic pre-military academy life is attractive
to religious youth who are often in reaction against the hedonistic
life style of secular Israeli youth. Since their inception the pre-
military academies have been situated in settlements in the Occupied
Territories. The army has from the beginning subsidized these
academies to some extent, but the major part of the support money
has come from private donors. Most graduates of these pre-military
academies are well prepared and advance to the officer corps.
Persuaded that the Israeli army is sacred, those who come out of
these academies almost always serve their full three-year terms.
Some serve for a much longer time and become career officers.
After the Rabin assassination, many Israelis began to view the
increasing number of NRP followers in the army as a threat to the
government and to the Israeli regime as a whole. Ran Edelist
summarized this concern well in his September 13, 1996 article in
the Hebrew-language newspaper Yerushalaim, titled "First We
Shall Conquer the Supreme Court and Then the General Staff."
The title of this article suggests the desire to penetrate and conquer
the most important institutions of the State of Israel. In discussing
the general aims of the messianic religious right, of which the
religious settlers are the advance guard, Edelist wrote:
Their institutions have the stamina of a long-distance runner since
they believe in the eternal survival of the Jewish nation; in this
framework they prepared four approaches for the battle of the
land of Israel: settlements, financial support, education and
promotion of their men in the army to achieve domination of a
future General Staff. This is not a conspiracy but a cool estimate
of a national situation in their struggle for a future image of Israeli
society and a sophisticated use of an opportunistic government,
enabling them to fill their budgets. It is not a case of good and
bad but a struggle about the character of the State of Israel. The
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 93
religious right wing uses the legitimate approach of conquering
positions of power of which the General Staff is central. It may
be said that since the inception of Israel the secret slogan of Israeli
politicians was "we shall conquer first the security apparatus and
then the Knesset and government." Ben-Gurion did this when
he pushed out Sharett and Lavon. Golda Meir's slogan was "the
party is everything," and since her time the Labor party has ruled
in the General Staff. This rule was so absolute that Begin and
Shamir, during the time that they were prime ministers, did not
succeed in shaking this and forming another General Staff that
would be influenced by their ideology.
Understanding Israeli politics, the religious settlers devised and
evolved their plan of penetrating the army, its officer corps and
ultimately the General Staff. As Edelist wrote:
The religious settlers understood that with the help of only party
politics and their ideology they would not get far and would not
achieve a State of Israel in the borders promised by God. If they
therefore want to be represented in every place in which the
important decisions are made, especially in the army as a whole
and particularly in the General Staff, they must be represented
in such places. First the aim and then the means to achieve that
end were decided.
The Hesder Yeshivot and the religious pre-military academies
became those means.
Other Israeli political observers and commentators seconded
Edelist's analysis. In his January 24, 1 997 Haaretz article, titled "The
Army of the Lord," Yidan Miller, for example, described the views
of Dr Reuven Gal, who served as the chief psychologist of the Israeli
army between 1976 and 1982 and then became the director of the
highly respected Karmel Institute for Military and Social Research.
Dr Gal, according to Miller, summarized the data about
volunteering to serve in combat units from 1 994 through 1 996 and
compared them with corresponding data of 1989. Dr Gal reported
that whereas 60 per cent of secular youth in 1 989 wanted to serve
in combat units, the average for the 1993 to 1996 period dropped
to 48 per cent. Most of that decline occurred in 1995 and 1996,
The decline was greatest in the secular kibbutzim, localities with
large leftist majorities. The drop was from 83 per cent in 1989 to
58 per cent in the 1993 to 1996 period. In comparison, among the
religious youth the wish to volunteer to combat units remained
constant at about 80 per cent during the same time. In religious
kibbutzim, the figure went to 90 per cent. Before the Oslo agreement
a large majority of religious youth entering the army considered a
94 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
commander's order to be superior to any instruction from a rabbi.
This had changed by 1996. Citing Dr Gal's summary, Miller
wrote: "For a significant part of them [the religious youth]
instruction by a rabbi had an equal and sometimes superior value
than did an order from a commander."
Publication of such findings disturbed many secular Jews. They
attempted to acquire for their youth opportunities for army careers
similar to those afforded religious youth. They advocated the estab-
lishment of secular pre-military academies. During the first two years
of the Netanyahu government, however, when the Oslo process
stagnated, the numbers of secular youth who volunteered to serve
in combat units increased to a point unparalleled since the 1970s.
This adversely affected the attempted penetration into the army
of the messianic religious right. Comprising only 6 to 7 per cent
of the Israeli Jewish population, 4 the messianic religious right
depended for its penetration upon the absence of motivation of other
Jews to serve in combat units.
Following Netanyahu's election in 1996, two factors motivated
more Israeli Jewish youth to volunteer for combat units. Hie rising
level of Arab hostility to Israel and to its elected government
constituted the first factor. Some Arab leaders issued war threats.
Most of Israel's Jewish youth considered all of this unjustified and
responded in the traditional Israeli manner by advocating increased
militarism. The second factor arose from the perception that
Netanyahu's government was a new coalition of Jewish minorities,
which as never before in the history of the state has allowed those
previously excluded from important social opportunities and
advancements to succeed. For the first time in Israeli history the
defense minister and the chief of staff were Oriental Jews. The older,
Labor-sympathizing elite members of the army opposed those
appointments. This most likely encouraged young Israeli Jewish
males who were not from Ashkenazi Labor-supporting families to
seek careers as army officers. Most of these and other such young
men previously thought that they would not be allowed to become
career officers. Among the lower-income class of Israeli Jews an
army career with its relatively high salaries is prestigious as well as
economically attractive. Except for computer experts, doctors and
other highly educated specialists, the way to a good career is to serve
in a combat unit.
Ironically, the collapse of the detested Oslo process adversely
affected the religious settlers in their attempt to penetrate the
Israeli army and in that way to achieve a commanding influence
over Israeli policies. During most of the time that the Oslo process
continued under the Rabin and Peres governments, the religious
settlers' chances of penetrating the army increased. The religious
settlers' chances of determining specific Israeli policies decreased
THE NATURE OF GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS 95
after Netanyahu and Likud came to power in 1996. Perhaps, this
development provides us with an example of what is sometimes
the fate of fanaticism: the fanatic group thrives when it perceives
itself to be in danger or threatened by other parts of its own society.
Conversely, when faced by a society that has become unified
against what is believed to be an outside threat, the fanatic group
is less able to penetrate major institutions such as the army and to
influence long-range policy.
The Real Significance of Baruch
Goldstein
The story of the massacre committed by Baruch Goldstein in the
Patriarchs' Cave in Hebron on February 25, 1994, is well known.
Goldstein entered the Muslim prayer hall and shot worshippers
mostly in their backs, killing 29, including children, and wounding
many more. In this chapter we shall not describe that massacre;
rather we shall focus upon Goldstein's career prior to the massacre
and upon the reactions of the Israeli government and fundamen-
talist Jews to the massacre a short time after it occurred. This
should provide a vivid illustration of Jewish fundamentalism. We
shall extend our discussion of some details until the summer of 1998.
One important background fact about Goldstein exemplifies
the influence of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel: long before the
massacre, Goldstein as an army physician repeatedly breached
army discipline by refusing to treat Arabs, even those serving in
the Israeli army. He was not punished, either while in active or
reserve service, for his refusal because of intervention in his favor.
Political commentators discussed this story in the Hebrew press
even though not a single Israeli politician referred to it. This story
deserves detailed exploration in our analysis of Jewish fundamen-
talism.
In his March 1, 1994, Yediot Ahronot article, Arych Kizel, a
regular Davar correspondent, wrote that Goldstein, shortly after
immigrating to Israel and as a conscript assigned to an artillery
battalion in Lebanon as a doctor, refused to treat Gentiles.
According to Kizel, Goldstein, after refusing to treat a wounded
Arab, declared: "I am not willing to treat any non-Jew. I recognize
as legitimate only two [religious] authorities: Maimonides and
Kahane." Kizel further reported:
Three Druze soldiers who served in Goldstein's battalion
approached their commander and asked for another doctor to
be stationed in their battalion, because they were afraid that
Goldstein would refuse to treat them in case they were wounded.
Because of their request Goldstein was reassigned to another
battalion. He continued to serve as a military doctor both in the
96
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 97
conscript army and in the reserves. After some years he was
reassigned to the regional Hebron brigade of the central command
where he thereafter served his reserve stint. Immediately after
receiving this assignment, he told his commanders that his
religious faith would make it impossible for him to treat wounded
or ill Arabs; he asked to be reassigned elsewhere. His request was
granted, and he was reassigned to a reserve unit serving in South
Lebanon.
Amir Oren, who subsequently became the military correspondent
of HaaretZy provided the most complete story of Goldstein's relations
with the Israeli army and the entire Israeli political establishment
in his March 4 Davar article. According to Oren, after the 1984
elections and the subsequent formation of the national unity
government, then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and then Chief
of Staff General Moshe Levy learned about Goldstein's refusal to
treat non-Jews in Lebanon. Oren wrote:
When Goldstein's refusal to treat non-Jewish patients became
evident to his commanders, both the artillery corps and medical
corps commanders quite naturally wanted to court-martial him
and thus get rid of him. They took it for granted that this could
be easily done, because Goldstein had graduated only from the
army's course for medical officers. [Goldstein did not have
combat officer training, which is normally a prerequisite for
admission to the course for medical officers.] The two corps
[commanders] also knew that Goldstein, while attending the
army's course for medical officers, had become notorious as an
anti-Arab extremist.
According to other Hebrew press reports, some of Goldstein's
trainee colleagues demanded that he be dismissed from the course;
their demand was refused. Oren related: " [Goldstein] was already
then protected by highly placed people in senior ministries. Those
patrons requested that Goldstein be allowed to serve in Kiryat Arba
rather than in a combat battalion." The situation then developed
into "a bone of contention between the commander of the army's
medical corps and its chief rabbi." Oren continued:
In the end the issue of what to do with an officer who openly
refused to obey orders by invoking Halacha has never been
resolved, even if that officer openly refused to provide medical
help both to Israeli soldiers and POWs. Can we avoid being
stunned by the army's failure to court-martial Goldstein? Why
was no order to court-martial him ever issued by the entire chain
of the army command? That chain of command included the
98 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
commander of the northern command, Reserve General Orri Or
[a Labor MK and later in 1994 the chairman of the Knesset
Committee for Foreign and Defense Affairs], and General Amos
Yaron, who now is the commander of the manpower department.
Why did they refuse to decide without first consulting the chief
rabbi? The already embarrassed medical corps [commanders]
now [after the massacre] admit that they were scared by publicity
that might have propelled the religious parties and religious
settlers' lobbies to make things more of a mess than ever before.
The fear of publicity time after time prompted the army
commanders to give in to all kinds of Goldsteins, rather than to
denounce their views and court-martial them.
Many sources corroborated Oren's hinting that this Goldstein
situation did not constitute a unique case. The story told by Oren
revealed the pervasiveness of the religious parties' influence in the
Israeli army. Jewish orthodoxy's stance against non-Jews, as openly
advocated by Goldstein's idolized leader. Rabbi Meir Kahane,
was - and still is - an essential position held by the major religious
parties. As such, this stance has had a strong impact upon the Israeli
army. Had Rabin and the army commanders mentioned by Oren,
moreover, felt no affinity whatsoever with Kahane's and Goldstein's
views, they would not have given in to the religious parties with
such abandon and thus sacrificed all consideration of military
discipline. Israeli policies, directed towards Palestinians, other
Middle East Arabs (perceived by Zionists as non-Jews) and people
of other nations, are only explainable by assuming that they are based
upon anti-Gentile feeling. The anti-Gentile feeling is strongest
among the most religious Jews but exists as well in this secular
milieu. This is the reason why support for Goldstein in 1984 and
1985 had a sequel in the excuses by many Israeli leaders for the
slaughter. These excuses were thinly disguised by mostly hypocritical
expressions of shock.
Goldstein's refusal to give proper medical treatment to non-Jews
continued after he was transferred to Kiryat Arba. In his February
27,1994 Yediot Ahronot article, Nahum Barnea wrote:
The senior Israeli army officer in the Hebron area told me about
his two encounters with Baruch Goldstein. The second time he
saw him was in the company of Kach goons who were abusing
President Ezer Weisman during his visit to Kiryat Arba. The first
time he encountered Goldstein was after an Israeli soldier had
wounded a local Arab in his legs. The Arab was brought to an
army clinic for treatment, but Goldstein refused to treat him.
Another army physician had to be summoned to substitute for
Goldstein. The officer did not explain why Goldstein was
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 99
thereafter not demoted in rank but was rather allowed to keep
performing his duties in the reserves. Incidentally, his misconduct
also constituted a violation of the oath he had taken upon
becoming a doctor, but for this the Israeli army cannot be
blamed.
Barnea made clear that the entire Israeli establishment, not just
the army, was responsible for the leniency granted to Goldstein
for his misdeeds. The leniency lasted until the massacre. Only after
the massacre did the official line change to shock, coupled with
assertions that Goldstein had acted alone. Thus, during the first
three hours after the slaughter Rabin and his retinue insisted either
that Goldstein was a psychopath or that he was a devoted doctor
who happened to suffer a momentary derangement. Barnea
reported: "Within hours a whole edifice of rationalization was
built, according to which Goldstein had allegedly been under
unbearable mental pressure, because he had to attend so many
wounded and dead [persons], including Arabs." The men who
propagated this lie knew that Goldstein had refused to treat Arabs.
Barnea continued: "Thus, the Arabs were made guilty for what he
could not avoid doing. The implication was that the Arabs assaulted
him rather than the other way around and that he really acted for
the benefit of the Arabs by letting them finally realize that Jewish
blood could not be shed with impunity." This brazen lie was
maintained as long as possible before being abandoned without
apology. The propagation of such a lie reveals the influence of Jewish
fundamentalism upon the secular parts of the Israeli establishment.
Goldstein represented Jewish fundamentalism in the extreme.
Some of the Gush Emunim leaders at the time of the massacre were
only a bit less extreme. Barnea compared Goldstein's attitude
toward non-Jews with that of Rabbi Levinger, the Gush Emunim
leader whom he interviewed on the day of the massacre:
Levinger was in a good mood; after arguing about how religious
settlers should respond to the massacre, he shortly before had
won the three hour debate at a session of the Kiryat Arba
municipality. The secretary of the Council of Judea, Samara and
Gaza District, Uri Ariel, [who became director of the prime
minister's office in 1998] proposed condemning the massacre.
Levinger staked his authority behind the proposal that the [Israeli]
government should instead be condemned [for putting Goldstein]
under unbearable mental pressure [propelling him to action].
In the discussion the terms "murder," "massacre" or "killing"
were avoided; instead the terms used were "deed," "event" or
"occurrence." The reason is that according to the Halacha the killing
100 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
by a Jew of a non-Jew under any circumstances is not regarded as
murder. It may be prohibited for other reasons, especially when it
causes danger for Jews. In many cases the real feelings about a Jew
murdering non-Jews, expressed in Israel with impunity, correspond
to the law. Levinger told Barnea that the resolution "expresses in
passing" the sorrow about dead Arabs "even though it emphasizes
the responsibility of the government." When asked by Barnea
whether he felt sorry, Levinger answered: "I am sorry not only about
dead Arabs but also about dead flies."
Goldstein on principle had refused to treat non-Jews for many
years before the massacre. He worked as the municipal doctor of
Kiryat Arba and treated Arabs only when he could not avoid doing
so. Barnea quoted one of Goldstein's colleagues from the Kiryat
Arba clinic who recalled that "whenever Goldstein arrived at a traffic
accident spot and recognized that some of the injured were Arabs,
he would attend to them but only until another doctor arrived. Then,
he would stop treating them. 'This was his compromise between
his doctor's oath and his ideology,' said his colleague."
The Halacha enjoins precisely the behavior of Goldstein's refusing
to attend non-Jews. The Halacha dictates that a pious Jewish
doctor may treat Gentiles when his refusal to do so might be
reported to the authorities and cause him or other Jews unpleas-
antness. There is reason to believe that whenever doctors as pious
as Goldstein were forced to treat Arabs they behaved as did
Goldstein. In his previously cited Yediot Ahronot article, Arych
Kizel added that the Israeli army found that Goldstein's conduct
did not require any disciplinary measures. A Maariv correspondent
wrote in his March 8, 1 994 article that Goldstein's military service
record was sufficiently distinguished to earn him a ceremonial
promotion from the rank of captain to that of major. The president
of Israel would have officially awarded this promotion on April 14,
1994, Israel's independence day. Only Goldstein's death, which
occurred at the time of the massacre, prevented what would have
been a revealing promotion.
An even greater example of Jewish fundamentalism's influence
upon the secular part of the Israeli establishment can be detected
in the official arrangement of Goldstein's elaborate funeral at a time
that the deliberate character of the massacre could not be denied.
The establishment was affected by the fact, widely reported in the
Hebrew press but given little place in the foreign press, that within
two days of the massacre the walls of religious neighborhoods of
west Jerusalem (and to a lesser extent of many other religious
neighborhoods) were covered by posters extolling Goldstein's
virtues and complaining that he did not manage to kill more Arabs.
Children of religious settlers who came to Jerusalem to demonstrate
sported buttons for months after the massacre that were inscribed:
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 1 1
"Dr Goldstein cured Israel's ills." Numerous concerts of Jewish
religious music and other events often developed into demonstra-
tions of tribute to Goldstein. The Hebrew press reported these
incidents of public tribute in copious detail. No major politician
protested against such celebrations.
President Weizman expressed more extravagantly than others his
sorrow for the massacre. Weizman, as reported by Uzi Benziman
in his March 4, 1994 Haaretz article, was also engaged in lengthy
and amiable negotiations with Goldstein's family and Kach
comrades concerning a suitably honorable funeral for the murderer.
Kiryat Arba settlers, many of whom had already declared themselves
in favor of the mass murder in radio and television interviews and
had lauded Goldstein as a martyr and holy man, demanded that
General Yatom, the commander responsible for the Hebron area,
allow the funeral cortege to parade through the city of Hebron, in
order to be viewed by the Arabs even though a curfew existed.
Yatom did not object outright to the demand but opposed it as
something that could cause disorder. Tzvi Katzover, the mayor of
Kiryat Arba and one of the most extreme leaders of the religious
settlers, telephoned Weizman and threatened that the settlers
would make a pogrom of Arabs if their demands were not met.
Weizman responded by telephoning the chief of staff and asking
why the army opposed the demand of the settlers. According to
Benziman, Chief of Staff Barak answered: "The army was afraid
that Arabs would desecrate Goldstein's tomb and carry away his
corpse." In further negotiations involving Barak, Yatom, Rabin,
Kach leaders and Kiryat Arba settlers, Weizman assumed the
consistent position, as stated by Benziman, that "the army should
pay respect to the desires and sensibilities of the settlers and of the
Goldstein family." Ultimately, the negotiated decision was that a
massively attended funeral cortege would take place in Jerusalem
and that the police would close some of the busiest streets to the
traffic in Goldstein's honor. Afterwards, the murderer would be
buried in Kiryat Arba along the continuation of Kahane Avenue.
According to Benziman, Kach leaders at first rejected this
compromise. General Yatom had to approach the Kach leaders in
person and beg them abjectly for their agreement, which he finally
secured. Yatom also had to obtain consent from the notorious Kiryat
Arba rabbi, Dov Lior. As reported in the March 4, 1994, issue of
Yerushalaim Lior declared: "Since Goldstein did what he did in
God's own name, he is to be regarded as a righteous man."
Benziman explained the conduct of Weizman and his entourage:
"After the fact the officials of the presidential mansion justify those
goings on by the need to becalm the settlers' mood." After the
funeral the army provided a guard of honor for Goldstein's tomb.
102 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
The tomb became a pilgrimage site, not only for the religious
settlers but also for delegations of pious Jews from all Israeli cities.
The details of Goldstein's funeral as arranged through the office
of President Weizman are significant. The facts below were taken
mostly from the liana Baum and Tzvi Singer report, published in
YediotAhronot on February, 28 1994. The funeral's first installment
took place in Jerusalem. Among the estimated thousand mourners
only a few were settlers from Kiryat Arba. Baum and Singer noted:
"Without having met Goldstein personally, other mourners most
of whom were Jerusalemites, were enthusiastic admirers of his
deed. Many more were Yeshiva students. A large group represented
the Chabad Hassidic movement, another group [consisted of anti-
Zionist] Satmar Hassids." Other Hassidic movements were also well
represented. (Not mentioned in the English-language press,
Goldstein, a follower of Kahane, was also a follower of the
Lubovitcher rabbi.) Baum and Singer continued:
People awaiting the arrival of the corpse could be heard repeating:
"What a hero! A righteous person! He did it on behalf of all of
us." As usual in such encounters between religious Jews, all the
participants tuned into a single, collective personality, united by
their burning hatred of the Israeli media, the wicked Israeli
government and, above all else, of anyone who dared to speak
against the murder.
Before the start of the procession well-known rabbis eulogized
Goldstein and commended the murder. Rabbi Israel Ariel, for
example, said: "The holy martyr, Baruch Goldstein, is from now
on our intercessor in heaven. Goldstein did not act as an individual;
he heard the cry of the land of Israel, which is being stolen from
us day after day by the Muslims. He acted to relieve that cry of the
land!" Toward the end of his eulogy Rabbi Ariel added: "The Jews
will inherit the land not by any peace agreement but only by
shedding blood." Ben-Shoshan Yeshu'a, a Jewish underground
member, sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and amnestied
after a few years spent under luxurious hotel conditions, lauded
Goldstein and praised his action as an example for other Jews to
follow.
Border guards, police and the secret police protected the funeral
cortege. Baum and Singer related:
An entire unit of border guards precede the cortege; they were
followed by young Kahane group members from Jerusalem who
continuously yelled: "death to the Arabs." While obviously
intending to find an Arab to kill, they could not spot one.
Suddenly, a border guard noticed an Arab approaching the
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 103
cortege behind a low fence. The border guard immediately
jumped over the fence, stopped the Arab and, using force, led
him away to safety before anyone could notice. He [the border
guard] thus saved him [the Arab] from a certain lynching.
Behind the young Kahane group members was a coffin, which was
surrounded by leaders of Kahane splinter groups, some of whom
were wanted by the police. (The police and the secret police
claimed later that they did not recognize these wanted leaders. The
press correspondents easily recognized them.) Baum wrote:
Tiran Pollak, a Kahane group leader wanted by the police,
granted me an interview near the coffin. "Goldstein was not only
righteous and holy," he told me, "but also a martyr. Since he is
a martyr, his corpse will be buried without being washed, not in
a shroud but in his clothes. The honorable Dr Goldstein has
always refused to provide medical help to Arabs. Even during
the war for Galilee he refused to treat any Arab, including those
serving in the army. General Gad Navon, the chief rabbi of the
Israeli army, at that time contacted Meir Kahane to ask him to
persuade Baruch Goldstein of blessed memory to treat the Arabs.
Kahane, however, refused to do so, because this would be against
the Jewish religion." Suddenly the crowd began yelling: "Death
to the journalists." I looked around and realized that I was the
only journalist inside the crowd of mourners. I clung to Tiran
Pollak and begged him to "please protect me." I was scared to
death that the crowd might recognize me as a journalist.
Military guards transported Goldstein's coffin to Kiryat Arba
through Palestinian villages. A second round of eulogies was
delivered in the hall of the Hesder Yeshiva Nir military institution
by a motley of religious settlers, including the aforementioned
Rabbi Dov Lior. Lior said: "Goldstein was full of love for fellow
human beings. He dedicated himself to helping others." The terms
"human beings" and "others" in the Halacha refer solely to Jews.
Lior continued: "Goldstein could not continue to bear the
humiliations and shame nowadays inflicted upon us; this was why
he took action for no other reason than to sanctify the holy name
of God."
Tohay Hakah reported in Yerushalaim on March 4, 1994 upon
another Lior eulogy of Goldstein a few days after the funeral. He
recalled that Lior several years ago was excoriated in the press for
recommending that medical experiments be performed on the live
bodies of Arab terrorists. The outcry against this recommendation
influenced the attorney general to prevent the otherwise guaranteed
election of Lior to the Supreme Rabbinical Council of Israel. The
104 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
attorney general, however, did not interfere with Lior's current
rabbinical duties. The press reported upon other eulogies, delivered
not only in religious settlements but in religious neighborhoods of
many Israeli towns during the days immediately following the
slaughter. The Hebrew press reportage of these eulogies suggests
that the most virulent lauding of Goldstein and the calling for
further massacres of Arabs occurred in the more homogeneous
religious communities.
The approval of Goldstein and his mass murder extended well
beyond the perimeters of the religious Jewish community. Secular
Israeli Jews, especially many of the youth, praised Goldstein and
his deed. That Israeli youth were even more pleased by the massacre
than were the adults is well-documented. The concern here
nevertheless will be with the adult population, which in many ways
is the most significant. According to Yuval Katz, who wrote an article
published in the March 4, 1994 issue of Yerushalaim, it is not true
that "with the exception of a few psychopaths, the entire nation
and its politicians included, has resolutely condemned Dr Goldstein,
even though, luckily for us, all major television networks in the world
were last week still deluded by this untruth." Katz told how a
popular television entertainer, Rafi Reshef, who was not controlled
as tightly as the moderators in sedate panels, "could this week
announce the findings of some reliable polls." Katz continued:
It is important that according to one poll about 50 per cent of
Kiryat Arba inhabitants approve of the massacre. More important
is another poll that showed that about 50 per cent of Israeli Jews
are more sympathetic toward the settlers after the massacre than
they were before the massacre. The most important poll
established that at least 50 per cent of Israeli Jews would approve
of the massacre, provided that it was not referred to as a massacre
but rather as a "Patriarch's Cave operation," a nice-sounding term
already being used by religious settlers.
Katz reported that the politicians and academics interviewed by
Reshef failed to grasp the significance of those findings. Attributing
them to a chance occurrence, they refused to comment upon them.
He tended to excuse them:
I presume that those busy public figures, along with everybody
else who this week exerted himself to speak in the name of the
entire nation simply did not have time to walk the streets in the
last days. Yet, with the exception of the wealthiest neighborhoods,
people could be seen smiling merrily when talking about the
massacre. The stock popular comment was: "Sure, Goldstein is
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 105
to be blamed. He could have escaped with ease and have done
the same in four other mosques, but he didn't."
The impression of many other Israelis corresponded to the Reshef
findings. People were rather evenly divided into two categories: in
one category the people were vociferous in cheering the slaughter;
in the other category the people mostly remained silent and
condemned the massacre only if encouraged to do so. Katz
continued:
Therefore, this was the right time to draw finally the obvious
conclusion that we, the Jews, are not any more sensitive or
merciful than are the Gentiles. Many Jews have been programmed
by the same racist computer program that is shaping the majority
of the world's nations. We have to acknowledge that our supposed
advancement in progressive beliefs and democracy have failed
to affect the archaic forms of Jewish tribalism. Those who still
delude themselves that Jews might be different than [people of]
other nations should now know better. The spree of bullets from
Goldstein's gun was for them an occasion to learn something.
The wise comments of Katz were not heeded in Israel except by a
minority. It may be that had more Israeli Jews paid attention and
heeded the words of Katz the murder of Yitzhak Rabin would have
been averted. In the view of this book's authors, the important
difference between the real shock caused by Rabin's murder and
the lack of shock caused by Goldstein's massacre lies in the fact
that Goldstein's victims were non-Jews.
Although less direct than Katz, many other commentators in the
Israeli Hebrew press have focused upon that part of the Israeli Jewish
public who were shocked by the rejoicing over the massacre of
innocent people and disturbed by the apologia offered by many
politicians and public figures. Some of those people who were
shocked described the backers of and apologists for Goldstein as
"Nazis" or "Nazi-like." These same people, who can be considered
moderate hawks rather than Zionist doves, had before the massacre
reacted negatively to the use by a few Israeli Jewish critics of such
terminology in describing a part of the Israeli Jewish population.
These "moderate hawks" had habitually labelled many Arab orga-
nizations, such as the Abu Nidal group and the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, "Nazi" or "Nazi-like." They did not
repudiate their views about these Arab organizations; they merely
concluded that some Jewish individuals and organizations also
merit being so labelled on equal terms with some Arabs. The
prestigious journalist, Teddy Preuss, reflected upon all of this in
106 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
a most severe but substantially representative manner in his
March 4, 1994 Davar article:
Compared to the giant-scale mass murderers of Auschwitz,
Goldstein was certainly a petty murderer. His recorded statements
and those of his comrades, however, prove that they were
perfectly willing to exterminate at least two million Palestinians
at an opportune moment. This makes Dr Goldstein comparable
to Dr Mengele; the same holds true for anyone saying that he
[or she] would welcome more of such Purim holiday celebrations.
[The massacre occurred on that holiday.] Let us not devalue
Goldstein by comparing him with an inquisitor or a Muslim Jihad
fighter. Whenever an infidel was ready to convert to either
Christianity or Islam, an inquisitor or Muslim Jihad fighter
would, as a rule, spare his life. Goldstein and his admirers are
not interested in converting Arabs to Judaism. As their statements
abundantly testify, they see the Arabs as nothing more than
disease-spreading rats, lice or other loathsome creatures; this is
exactly how the Nazis believed that the Aryan race alone had
laudable qualities that were inheritable but that could become
polluted by sheer contact with dirty and morbid Jews. Kahane,
who learned nothing from the Nuremberg Laws, had exactly the
same notions about the Arabs.
Really, Kahane had the same notions about non-Jews. Although
less scathing than Preuss, other Israeli commentators suggested the
same consideration.
In contrast to the above criticism were the even more numerous
comments about the harm caused to Israeli Jews by the Goldstein
massacre. The lament in the February 28, 1994 Haaretz Economic
Supplement, for example, was headlined: "Goldstein's massacre
caused distress on the Tel-Aviv stock market." Other papers voiced
similar sentiments. More importantly, Shimon Peres and other
senior dovish politicians presented a typical political apologia in
their criticism of the massacre, which they delivered in a meeting
of the Knesset Committee for Foreign and Defense Affairs. Specific
detail of this meeting is included below to illustrate the real opinions
of most Israeli politicians and their general disregard of a major
massacre of non-Jews except as it affected the interests of Israel and
its allies. A March 8, 1994 Haaretz article reported the discussion
at this meeting. Peres wasted no time expressing heartfelt shock
about the murdered Palestinians but spoke instead about the harm
to Israel caused by the "pictures of corpses that the entire world
could watch." Peres did not condemn the armed religious settlers
for their public rejoicing and shooting; he deplored the harm
caused to Israel and to themselves by the pictures of them. As quoted
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 107
in HaaretZy Peres added: "The events in Hebron also adversely
affected the interests of President Mubarak and King Hussein, and
even more of the PLO and its leadership." Peres then went on to
say: "We have had Jewish Kibbutzim located in the midst of Arab-
inhabited areas for 80 years, and I cannot recall a single instance
of such a slaughter nor of firing at Arab buses nor of maiming Arab
mayors." At this point in the discussion senior Likud politicians
interpolated Peres. As reported in Haaretz:
The first to interrupt Peres' speech was Sharon. "Kibbutzim are
dear to me no less than to you, but there have been many cases
when somebody from a kibbutz would go out to murder Arabs."
Peres answered: "The two cases are not comparable, because in
the case under discussion the murderer was supported by a
whole group of followers." Benny Begin [answered]: "Why are
you always talking in generalities?" Peres [responded] : "I am not.
I only maintain that in order to pursue the peace process we need
the PLO as a partner, and now this partnership is in straits and
we need to help the PLO." Sharon [answered]: "You mean that
we should help that murderer [Arafat]." Peres, angrily banging
the table [responded]: "And what about Egyptians with whom
you, Likud, made peace? Didn't Egyptians murder Jews? Really.
What's the difference between war and terrorism? Does it make
any difference how 16,000 of our soldiers were killed? Everywhere,
states are making deals with terror organizations." Netanyahu
[spoke] : "No state exists that has made a deal with an organization
still committed to its destruction. The PLO has not rescinded
the Palestinian Covenant. You are dwelling upon the crime
committed in Hebron not in order to reassure people [Jews] living
there but in order to advance your plan to establish a Palestinian
state." Peres [answered] : "It is you and your plans that will lead
to the formation of a Palestinian state, because it is you, the Likud,
that created the PLO in Madrid. It is you who conceived the
autonomy in the first place, contrary to all our [previously
pursued] aims." Netanyahu [stated] : "Autonomy is not the same
thing as state." Peres [continued]: "But it is Sharon who is first
to say that autonomy is bound to lead to a Palestinian state . . .
I am not less steadfast than are you; this is why I have elaborated
the most restrictive possible interpretation of autonomy in Oslo,
in relation to its territory, power and authorities. This is why we
are against international observers and consent only to the
temporary presence of representatives from the countries
contributing money. And regarding the Palestinian Covenant,
they have renounced it publicly, but they find it difficult to
convene their representative bodies to ratify this renunciation."
Begin [answered]: "Let me remind you that the PLO has not
108 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
undertaken publicly to rescind the Palestinian Covenant." Peres
[answered] : "I don't give a damn about you and/or your legalistic
verbiage! Arafat said that he renounced the Palestinian Covenant
and for me Arafat is the PLO."
The above passage shows, among other things, that knowledge of
Israeli politics and more generally Jewish affairs can be best attained
by using the original sources of what Jews say among themselves.
The continuing process of Goldstein's elevation to the rank of
saint by groups of Israeli Jews and his worship as such began soon
after the massacre. In his February 28, 1994 Haareiz article,
Shmuel Rosner recounted a sermon delivered on the Sabbath after
the massacre by Rabbi Goren, the former chief military rabbi and
chief rabbi of Israel. Rosner wrote: "Goren's conclusion was that
next time an authorization would be needed for a massacre. The
authorization should come from the community 'not from the
[present] illegal government.'" Rosner observed that the audience
liked Goren's sermon but would have preferred, as would numerous
other Israeli Jews, that the army rather than Goldstein had
committed the massacre.
In the days and weeks after the massacre, appreciation of
Goldstein and his deed spread throughout the Israeli religious
community and among its supporters in the United States. The
initial expressions of that appreciation may be most significant,
because they were spontaneous and because they illustrated the
influence, even beyond the messianic community, of an ideology
that approved indiscriminate killing of Gentiles by Jews. Avirama
Golan described in her February 28, 1 994 Haaretz article how news
about Goldstein on the day of the massacre became known in the
overwhelmingly Haredi city of Bnei Brak and how the next day a
religious Jewish crowd reacted with praise of Goldstein during a
mass entertainment event. The massacre occurred on Purim, the
festival during which religious Jews are merry and sometimes drink
alcoholic beverages to the point of drunkenness. Bnei Brak streets
were filled to capacity by joyful celebrants that day; a special
security force, comprised of religious veterans of the Israeli army's
elite units, had been hired by the mayor to enforce order and
modesty. Golan described the response in the streets to the
spreading news of the massacre:
A hired security guard, with a huge gun in his belt, a black
skullcap on his head, and special insignia of "Bnei Brak Security
Team" on his chest, stared at a fundraising stall. Then he noticed
his pal across the street. "A Purim miracle, I'm telling you,
Purim miracle," he shouted at the top of his voice. "That holy
man did something great. 52 Arabs at one stroke." However, the
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 109
fundraiser, a slim yeshiva student, was skeptical. "That's just
impossible," he said. "Those must be just stories." But the
people standing around confirmed the news. "It was on the
radio," they said. "Where?" "In the Patriarchs' Cave in Hebron."
The yeshiva student turned pale. "I don't mind the Arabs, but
it is us who will pay the price," he said. "What are you talking
about?" the security guard shouted, "It's a Purim miracle. God
has helped." People around the stall formed two groups: on the
one hand those who said that God Himself ordained a well-
deserved punishment of the Arabs; on the other, those who
remained silent throughout. The fundraiser went on writing
receipts and shaking his head. "Oh," he said, "nothing really
happened." The Bnei Brak functionary's wife said that dozens
of visitors who, as is customary on Purim, visited their home that
morning, were shocked. "By the murder?" somebody asked.
"To tell you the truth, not exactly by the murder. About what
may now happen to the Jews."
Jumping to the evening of the next day, Golan continued: "Masses
of religious Jews were expected to come to Yad Eliahu Stadium
[the biggest in Israel] to be entertained by the famous religious jazz
singer, Mordechai Ben-David. For months before the massacre,
this evening had been planned as a demonstration intended to save
the land of Israel from Rabin, Peres and other Jewish infidels." All
factions of the religious community were represented in the crowd.
Golan again continued:
The first part of the evening passed quietly and even rather
dully. Only after the intermission, some minutes before the star
of the evening was to appear, the crowd went on a rampage. The
master of the ceremony called upon a Kiryat Arba resident to
address the crowd. He started by praising that "righteous and
holy physician, Dr Goldstein, who rendered us a sacred service
and got martyred in the process." The speaker called upon the
audience to mourn him. By and large, the audience remained
silent. Some applauded. Only a single individual, wearing a
small beard and a knitted skullcap, stood up and yelled: "I
disagree; that was a cold-blooded murder!" Instantly he was
physically assaulted. Many in the crowd yelled: "Kick the infidel
out of the hall!" The tempers calmed down only when Ben-David
finally appeared on the stage and began singing. Outside after
the performance some people reminisced that more Gentiles had
been killed by the Jews in Susa during the original Purim [75,000] .
They, therefore, reasoned that this was the right time to kill a
comparable number of Gentiles in the holy land.
110 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
No wonder that Dov Halvertal, a member of the almost defunct
faction of the NRP doves, told Golan: "This Purim joy epitomizes
the moral collapse of religious Zionism . . . If religious Zionism does
not undertake soul-searching right now, I doubt if it will ever have
another opportunity."
Subsequent developments showed that neither the religious
Zionists nor other factions within the Jewish religious community
were or are in any mood to engage in soul-searching. On the
contrary, the appreciation of Goldstein and the feeling that Jews
have a right and duty to kill Gentiles who live in the land of Israel
are growing. In his March 23, 1994 Haaretz article, Nadav Shraggai
discussed the visit of a delegation of all Israeli branches of the Bnei
Akiva, the large youth movement affiliated with the NRP, to Kiryat
Arba and Hebron, which was then under a curfew selectively
applied to its Arab inhabitants. The purpose of this visit was to
"encourage Jewish settlers." Yossi Leibowitz, a settler leader from
Hebron, as described by Shraggai, "beaming with satisfaction
visible in his face asked the delegation: 'Have you already visited
the tomb of holy Rabbi Doctor Goldstein?' " The visitors rejected
the suggestion but did not utter one word of rebuke to the
worshippers of the new saint. They then had to withstand a flurry
of abuse from their local Bnei Akiva comrades who argued that their
refusal to pay homage to Goldstein amounted to support of the left.
Local rabbis affiliated with the NRP seconded the denunciation.
Rabbi Shimon Ben-Zion, a senior teacher in the local Hesder
Yeshiva and hence a state employee, delivered a eulogy of Goldstein
and of what he called "his act." He added: "[If the government]
keeps bowing low to Arabs, all of whom are murderers, [and if]
the Jews fail to establish a firm rule over the land of Israel [there
will be] more Goldsteins." Most visitors made counter-arguments;
they were nevertheless influenced by their hosts' arguments; they
came to believe that their duty to support the Jewish settlers in
Hebron was more important than any minor disagreements about
Goldstein's sainthood.
Gabby Baron reported in the March 16, 1994 Yediot Ahronot:
Deputy Minister of Education Mikha Goldman was physically
assaulted yesterday after delivering a welcoming speech at a
meeting of Jerusalem's district teachers in the Binyaney Ha'umah
hall in that city. He managed to avoid being hurt. His speech
infuriated dozens of religious teachers, because he talked about
his visit to Kiryat Arba and the shock he experienced when
finding how enthused the religious school children were by the
massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs. A virtual riot erupted in
the hall, which was filled by about 5000 Jerusalem district
teachers, as soon as he spoke about it. Dozens of religious
THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BARUCH GOLDSTEIN 1 1 1
teachers jumped onto the podium. A female teacher who managed
to reach it [the podium] picked up a flowerpot from the speaker's
table; she was ready to hurl it at him when at the last moment
she balked. All the religious teachers assembled in rage in front
of the podium and decried the deputy minister as "a fascist."
Goldman insisted upon continuing his speech. When he ended,
he had to leave the building under heavy guard, thanks to which
the pursuing teachers were unable to injure him.
Neither Education Minister Amnon Rubinstein nor Prime Minister
Rabin uttered a single word in condemnation of the incident.
On April 5, 1994, Israeli radio reported that Rabbi Shimon
Ben-Zion had distributed a leaflet among the Kiryat Arba and
Hebron settlers requesting financial contributions for a book about
"Saint Baruch Goldstein." On April 6, Yediot Ahronot published
the text. The book refers to Goldstein as "Rabbi Doctor Baruch
Goldstein of blessed memory, let the Lord avenge his blood." The
Kiryat Arba municipal council backed the ideas of Ben-Zion. In
his April 5, 1994 Haaretz article, Amnon Barzilay reported that two
days earlier Gush Emunim leaders, including Mayor Benny
Katzover, had an amicable talk with Prime Minister Rabin who
apologized to them for his past outbursts against them and promised
never to repeat them. (The outbursts anyway were intended for
consumption of the Israeli "doves," Arafat and the Western media.)
The two sides agreed to cooperate closely in the future. Thus, Rabin
understandably found it ill-advised to say anything about Rabbi
Ben-Zion's idea.
About one year later the Kiryat Arba municipality obtained a
permit from the Civil Administration of the Occupied Territories
to build a large and sumptuous memorial on Goldstein's tomb,
which has become a place of pilgrimage. Thousands of Jews from
all Israeli cities, and even more from the United States and France,
have come to light candles and pray for the intercession of "holy
saint and martyr," now in a special section of paradise close to God
and able to obtain for them various benefits, such as cures for
diseases from which they suffer, or to grant them male offspring.
The visitors have donated money for Goldstein's comrades. No
Orthodox rabbi has criticized this.
The well-publicized worship of the new saint has brought
increasing opposition from secular Jews. (The opposition of
Palestinians, especially those living in Hebron, to the hero-worship
of Goldstein and to the monument to this mass murderer are not
within the scope of this book but should be obvious.) After a long
campaign in the press, Knesset members passed a piece of legislation
in May, 1 998, that prohibited the building of monuments for mass
murderers and ordering removal of existing ones. The Israeli army
112 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
should have removed the monument immediately after passage of
the law in the Knesset. Instead army spokesmen announced that
negotiations over the Goldstein monument were on-going with
Goldstein's family and local rabbis.
The book in praise of Goldstein, titled Blessed the Male, was
published in 1995 and sold in many editions. Most of the readers
were from the religious public. The book contained eulogies of
Goldstein and halachic justifications for the right of every Jew to
kill non-Jews. Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburgh, the then head of the
Kever Yosef (tomb of Joseph) Yeshiva, located on the outskirts of
Nablus, wrote one chapter of that book. The essence of Rabbi
Ginsburgh's views were presented in Chapter 4. His and other such
ideologies., even if expressed more cautiously, explain Goldstein's
massacre, the considerable support Goldstein and later his followers
have received from religious Jews and the ambiguous attitude of
Israeli governments to this crime. Those people, especially
Germans, who were silent and did not condemn Nazi ideology
before Hitler came to power are also, at least in a moral sense, guilty
for the terrible consequences that followed. Similarly, those who
are silent and do not condemn Jewish Nazism, as exemplified by
the ideologies of Goldstein and Ginsburgh, especially if they are
Jews, are guilty of the terrible consequences that may yet develop
as a result of their silence.
The Religious Background of Rabin's
Assassination
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was murdered for religious reasons.
The murderer and his sympathizers were and still are convinced
that the killing was dictated by God and was therefore a
commandment of Judaism. Comprehensive surveys, published in
the Hebrew press, of people in religious neighborhoods and
especially religious settlements indicated great sympathy for the
murder. The polarization of approval and disapproval in the Israeli
Jewish community over the killing of the prime minister of the
Jewish state has increased since the time of the murder. Many
Israeli Jews, significant numbers of Jews living outside Israel and
most non-Jews do not possess sufficient knowledge of Jewish
history and religion to put this kind of an assassination into its
proper context. In this chapter we shall attempt to provide the
historical-religious background necessary for an understanding of
the Rabin assassination.
Jewish history has been replete with religious civil wars or
rebellions accompanied by civil wars in which horrifying assassi-
nations were committed. The Great Rebellion (ad 66-73) of Jews
against the Romans that culminated in the destruction of the
Second Temple and in mass suicide in Masada is exemplary. The
defenders of Masada were, as many present-day visitors to the
Masada site are seemingly unaware, a band of assassins called
Sikarikin, a name taken from the word for a short sword that group
members hid under their robes and used to kill their Jewish
opponents in crowds of people. In the Talmud the word means
terrorists or robbers and is applied only to Jews. Neither Masada
nor this particular group are mentioned in the Talmud or in any
part of the traditional writing preserved by Jews. Actually the
Sikarikin were an ancient Jewish analogue to modern-day terrorists.
Their suicide activity resembled the terrorist behavior of the suicide
bombers who are so abhorred in the state of Israel. The Sikarikin
escaped to Masada not from the Romans but from their Jewish
brethren. Shortly after the rebellion against the Romans began, the
Roman army that was advancing to Jerusalem was initially defeated
and had to withdraw. The Sikarikin attempted forcefully to establish
113
114 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
their leader, Menahem, as absolute king. The Jews of Jerusalem
then attacked and defeated the Sikarikin in the temple itself, killing
most of them including Menahem. The remaining Sikarikin escaped
to Masada where they stayed during the rebellion; they did not fight
the Romans but instead robbed neighboring Jewish villages. Three
years after the Sikarikin defeat, the Roman army, commanded by
Titus, approached Jerusalem for the final onslaught. (Titus' chief
of staff, Tiberius Julius Alexander, was a Jew, the nephew of the
great philosopher, Philo.) Jerusalem was divided into three parts;
each part was under the command of a different leader; the leaders
had already been fighting with one another for two years. The
Roman Empire at that time was then concerned about a civil war.
One of the leaders, Eliezer the Priest, commanded the Temple and
used it as his stronghold. On Passover eve in the year AD 70,
another rebel leader, Yohanan of Gush Halav, utilized brilliant
strategy to overcome Eliezer. He dressed his soldiers as pious
pilgrims who seemed to be coming to the temple for the Passover
sacrifice. After being admitted to the temple by the gullible Eliezer
without a body search, they, after guessing correctly that Eliezer
and his men would not carry arms in a place so holy, pulled out
their swords and slaughtered all their opponents. The well-known
Masada terrorists became Jewish and Israeli national heroes, as did
the Jerusalem Jews who killed most of the Sikarikin. Yohanan of
Gush Halav also became a national hero, but Eliezer the Priest,
perhaps because he was killed by Jews, was completely forgotten.
In these and in many similar incidents in Jewish history, killing was
allegedly committed for the greater glory of God. Yigal Amir,
Rabin's assassin, made such an allegation.
The violence between Jews did not end with the loss of Jewish
independence and the ceasing of Jewish rebellions. (The last Jewish
rebellion occurred in ad 614.) From the Middle Ages until the
advent of the modern state, Jewish communities enjoyed a great
degree of autonomy. The rabbis who headed and had the authority
in these communities were most often able to persecute Jews
mercilessly. The rabbis persecuted Jews who committed religious
sins and even more harshly persecuted Jews who informed upon
other Jews to non-Jews or in other ways harmed Jewish interests.
The rabbis generally tolerated violence committed by some Jews
against other Jews, especially against women, so long as the Jewish
religion and their own interests were not harmed. The relevancy
of this aspect of Jewish history to the Rabin murder is obvious. The
assassin, Yigal Amir, is a talmudic scholar who was trained in a
yeshiva that inculcated its students to believe that this violence
committed by rabbis over a lengthy time period was in accordance
with God's word.
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 115
Long before Rabin's assassination, scholarly studies of Jewish
history, written in Hebrew, recorded the violence mentioned above.
The assassination aroused so much public interest in this topic that
the Hebrew press published numerous articles either written by or
resulting from interviews with distinguished Israeli scholars. Rami
Rosen's November 15, 1996 Haaretz Magazine article, titled
"History of a Denial," is an excellent and representative example.
Although Rosen interviewed several distinguished historians, he
relied primarily upon the views of Professor Yisrael Bartal, the head
of the department of Jewish history at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem. Bartal began his statement:
Zionism has described the diaspora Jews as weak people who
desire peace and abhor every form of violence. It is astonishing
to discover that orthodox Jews are also providing similar
descriptions. They describe past Jewish society as one not
interested in anything other than the Halacha and the fulfillment
of the commandments. The entire Jewish literature produced in
eastern Europe, however, teaches us that the reverse is true. Even
in the nineteenth century the descriptions of how Jews lived are
filled with violent battles that often took place in the synagogues,
of Jews beating other Jews in the streets or spitting on them, of
the frequent cases of pulling out of beards and of numbers of
murders.
Citing the authorities interviewed, Rosen explained that many
murders were committed for religious reasons. It was usual in
some Hassidic circles until the last quarter of the nineteenth century
to attack and often to murder Jews who had reform religious
tendencies, even if small ones. These Hassidic Jews also attacked
one another because of frequent quarrels between different holy
rabbis over spheres of influence, money and prestige. After having
learned the opinions of the best Israeli scholars, Rosen asked:
Were Yigal Amir, Baruch Goldstein, Yonah Avrushmi [who
threw a hand grenade into a Peace Now demonstration, killing
one and wounding a few people] and Ami Poper [who killed seven
innocent Palestinian workers and was adopted as a great hero
by extremists] parts of the Jewish tradition? Is it only by chance
that Baruch Goldstein massacred his victims on the Purim
holiday?
Rosen answered his own question:
A check of main facts of the [Jewish] historiography of the last
1500 years shows that the picture is different from the one
116 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
previously shown to us. It includes massacres of Christians [by
Jews]; mock repetitions of the crucifixion of Jesus that usually
took place on Purim; cruel murders within the family; liquidation
of informers, often done for religious reasons by secret rabbinical
courts, which issued a sentence of "pursuer" and appointed
secret executioners; assassinations of adulterous women in
synagogues and/or the cutting of their [the women's] noses by
command of the rabbis.
Rosen included in his long article many well-documented cases of
massacres of Christians and mock repetitions of the crucifixion of
Jesus on Purim, most of which occurred either in the late ancient
period or in the Middle Ages. (Some isolated cases occurred in
sixteenth-century Poland.) From the eleventh century until the
nineteenth century, Ashkenazi Jews were more violent and fanatical
than were the Oriental Jews, although the fanaticism of the Spanish
Jews during both Muslim and Christian rule was exceptional.
Jewish historians have not yet determined the causes of those
differences. The influence of Christian fanaticism on the Jews may
have been a cause. The Jews who lived in Spain may have been
influenced by the fact that Muslim Spain was more fanatical than
the rest of the Muslim world.
The violence perpetrated against women for centuries and other
aspects of internal group violence influenced the developing
character of traditional Jewish society. This character set the
contextual framework for Rabin's assassination. Citing a few case
examples here may further understanding of this character. Rabbi
Simha Asaf s book. The Punishments After the Talmud Was Finalized:
Materials for the History of Hebrew Law (Jerusalem, 1922) is a
marvelous source of information. Rabbi Asaf, who subsequently
became a professor at the Hebrew University and in 1948 was one
of the first nine judges of the Israeli Supreme Court, was a distin-
guished scholar and a religious Jew. Convinced that a Jewish state
would be established, he wrote his book in order to show that a
sufficient number of legal cases existed in the history of punishments
inflicted by Jewish religious courts to provide precedents.
Although some variances in halachic interpretation and in practice
existed, violence against women, as defined in any reasonable and
modern way, was routinely practiced for centuries in most Jewish
communities. Some rabbis allowed the Jewish husband to beat his
wife when she disobeyed him. Other rabbis limited this "right" by
requiring that, prior to the beating, a rabbinical court, after
considering the husband's complaint, had to issue an order.
Presumably as an extension of this husband's right, rabbinical
courts in Spain ordered the cruellest punishment for Jewish women
suspected of fornication, prostitution and adultery and a much
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 117
lighter punishment for Jewish male fornicators. In the early
fourteenth century a local Jewish notable asked the famous Spanish
rabbi, Rabenu 1 Asher, whether it was correct punishment to cut
the nose of a Jewish widow, made pregnant by a Muslim. The
notable added that, although the evidence itself was not conclusive,
the pregnancy was well-known in the city. Rabenu Asher answered:
"You have decided beautifully to cut her nose in order that those
committing adultery with her will find her ugly, but let this be done
suddenly so that she will not become an apostate [before her nose
is cut]" (Asaf, p. 69). In a case wherein a male fornicated with
Muslim women, Rabbi Yehuda, the son of Rabenu Asher, ordered
only excommunication or imprisonment (Asaf, p. 78). This same
punishment was prescribed when male Jews owned a Muslim
female slave with whom other male Jews fornicated. The rabbis
regarded the commission of adultery of Jewish women with Jewish
men as less serious. In such a case one rabbi ordered that the
woman's hair be shorn and that she be officially excommunicated
in the synagogue in the presence of other women (Asaf, p. 87). The
Sephardic Jews of Jerusalem sheared women's hair as punishment
for such sexual sins still in the nineteenth century. In some recorded
cases the punishment was based upon the belief that the sexual sins
of Jews, especially those committed by women, prevented rain
from falling. The rabbis supposed that the rain would fall if Jewish
women sinners were punished. Enlightened Hebrew press
commentators at the time humorously noted that the rain did not
fall even after women had been punished. In places where more
modern attitudes prevailed, however, Spanish and Portuguese
Jews desisted from these ancestral customs. Asaf quotes the elders
of the Portuguese Jewish community in Hamburg in the late
seventeenth century who, although having publicly accused
members of their community of having intimate relations with
non-Jewish women, expressed their regret that they could not
punish them. Asaf pointed to the reason: "In every such case they
must get permission from the town judges" (p. 95). The Jewish
community, Asaf wrote, could only inflict religious sanctions, such
as telling two brothers that they could not enter the synagogue until
they had dismissed a notorious servant from their home (p. 97).
The Jewish rabbinical authorities in some eastern parts of Europe
could inflict somewhat tougher punishments. These punishments,
however, were less severe than those that had been imposed in Spain.
The heads of the Jewish community in Prague decided in 1 6 1 2 that
all Jewish prostitutes had to leave the town by a certain date or be
branded after that date with a hot iron (Asaf, p. 114). The
prostitutes' main offence was that they were seen drinking non-
kosher wine with some unnamed notables of the community. The
most tolerant communities were those in Italy who, as Asaf recorded.
118 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
gave full encouragement to the prostitutes, because they saved
"bachelors and fools from the worse sins of adultery or of
cohabitation with non- Jewish women."
In his previously mentioned article, Rosen recorded research of
new Jewish historians showing that Italian Jews copied the
Renaissance custom according to which a husband or brother can
kill his wife or sister with impunity if he suspects her of adultery.
To remove the resultant blemish upon the honor of an insulted
husband, Jews committed many of these murders in the synagogue
during prayer in order to obtain publicity. A Jew, named Ovadia,
from Spoleto, for instance, murdered his wife in the synagogue and,
after explaining his reasons, received no punishment. The Italian
authorities put Ovadia on trial and fined him, but the Jews did not
believe he had done anything wrong. Soon thereafter, he remarried
another Jewish woman. Brothers in other cases murdered suspected
women. Referring to his research, Rosen cited one such case in
Ferrara in the mid-sixteenth century. The murderer brother worked
for a charity organization that was affiliated with the congregation;
he was able to continue in his job after the murder. Rosen
determined and reported that in such cases the rabbis usually did
not react.
Jewish autonomy before the rise of the modern nation state
allowed rabbis to engage in a wide spectrum of persecution, of which
violence against women was but one category. The rabbis employed
various types of violence against Jews who committed religious or
other sins. Jewish fundamentalists, wanting to revive a situation that
existed before the hated modern influences allegedly corrupted the
Jews, emphasized this violence. The centrality of violence in the
Halacha played an important role in the development of Orthodox
Judaism. Orthodox Judaism historically had a double system of law.
There was, on the one side, a more normal system of law, but there
was, on the other side, been a more arbitrary system of law employed
in emergencies. These emergency situations most often occurred
when rabbis had great communal power. The rabbis, alleging that
heresy and infidelity were at dangerously high levels, often
suspended the normal system of laws, at least in the area of guarding
the beliefs of the community, and used emergency powers to avert
God's wrath. A relevant example for our study concerns the death
penalty. In the normal system of law, the halachic application of
the death punishment against a Jew was almost impossible to carry
out, as opposed to its much easier application against a non-Jew.
Even inflicting less severe punishment against Jews, such as thirty-
nine lashes, was difficult. The normal talmudic alternative to the
death penalty for Jews who killed other Jews was release of the Jewish
murderer without further punishment. The Talmud posits another
alternative. This alternative, as described by Maimonides in his
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 119
commentary. Laws of the Murderer and of Taking Precautions^ chapter
4, rule 8, is that Jewish murderers, absolved of the death punishment
by a rabbinical court, could be "put into a small cell and given first
only a small amount of bread and water until their intestines
narrowed and then [fed] barley so that their bellies would burst
because of the illness."
Rabbinical judges experienced difficulty in inflicting punishment
when Jewish autonomy was limited by secular authorities. Only
those rabbinical judges who were appointed by what was called
"laying of hands," 2 for example, could at first inflict flogging
limited to thirty-nine lashes. Rabbis later devised a new more
arbitrary way of inflicting punishment called "stripes of rebellion."
The new method, which could be used by any rabbi, included
harsher punishments. The number of lashes, for example, was
unlimited. The cutting of limbs and unlimited imprisonment time
were added. After the talmudic period and following the declines
of the Roman and Sassanid Empires and of the Muslim caliphates,
Jewish communities in many places became more autonomous and
thus the opportunities for rabbis to impose more severe punishments
increased.
The Jewish religious authorities perpetrated most of the violence
against Jews who were considered to be heretics or religious
dissenters. The punishments imposed had to be warranted by the
Talmud, or at least by interpretation of the Talmud. The Talmud
was composed under the rule and authority of two strong empires,
the Roman and the Sassanid; both of these empires limited the
powers of Jewish autonomy much more than did subsequent
medieval regimes. Talmudic sages frequently complained that
under the rule of these two empires, they did not have the power
to punish Jewish criminals with death but rather only with flogging.
The few cases in which talmudic sages attempted to execute a Jewish
criminal prompted strict official investigations. One of these few
cases, mentioned in the Palestinian Talmud, concerned a Jewish
prostitute in the third century who was finally executed. Apparently
because execution was so difficult to enforce, the Talmud does not
order a death punishment for Jewish heretics but does enjoin pious
Jews to kill them by employing subterfuges. The major halachic
codes, although emphasizing that the death punishment should be
inflicted only if execution was possible, contain such prescription.
The paradigmatic expression of this command in the codes comes
ironically under the section devoted to saving life. The question is
posed: What is a pious Jew to do when he sees a human being
drowning in the sea or having fallen into a well? The talmudic
answer, still accepted by traditional Judaism, is that the answer is
dependent upon the category to which the human being belongs.
If the person is either a pious Jew or one guilty of no more than
120 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
ordinary offences, he should be saved. If the person is a non-Jew
or a Jew who is a "shepherd of sheep and goats," a category that
lapsed after talmudic times, he should neither be saved nor pushed
into the sea or well. If, however, the person is a Jewish heretic, he
should either be pushed down into the well or into the sea or; if
the person is already in the well or sea, he should not be rescued.
This legal stipulation, although mutilated by censorship in certain
editions of the Talmud and even more in most translations, appears
in Tractate Avoda Zara (pp. 26a-b). Maimonides also explained
this stipulation in three places: In the Laws of Murderer and
Preservation of Life> Maimonides contrasted the fate of non-Jews
with that of Jewish heretics. In the passages from Laws of of Idolatry
Maimonides only discussed Jewish heretics. In Laws of Murderer
and Preservation of Life (chapter 4, rules 10-1 1), he wrote:
The [Jewish] heretics are those [Jews] who commit sins on
purpose; even one who eats meat not ritually slaughtered or who
dresses in a sha'atnez clothes (made of linen and wool woven
together) on purpose is called a heretic [as are] those [Jews] who
deny the Torah and prophecy. They should be killed. If he [a
Jew] has the power to kill them by the sword, he should do so.
But if he has not [the power to do so], he should behave so
deceitfully to them that death would ensue. How? If he [a Jew]
sees one of them who has fallen into a well and there is a ladder
into the well, he [should] take it away and say: "I need it [the
ladder] to take my son down from the roof," or [he should say]
similar things. Deaths of non-Jews with whom we are not at war
and Jewish shepherds of sheep and goats and similar people
should not be caused, although it is forbidden to save them if
they are at the point of death. If, for example, one of them is seen
falling into the sea, he should not be rescued. As it is written:
"Neither shall you stand against the blood of your fellow"
(Leviticus 19:16) but he [the non-Jew] is not your fellow.
In Laws of Idolatry > chapter 2, rule 5 Maimonides stated:
Jews who worship idolatrously are considered as non-Jews, in
contrast to Jews who have committed [another] sin punishable
by stoning; if he [a Jew] converted to idolatry he is considered
to be a denier of the entire Torah. [Jewish] heretics are also not
considered to be Jews in any respect. Their repentance should
never be accepted. As it is written: "None that go into her return
again, neither [do] they hold the paths of life" {Proverbs 2:19).
[This verse is actually a reference to men who frequent "a
strange woman," that is, a prostitute.] In regard to the heretics
who follow their own thoughts and speak foolishly, it is forbidden
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 121
to talk with or to answer them, as we have said above [in the
first section of the work] so that they may ultimately contravene
maliciously and proudly the most important parts of the Jewish
religion and say there is no sin [in doing this]. As it is written:
"Remove your way far from her and come not near the door of
her house." (Proverbs 5:8).
The last verse refers again to men who "frequent a strange woman",
that is, a prostitute. The commentators explained that this passage
meant that a truly repentant idolatrous Jew is accepted by the
Jewish community, but a heretic is not accepted. A heretic who
wants to repent, however, may do it alone. The main reason for
this difference is seemingly that an idolatrous Jew, including one
who converts to Christianity, accepts another religious discipline,
while a heretic follows his own views and is thereby considered to
be more dangerous. In chapter 10, rule 1 of Laws of Idolatry,
Maimonides, after explaining the extermination of the ancient
Canaanites and again asserting that no Jews should be killed, said:
"All this applies to the seven [Canaanite] nations, but Jewish
informers and heretics should be exterminated by one's own hand
and put into hell, because they cause trouble to Jews by removing
their hearts from being true to the Lord, like Tzadok, and Beitos
[the alleged founders of the Sadducean sect] and their pupils. Let
the name of the wicked perish." In nis next rule Maimonides
asserted that non-Jews should not be healed by Jews except when
danger of non-Jewish enmity exists. In his Fundamental Laws of
Torah, the first treatise of his codex, chapter 6, rule 8, Maimonides,
after explaining that Jews are forbidden to burn or otherwise to
destroy the holy script and that they may not even damage any
Hebrew writing in which one of the seven sacred names of God is
written, ruled:
If a Torah scroll was written by a Jewish heretic, it should be
burned, together with all its sacred names [of God], because the
heretic does not believe in the holiness of God and could not
write it for God but must have thought that it is like other books.
Therefore, given this view, God is not sanctified [by it] and it is
a commandment to burn it [the scroll] so that no memory is left
of the heretics or to their deeds. But, a Torah scroll written by
a non-Jew should be put away with the other holy books that
deteriorated or were written by non-Jews. 3
Although he did not instruct Jews to burn heretical books,
Maimonides probably based the above passage upon many directives
issued by talmudic sages since about ad 100. These directives
called for the burning of books by heretics. Indeed, talmudic sages
122 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
even boasted at times about burning such books themselves.
Halachic codes did not so instruct, but rabbinical responsa
frequently called for and Jewish history is replete with examples of
Jews burning Jewish books. Together with burial of books in
cemeteries, this reached a high point in the eighteenth century.
Although minimized in many apologetic histories of Jews, especially
in works written in English, the burning and the burial in cemeteries
of books in the history of Judaism was far more intense than in the
histories of either Christianity or Islam.
Traditional Judaism also forbade independent thoughts. In his
Laws of Idolatry, chapter 2, rule 3, Maimonides, after explaining
that a Jew should not think about idolatry, continued:
And it is not only forbidden to think about idolatry but [about]
any thought that may cause a Jew to doubt one principle of the
Jewish religion. [The Jew] is warned not to bring it to his con-
sciousness. We shall not think in that direction, and we shall not
allow ourselves to be drawn into meditations of the heart, because
human understanding is limited, and not every opinion is directed
to the real truth. If a Jew, therefore, allows himself to follow his
[independent] thoughts, he will surely destroy the world because
of insufficient understanding. How? He may sometimes be
seduced to idolatry and sometimes think about the uniqueness
of the Lord, sometimes that he exists and other times that he
does not; [he may] investigate what is above [in the sky] and what
is below [under earth], what is before [the world was created]
and what is after [the end of the world] . He may think about
whether or not prophecy is true; he may think about whether or
not the Torah was given by God. Because such people do not
know the [true] logic to be used in order to reach the real truth,
they become heretics. It is about that issue that the Torah warned
us. As it is written: "And that you seek not after your own heart
and after your own eyes that you are using to prostitute
yourselves" (Numbers 16:39). [This verse is included in the
third passage of "Kry'at Sh'ma," one of the most sacred Jewish
prayers that is said daily in the morning and in the evening.] This
means that every Jew is forbidden to allow himself to follow his
own insufficient knowledge and to imagine that his own thoughts
are capable of reaching the truth. The sages have said: "after your
own heart" means heresy; "after your own eyes" means
prostitution. This prohibition, even though the sin causes a Jew
to lose paradise, does not carry the penalty of flogging [because
flogging is inflicted only in cases of deeds] .
Such prohibitions of any independent thinking (which some
Haredim apply to some of Maimonides' own writings) were
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 123
common in post-talmudic Judaism and have persisted to date in
part of Orthodox Judaism. Orthodox Judaism totally prohibited
independent thinking about issues discussed freely by St Augustine
regardless of whatever answers he put forward. Indeed, such issues
are almost never mentioned today by Orthodox Jewish scholars. 4
Many theological problems freely discussed by Thomas Aquinas 5
were and remain unthinkable in traditional Judaism. (Traditional
Judaism today includes not only Orthodox but much of
Conservative Judaism as well.) Amazingly, many people, especially
in English-speaking countries, still attribute to post-talmudic
Judaism the intellectual distinction achieved in numerous countries
by many Jews in the past 1 50 years. This delusion has contributed
to the spread of fundamentalist Judaism. In reality, the contrary
has been the case. Most of the Jews who attained intellectual
distinction were influenced by rebellion against this type of
totalitarian system; they negated some of its major tenets.
In addition to advocating that heretics be killed, whenever
possible, by employing one method or another, traditional Judaism
directed that heretics while still alive should under all possible cir-
cumstances be treated in a worse manner than non-Jews or Jews
who converted to another religion. One socially important example
of such directed treatment is the burial of the heretic's corpse,
together with the ceremonies to be observed by the family after the
burial. Whereas traditional Judaism permits and sometimes even
obliges Jews to bury most Jewish sinners, it strictly prohibits Jews
to bury Jewish heretics and/or a few types of Jewish sinners. Tractate
Trumot of the Palestinian Talmud^ chapter 8, halacha 3, discusses
a Jewish butcher in the town of Tzipori in Galilee who sold non-
kosher meat. This butcher fell from a roof and was killed. Rabbi
Hanina Bar Hama, a sage in the early third century ad, encouraged
the Jews of the town to let their dogs eat the corpse. Such behavior
was usually not feasible; hence, later authorities were more
moderate. Maimonides and later rabbis were content with
prohibiting the family of the heretic to mourn his death and ordering
the family to rejoice. Maimonides clearly put this in his Laws of
Mourning, chapter 1, rule 10:
All who separate themselves from public custom [of the Jews],
such as those who do not fulfil commandments and do not
honor the holidays or do not frequent synagogues or houses of
study but rather regard themselves free and [behave] like other
nations, and heretics, converts and informers should not be
mourned; when they die, their brothers and all other relatives
should put on white garments, make banquets and rejoice, since
those who hate the Lord, blessed be he, have perished.
124 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Most Jews rigorously followed this rule of Maimonides until the
beginning of Jewish modernization; some orthodox Jews follow this
rule to date. 6 In the small towns of eastern Europe in the nineteenth
century, Jews devised another custom of humiliating burial of
heretics and other Jewish sinners. This custom, often mentioned
in the contemporary Hebrew and Yiddish literature, was called "ass
burial." It was derived from the biblical verse, Jeremiah 22: 19, where
the prophet predicts that King Yohoiakim of Judah "will be buried
as an ass." This custom had three general components. First,
members of the Jewish burial society, called the Holy Society and
consisting of the fiercest zealots of the town, would first beat the
heretic's corpse. Then the corpse would thereafter be put on a cart
filled with dung and was in that condition paraded through the town.
Finally, the corpse would be buried beyond the fence of the
graveyard without religious rites. The two expressions, "ass burial"
and "beyond the fence" became proverbial terms in Hebrew and
Yiddish and are still used to denote social ostracism. The famous
Jewish writer, Peretz Smolenskin (1840-85), wrote a Hebrew
novel, tided Ass Burial, which is still read. In his novel Smolenskin
told the story of a young Jew in a Russian small town who, because
of a petty quarrel with the chief of the Jewish burial society, was
declared a heretic. The Jewish congregation hired an assassin who
murdered the heretic. The heretic was buried in an ass burial.
Smolenskin was the father of the naturalistic style in Hebrew
literature. His novels were based upon a close observation of Jewish
life as it was in his time.
Learned authorities often disagreed on the definition of heretic.
Talmudic sages enumerated several kinds of heretics who were
called by different names. The Talmud emphasized one type of
heretic, called "apikoros" apparently named after followers of the
Greek philosopher, Epicurus. In Tractate Sanhedrin, page 99b of
the Talmud, the Apikoros were designated as all Jews who were
disrespectful to rabbis. One talmudic sage asserted that a Jew who
was disrespectful to another Jew in the presence of a rabbi was a
heretic. Rabbi Menahem Ha'Meiri, in commenting upon the above
passage, said that a Jew who called a rabbi by his name without
using the honorific tide was a heretic. The prevalent opinion until
the twentieth century was that Jews who were disrespectful to
rabbis were not heretics but were only "like heretics." Real heretics
were those who denied the validity of the Talmud as religious
authority. This definition did not lessen the punishment of heretics
and other sinners, when feasible to employ under emergency laws.
This definition lessened the duty, imposed by the Talmud, of
separating many Jews who paid taxes from the congregation. In the
first half of the twentieth century, two famous rabbis, Rabbi Hazon
Ish and Rabbi Kook the elder both ruled that laws regarding
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 125
heretics "do not apply because visible miracles do not occur." To
what extent the Hazon Ish-Kook opinion is followed today is
difficult to determine. At this point in our discussion, nevertheless,
the focus is upon pre-modern times.
Our survey of punishments, inflicted under emergency Jewish
laws upon Jewish heretics and other sinners, begins with pro-
nouncements by the last Jewish rabbis whose authority was and still
is universally acknowledged. These rabbis were the heads of yeshivot
in Iraq until about 1050; they were named "Ge'onim." (In the
singular each of them bore the name "Ga'on," which in Hebrew
means "genius.") The Ge'onim left many responses to questions
addressed to them from all parts of the Jewish world. These
questions were concerned with how Jews, especially Jewish
communities, should behave. In his previously mentioned book
(1922), Rabbi Simha Asaf quoted a collection of such responses
ordering that a Jew who violates the sabbath should be flogged and
should have his hair shaved (p. 45). Rabbi Paltoi Ga'on, as noted
by Asaf, in ad 858 answered the more difficult question: Should
a Jew who sinned on either the Sabbath or a holiday be flogged on
that sacred day if the danger exists that he may escape before the
Sabbath or the holiday ended? Rabbi Paltoi answered by reminding
his questioners that the congregation had a prison and that the sinner
could be imprisoned on the Sabbath or on the holiday and then
flogged afterwards. Rabbi Paltoi, nevertheless, after acknowledg-
ing that the act of flogging violated the Sabbath in certain ways,
concluded that the concern about the Sabbath or holiday violations
should not prevent the flogging of Jewish sinners on the sacred day
(Asaf, p. 48). Rabbi Tzemach Ga'on, who lived after Rabbi Paltoi,
was asked what to do with a Jewish priest who married a divorced
woman, which as noted by Asaf is forbidden to priests (p. 52). Rabbi
Tzemach Ga'on expressed the fear that such a sinner, if only
flogged, would go to another place and during synagogue services
would participate in the priest's blessing by stretching out over the
heads of congregation members his hands with his fingers separated.
Rabbi Tzemach Ga'on, therefore, ordered that the last joints of the
priestly sinner's fingers should be cut off, thus identifying and
making it impossible for the sinner to participate in the blessing.
The last and most famous Ga'on, Rabbi Ha'i, who died in 1042,
devoted a long response, cited by Asaf, to an explanation of how
Jewish sinners were flogged during his time; he detailed, moreover,
how they were specifically flogged by his court. He emphasized that
the whip was made of hemp and for the worst sinners was especially
thick. The sinner was bound "right hand to the right foot and left
hand to the left foot." The one who flogged him stood near his head.
The ceremony began with a reading of the appropriate biblical
verses. After the flogging, the sinner stood naked with his dress in
126 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
his hand and acknowledged the justice of his sentence. Finally, the
court asked God to have mercy on him. In other responsa, cited
by Asaf on pages 56 and 57, Rabbi Ha'i specified the sins for
which Jews should be flogged. Cutting one's hair on the minor
holidays, putting on shoes during the mourning periods and
violating the Sabbath were three examples. Asaf pointed out further
on pages 58 and 59 that other responsa in the eleventh century
provided proofs that the Jews of Egypt flogged sinners in front of
the doors of synagogues and that the rabbis of Italy, because of the
general political chaos and much greater Jewish autonomy, could
and did execute sinners. Asaf specifically recorded the numerous
death sentences inflicted by the Babylonian rabbi, Abu Aharon, who
immigrated to Italy; for example, Rabbi Abu Aharon sentenced an
adulterer to be strangled and a man who committed incest with
his mother-in-law to be burned. Asaf illustrated the wide parameters
of flogging by reporting that another unnamed Italian rabbi
stipulated that if a Jew living in a courtyard area with other Jews
sold his flat to a non-Jew, he should be flogged.
In Spain, whether under Muslim or Christian rule, Jewish
autonomy and the consequent punishment of Jewish sinners were
most developed and punishments were recorded in the largest
number of cases. On page 62, Asaf quoted Rabbi Samuel the
Prince, 7 who died in 1046: "Spanish Jews were always free of
heresy, except in a few villages near the Christian land where
suspicion exists of some heretics being harbored in secret. Our
predecessors have flogged a part of [those] Jews who deserved to
be flogged, and they have died from flogging." Rabbi Ha'i, as
previously mentioned, insisted that the Jew being flogged must
acknowledge the justice of his sentence and repent. Refusal to
repent, Ha'i and many other rabbinical authorities made clear,
compelled more flogging even until death. Spain may have become
"free of heresy" at least partially because previous heretics were
flogged to death. Rabbi Samuel's boast was confirmed to some
extent, according to Asaf on page 63, by the story of the Jewish
philosopher and historian, Rabbi Avraham Ibn Daud who, in his
book Shalshelet Ha'kabalah (Chain of Tradition), told how the
Karaites, when they began to spread, were humiliated and expelled
from all the towns of Castile except for one. 8 Somewhat later, after
Rabbi Daud's death, Maimonides moderated the flogging
punishment. In his commentary on the Mishnah, Tractate Khulin,
quoted by Asaf on page 64, Maimonides maintained that Jews who
committed sins which would normally result in the death penalty
should "now only be flogged and excommunicated but their excom-
munication should never be removed."
The Jewish sins punished with the greatest cruelty, apart from
informing which will be separately discussed below, were acts of
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 127
disobedience to the will of and/or physical attacks upon rabbis. Such
acts were not rare occurrences. Asaf on page 67 quoted the late
thirteenth-century responsa of Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet, the
famous rabbi of Barcelona. Rabbi ben Aderet endeavored to show
that any rabbi can "together with the elders" sentence Jews who
oppose the rabbi's authority and are "notorious for their
wickedness", not only to flogging but to the more severe
punishments of having their hands or feet cut off or of being killed.
Many other rabbinic responsa dealt in detail with such severe
punishments. Asaf reported on page 72 that the previously
mentioned Rabenu Asher was angry with Rabbi Moshe of Valencia
for ruling against a usual custom and thus Asher's own authority
in a matter of sabbath observance. From Toledo, Asher wrote to
Rabbi Yitzhak of Valencia and ordered him to condemn the
offending Rabbi Moshe to death unless he (Rabbi Moshe) did not
repent after being fined and excommunicated. Rabenu Asher also
dealt with the financial aspect of inflicting the death penalty. In his
responsa to "the holy community of Avila," as reported by Asaf
on page 74, the execution of the wicked was compared to the
building of city walls; executions supposedly defended the purity
of Judaism just as the walls defended their physical safety. Thus,
just as every Jew could be compelled to pay taxes for the upkeep
of the walls, every Jew could be compelled to pay for the execution
of the wicked Jews.
Our final example from Spain is a summary of the responsa of
Rabbi Yehuda, the son of Rabenu Asher. This responsa, quoted
by Asaf on page 77, is important not only because it documents
the use of violence but also because it describes the normal
procedure in emergency cases of halachic decision making in cases
brought before the rabbinical court. The elaborate display of
reasoning in Jewish emergency law, differing totally from Halacha,
is well illustrated in this responsa.
A cornerstone of the normal halachic procedure, based upon the
Bible and employed in all cases brought before the rabbinical
court, is that, in the absence of written documents that are used
only in civil cases, every judgment must be based upon the testimony
of two or more male Jewish witnesses. The testimony of each of
the two witnesses must be exactly the same as determined in direct
interrogation. In the illustrative example presented in his responsa,
Rabbi Yehuda cited a case of a Jew who beat another Jew so
severely that, as a consequence of this, the latter died. Two
witnesses, Moshe and Avraham (family names not given), saw the
beating. Two other witnesses, Yoseph and Yitzhak, saw only the
beginning of the beating; they then left and thereafter returned to
see the beaten man lying on the ground with blood pouring from
his head. After giving thanks to God for "inspiring the kings of the
128 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
earth to give Jews the power to judge [their offenders] as we are
judging now," Rabbi Yehuda explained how the principles of
current Jewish law that are not all according to Halacha have to
be applied in the case under consideration. Rabbi Yehuda, as
quoted by Asaf, decided:
If only the testimony of Moshe and Avraham is found to be valid,
the offender should be executed. If only one of their testimonies
is found to be valid together with finding the testimony of either
Yoseph or Yitzhak to be valid, the offender's hands should be
cut off. If the testimony of either Moshe or Avraham is found
to be valid but the testimony of both Yoseph and Yitzhak is found
to be invalid, the offender's right hand should be cut off. If the
testimony of both Moshe and Avraham is found to be invalid
but the testimony of both Yoseph and Yitzhak is found to be valid,
the offender's left hand should be cut off. If all the testimonies
are found to be invalid, the offender should be exiled from the
city because the fact that he killed [the victim] became notorious.
In other European countries, Jewish autonomy and thus its
consequences were less powerful than in Spain. Perhaps this was
because the other states, in spite of their feudal nature, were
stronger than the Spanish kingdoms before the latter part of the
fifteenth century. In England, where royal power was especially
strong and where Jews settled only after England's conquest by
William I, there were, so far as we know, no cases of rabbis' flogging
or otherwise punishing Jews for religious offenses. In continental
Europe, where Jewish autonomy depended more on the feudal lords
than on the king or emperor, however, there were significant
numbers of cases. In fourteenth-century Germany, for example,
the famous rabbi, Yosef Weil, according to Asaf on page 102,
recorded in his book of responsa that Rabbi Shimon from
Braunschweig asked him whether it was permitted to put out the
eyes of a Jew who violated the Sabbath and Yom Kippur (the Day
of Atonement) . Rabbi Weil answered that it was permitted and
referred to talmudic evidence for his permission. In another case,
reported by Asaf on page 104, the famous Rabenu Tarn who lived
in northern France in the twelfth century ordered that in the case
of a Jew who beat another Jew the punishment should be the
cutting off of the offender's hand rather than the usual punishment
of flogging. Asaf recorded on page 103 that another rabbi had seen
his father inflicting the punishment of flogging. Flogging was used
in general in Germany as a punishment for lesser religious sins; the
cutting of limbs was rare. The use of flogging even diminished with
the passage of time; fines, excommunications and obligatory fasts
were used by German Jews as almost the only punishments.
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 129
In the countries east of Germany, especially in Poland and after
1569 in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth where Jewish
autonomy was extensive, punishments inflicted by rabbis almost
equalled those inflicted in Spain. Every Jewish community had its
own prison and stocks, called "kuneh" in Yiddish, that were placed
in the entrances to major synagogues. The stocks consisted of iron
bars to secure the sinner's arms, compelling him to stand facing
entering members of the congregation who would spit at him, slap
his face and/or take other physical action against him. Flogging was
freely practiced in the synagogue, usually during the reading of the
law in the midst of the morning prayer. Asaf reported on page 122
that the famous sixteenth-century rabbi, Shlomo Luria, assured his
questioners that a well-flogged sinner would not sin again and that
the number of stripes in flogging should be determined by the court
according to what is decided as fitting the sin. In serious cases the
inflicted penalties were mutilation and death. A generation after
Rabbi Shlomo Luria, another famous rabbi, Maharam (our teacher
Rabbi Meir) of Lublin, according to Asaf on page 123, wrote
about a case of a Jewish murderer caught by Polish authorities.
Maharam insisted that such an offender should be executed by the
rabbinical or Polish authorities. Maharam warned the rabbis against
substituting mutilation for execution:
I recall what occurred when I was young, in the time of Rabbi
Shekhna R.I.P. In his time there was a most wicked Jew; the great
rabbi permitted [the community] to put out his eyes and cut off
his tongue. After having this done to him, he converted to
Christianity, married a non-Jewish woman and had children. He
and his [family members] were always enemies of the Jews.
In the seventeenth century, mutilation as a punishment, instead
of death or flogging, tended to disappear among Jews of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. Expulsion from the town appeared as
a new punishment. The autonomous Jewish community of a given
town could determine which Jews would reside in the town. The
privilege of residence was usually granted automatically only to the
children of the old residents, their wives and the rabbis. All other
Jews had to apply to the community authorities and receive, often
after a payment and/or for a limited time, their residence rights.
One of the cruellest punishments that a Jewish congregation could
inflict, therefore, was expulsion, because an expelled Jew would have
great difficulty acquiring residence rights elsewhere. This
punishment, nevertheless, was increasingly employed in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When Russia, Prussia and
Austria thereafter divided Poland, these three conquering powers
limited the autonomy of Jewish communities and forbade them to
130 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
expel their members from towns. The expulsions in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries were often immediate, regardless of the
time of year, and were many times used as a weapon in religious
disputes, such as the quarrel between the Hassids and their
opponents, the Mitnagdim. The Union of Jewish Congregations
in Lithuania, according to Asaf on page 127, ordered immediate
expulsion from the town in addition to physical and financial
punishment for any Jew who "behaved with contempt toward the
rabbi." In another rule, cited by Asaf on pages 127 and 128, the
Union ordered congregations to expel Jews who had previously been
expelled from another town. The expelled Jews were usually
compelled to sign a document, similar to the one quoted by Asaf
on page 132, from the city of Krakow, stating that if they stay in
the town for even one night they must accept any punishment
imposed upon them by the community leaders, including
"mutilation of ear or nose or of other places." In another case, cited
by Asaf, a young Jew, who was expelled from Krakow for having
taken part in a theft committed in the house of a notable, was
sentenced to be flogged in front of the door to the synagogue; the
youth additionally had to sign a declaration that if found again in
Krakow he knew that "his two ears would be cut off, in addition
[to his receiving] other punishments." The kuneh or stock was also
used in this period as punishment especially for heretics but also
for sinners who committed minor offences. In 1772, when the
leaders of the Jewish community of Vilna began their struggle
against the Hassidic movement, they first punished the Hassids in
their town. Before the eve of the Sabbath prayer all Hassidic
writings were burned near the kuneh so that the congregation
members would see the ashes when they came to the synagogue.
Before the burning the chief Hassid of Vilna, Meir Issar, was
flogged privately in the "hall of the community." Following
the flogging, Issar had to confess his sin, strictly following the
formula prepared by the rabbinic court, in the synagogue during
morning Sabbath prayers. He was then imprisoned for one week
in the castle of Vilna. The chief rabbinic authority at that time,
Haga'on Rabbi Eliyahu of Vilna, additionally wanted to put Issar
in the kuneh, but the community leaders, apparently because
Issar's family was important, refused. This story, mentioned by Asaf
on page 139, was included in the detailed, Hebrew-language
histories of this period. 9
The story of Meir Issar is a typical example of persecution by
Jewish authorities in eastern Europe of a Jewish religious dissident
at the end of the eighteenth century. Fanaticism, religious disputes
interposed with excommunications, burning of or sometimes burial
in cemeteries of books and popular riots against heretics and
dissenters characterized many European Jewish communities
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 1 3 1
throughout most of the eighteenth century, with the exception of
those in England and Holland. Towards the end of the century the
zealotry decreased, first in Germany and Italy and then in the
larger towns of eastern Europe; it continued during much of the
nineteenth century among the bulk of the Jewish population in
eastern Europe who lived in smaller towns. The great majority of
Jewish immigrants to the United States, Britain and a few other
places in the nineteenth century, having come from areas in which
religious persecution of Jews by other Jews had been widely practiced
for a long time, suddenly arrived in countries in which such
persecution could not, at least not to nearly the same extent, be
carried out. 10 The wish of many eighteenth-century Jews to
persecute was seemingly greater than their actual ability to do so.
An incident in the history of the Frankist heresy, which erupted in
Poland in 1756 and continued for some years thereafter, provides
a good example. When leaders of the autonomous Jewish
community in Poland learned of this heresy, one of them, Rabbi
Baruch from Greece, wrote a long letter to his friend in Germany
and one of the greatest rabbis of that generation, Rabbi Ya'akov
Emden. 1 1 In his letter Rabbi Baruch described the proceedings and
aims of the main council of Jewish autonomy held in September,
1756, in Konstantinov. The council was called the 'committee of
four lands', a name which referred to the four main Polish provinces.
Rabbi Baruch reported details of the heresy and wrote that the
committee of four lands decided "to bring the matter before the
great Lord who rules over their [the Christian] faith, the Pope in
Rome" and to struggle against the heresy. Rabbi Baruch wrote
further that the committee asked "the help of [Polish] bishops so
that the cursed ones would be condemned to be burned at the
stake." Meir Balaban, the distinguished historian of Polish Jewry,
remarked that the wish to see hundreds of "the cursed ones"
burned at the stake by the Christian authorities, who at that very
time were persecuting Polish Jews, indicated the depth of the
hatred of the heretics felt by the Jewish leadership. 12 The
committee's attempt failed. Rabbi Baruch went so far as to try to
involve his patron, the powerful Minister Bruhl who was the favorite
of the Polish King August III in this matter. Rabbi Baruch wanted
Bruhl to arrange an interview for him with the papal nuncio in
Warsaw. The Pope of that time period, Benedict XVIII, would
almost certainly not have agreed to have a mass burning, but the
heretics anyway obtained the help of powerful bishops and magnates
and even of Countess Bruhl, the wife of the minister. The result
was that the Jewish leaders could not, as they wanted to, pursue
the persecution.
It may be instructive to compare the Frankist heresy incident with
what Baruch Spinoza had to endure in Holland about a hundred
132 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
years earlier. Because of the relatively tolerant and more modern
Dutch regime, the Jewish community of Amsterdam could only
excommunicate Spinoza. As much as members of that community
desired to do so, they could not flog or kill Spinoza; they could not
compel Spinoza to make public confession in the synagogue that
he had sinned in his commentaries and statements about Judaism.
The Jewish community could only excommunicate Spinoza and
forbid him from attending the synagogue. A few years before
Spinoza's excommunication, the Jewish community of Amsterdam
excommunicated Uriel D'Acusta for similar reasons. D'Acusta,
however, was not endowed with Spinoza's firmness and could not
stand his exclusion from the synagogue and from Jewish community
life. D'Acusta asked the rabbis to reinstate him. The rabbis
sentenced him not only to the usual confession but also to lie at
the synagogue entrance so that congregation members could
trample on him before praying to God. D'Acusta accepted the
conditions and, after both confessing and being trampled upon,
was duly forgiven. He, however, again came thereafter to have
heretical views. Fearing another excommunication and something
even worse than being trampled underfoot as a recurrent sinner,
he committed suicide. A comparison between the fates of Spinoza
and D'Acusta suggests two lessons for contemporary Jews who do
not wish to submit to the tyranny often prevalent in Jewish
orthodoxy: 1) An intellectual compromise with Jewish orthodoxy
is no more possible than is an intellectual compromise with any
other totalitarian system. 2) An apologetic approach to the Jewish
past, which is in reality false beautification and falsification of one
part of Jewish history and is intended to remove the horrors and
persecutions that Jews suffered at the hands of their own authorities
and rabbis, only increases the dangers of a developing Jewish
"Khomeinism." In Israel such compromise increases the danger
of a Jewish state that could become dominated by rabbis who will
not hesitate to punish other Jews as did their revered predecessors
when not prevented from doing so by an outside power.
We have seen that formal and legal infliction of severe
punishments depended upon the amount of Jewish autonomy that
existed in specific places at specific times. Russia, Prussia and
Austria, as previously noted, after their conquest of Poland,
abolished Jewish autonomy and subjected Jews to the ordinary
criminal law of their countries. As bad as that criminal law was, it
was on balance better and more humane than the Jewish law as
applied by the rabbis. 13 Jewish communities that were suddenly
deprived of their power to persecute heretics found it difficult to
accustom themselves to a new situation. The relatively lax police
supervision that existed in Tsarist Russia during most of the
nineteenth century allowed Jewish authorities to persecute religious
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 133
innovators through riots, which were similar to what were called
"pogroms" when committed by non-Jews against Jews. Until 1881
in Russia, the number of riots by Jews against other Jews probably
exceeded the number of pogroms by non-Jews against Jews. The
previously persecuted Hassids were the major and worst persecutors;
they were especially active against the emerging Hebrew press of
that time that appeared before the rise of the Yiddish press. The
Hebrew press antagonized the Hassids mainly by reporting and
protesting against the religious persecution by rabbis and their
followers. In order to avert persecution by Jewish rioters, most of
the Hebrew papers were printed and issued in St. Petersburg or
behind the Prussian border, where the police were strong and the
small Jewish communities mosdy consisted of educated individuals.
The history of Jews in Russia until 1881 includes a great deal of
persecution of Jews by Jews. The two following typical examples,
one major and one minor, are illustrative: The major example is
taken from the long article by David Asaf, 14 published in Zion (1994,
number 4), the quarterly journal of the Israeli Historical Association.
Asaf described the riot in Uman in the Ukraine, where one of the
more famous Hassidic rabbis, Nahman of Braslaw, was buried and
where his followers who came on pilgrimage to his tomb on the
Jewish New Year were attacked and beaten year after year for
decades by other Hassids. The annual beatings finally culminated
in 1 863 in an especially nasty attack by a coalition of Hassidic sects
that was described by a contemporary Jewish writer in the Hebrew
press of that time. The writer of the article noted the similarity
between this Hassidic "pogrom" and those committed by the anti-
Semites. He described how Hassids smashed the holy cupboard
(Aron Ha'kodesh in Hebrew) where the scrolls of law were stored.
The attacking Hassids considered the place to be heretical in and
of itself; the alleged heretics were beaten and stoned; when they
fainted, they were attacked again. The attackers used the occasion
to beat the modernized Jews of the place as well, including women
who wore what was considered to be immodest clothing. Fearful
of other attacks, the Breslaw Hassids hired a company of Russian
soldiers to defend themselves from other Hassids. The following
year the collapse of the Hassidic coalition and another Jewish
attack upon Jews in the town of Rzhishchev (south of Kiev) gave
the Breslaw Hassids a temporary respite. The Rzhishchev riot
erupted when a holy rabbi from another place had the temerity to
visit Rzhishchev, where another holy rabbi resided, to collect
money. As Asaf wrote in his article: "Of course, the Hassids of the
local holy rabbi cursed and stoned the invader and he was almost
killed." Many of the Hassids were wounded. The two holy rabbis
then proclaimed that ritual slaughterers of each side were not
kosher; each rabbi also proclaimed that the prayers of the other side
134 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
were "an abomination to God." Scuffles ensured. The holy rabbi
of Rzhishchev was denounced by his colleague as a forger of
banknotes. A police investigation followed. Although the Breslaw
Hassids attained a respite, they were, as Asaf showed, attacked
periodically by other Hassids until 1914.
A minor example occurred in the town of Vyshegrad in 1 886 and
was recorded in the contemporary Hebrew press. Quoting research
of new Jewish historians, Rosen in his previously cited article wrote:
Hassids of Vyshegrad were opposed to the new cantor [of the
synagogue] because his clothes are clean and he puts rubber shoes
over his ordinary shoes. They therefore rioted in the synagogue
against this cantor and beat their opponents until blood flowed.
The police came quickly to separate the two sides. The rabbi who
incited the riot was then arrested by soldiers and brought to the
government house to explain the riot. The actual rioters will be
criminally prosecuted.
After 1881 the situation in Russia began to change and Jewish
attacks upon Jews decreased for several apparent reasons. First, in
1881 the government instigated Russian and Ukrainian pogroms
began, and mass emigration of Jews from Russia began. In addition
police supervision was tightened under the regime of Alexander III,
who ascended to the throne after revolutionaries assassinated his
father, Alexander II. Attacks by Jews against Jews, although
diminished, nevertheless continued in Russia until 1914.
In Polish areas ruled by Austrian police, supervision was stronger
and therefore direct attacks by Jews against other Jews apparently
ceased. Orthodox Jews employed some secret forms of religious
persecution against modern Jews, who called themselves "maskilim"
(enlightened). In extreme cases, Jewish servants of the maskilim
were suborned to kill their employers or other methods of assassi-
nation were employed. In his article Rosen related:
Because of the approaching anniversary of Rabin's assassination.
Professor Ze'ev Gris of the department of Jewish thought at
Ben-Gurion University [in Be'er Sheva] sent us a story about
what happened in Lemberg (now Lviv) in the nineteenth century.
[In 1 848 Lemberg was part of Austria.] A rabbi, named Avraham
Cohen was assassinated by Jews for religious reasons. This was
part of a confrontation between enlightened Jews, although
relatively moderate since they kept the commandments, and the
fanatical Hassids. An article about this was once published by
the Hebrew press in Palestine in Davar one year after [the Labor
leader] Arlozorov [was assassinated] . [The article] was severely
attacked by the right wing Hebrew press of that time.
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 135
Rosen also quoted Professor Bartal who believed the attacks of the
TIassids in the general confrontation to be the forerunner of the
massacre committed by Baruch Goldstein. Bartal commented
further that the maskilim usually only attacked the Hassids or
other orthodox religious Jews by employing satire. 15 Only if
provoked beyond endurance, Bartal asserted, would the maskilim
attack or defend themselves by using physical violence.
Rosen's account of the poisoning assassination of Rabbi Cohen,
as taken from what Professor Gris wrote, is worth relating:
In Lemberg in the 1 840s hundreds of maskilim, after looking for
a rabbi to head their congregation, found Rabbi Avraham Cohen,
who was the rabbi in the small Austrian town of Hohenmass.
Avraham Cohen was born in Bohemia to a poor Jewish peddler,
but he became highly educated. After finishing his Yeshiva
studies and receiving the authorization to become a rabbi, he went
to study at and earned a degree from Prague University. The
historian, Dr Ze'ev Aharon Eshkoli, who researched the story
of Rabbi Cohen, published his account in 1934; he wrote that
Cohen was a moderate but as "one educated in the German style
of those times he was considered a modernist." In 1844, Cohen
was appointed rabbi of the Lemberg congregation of maskilim;
two years later he was the rabbi of all maskilim in the district of
Lemberg. In this role he tried to introduce changes in Jewish life,
but he soon encountered furious opposition of "the religious
fanatics," as Eshkoli defined them. Cohen, for example, initiated
the opening of Jewish schools that would serve as alternates to
yeshivot, and he attempted to abolish the tests of Jewish religious
subjects that Orthodox rabbis imposed upon all young Jewish
couples at their betrothal. Cohen's most important initiative,
according to Eshkoli, was his attempt to abolish the taxes on
kosher meat and sabbath candles, which Lemberg Jews paid to
[Austrian] authorities. These taxes were burdensome for poor
Jews but were sources of income for many Orthodox notables.
The method [of taxation] was as follows: A rich Jew for a certain
lump sum obtained from the authorities the right to impose the
tax on the Jews, from whom he took a much greater sum
supposedly for his efforts. Five tax gatherers, all very pious,
headed the opposition to Cohen. Their leader was Rabbi Hertz
Berenstein, who came from a noted rabbinical family; the second
was Rabbi Tzvi Orenstein, the son of the former Orthodox rabbi
of Lemberg. In 1846, Cohen sent a memorandum to the emperor
[of Austria] pointing out the injustice involved in the gathering
of those taxes. Because of his connection with the authorities,
he was twice invited to talk with the emperor. The five tax
gatherers also sent a memorandum pointing out that the tax
136 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
gathering provides a livelihood for thousands of Jewish families.
The Austrian authorities, nevertheless, accepted Cohen's request
and abolished those taxes in March, 1848.
The abolition of those taxes may not primarily have been due to
Cohen's request. The 1848 revolution, which began in Vienna as
a reaction against Hapsburg absolutism, probably prompted the
tax abolition. Austrian liberals viewed those taxes as discrimina-
tory and opposed them; they were supported by the enlightened
Jews. Orthodox Jews, especially their rabbis, were the firm allies
of absolutism and reaction, not only in Austria but throughout
Europe and the Middle East. Rosen continued his story about Rabbi
Cohen's misfortune:
Whether for reasons of ideological opposition to Cohen or for
economic reasons or for both, the five Jewish notables in 1848
began a total struggle against Rabbi Avraham Cohen. First, they
put placards in the synagogues that incited Jews to spit in his face
and stone him. When the persecution increased, Cohen's friends
asked him to agree to his being guarded all the time; he refused,
saying that he did not believe that Jews would kill him. The next
step involved placards saying plainly that the "law of pursuer"
[to be explained below] applies to Rabbi Cohen. [One placard
said], for example: "He is one of those Jewish sinners for which
the Talmud says their blood is permitted" (that is, every Jew can
and should kill them) . Another placard asked: "Will a Jew be found
who will liberate us from the rabbi who destroys his congregation?"
The fanatics first decided that the assassination would take place
during Purim in 1848; they even cast lots to determine who would
have the honor of murdering the rabbi, but their plans went awry.
A month later during Passover of 1848 a crowd of Jews stoned
Rabbi Cohen's home; only a large number of policemen saved
him. On September 6, 1848, however, Avraham Bar-Pilpel, a
Jewish assassin, successfully entered the rabbi's home unseen,
went to the kitchen and put arsenic poison in the pot of soup
that was cooking. Shortly thereafter. Rabbi Cohen and his family
ate the soup; Rabbi Cohen and his little daughter died. The
Hassids and their leaders did not attend the funeral; they
celebrated. No Orthodox rabbi, moreover, uttered one word of
condemnation, neither of murderous incitement before the
murder nor of the murder itself. Many nationalistic Jews who
were not Orthodox shared in being silent. The Jewish historian
Graetz, author of the first history of the Jews, omitted this story
from his history, which, by the way, [was published] later.
Orthodox Jews took the murdered rabbi's corpse from the section
of the notables of the cemetery and buried it in another section.
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 1 37
Professor Ze'ev Gris says: "My conclusion is, and I am sorry for
it, that there is nothing new in Judaism." The de-legitimization,
incitement, writing on the wall and especially the silence of the
rabbinical leadership of Galicia of those times - everything was
exactly the same as it was before the assassination of Rabin.
Was the murder of Rabbi Avraham Cohen an exceptional case?
In December, 1838, the governor of southwestern Russia,
General Dimitri Gabrielovitch Bibikov, issued a circular to
district governors under his authority. He asked them to look
carefully into what was happening in the synagogues and in
Jewish houses of study. "In those places," he wrote, "Very often
something happens that leaves dead Jews in its wake. Such
crimes are especially grave since they occur in places dedicated
to prayer and study of religious principles. They also are char-
acteristic of autonomous judgment by the rabbinical courts,
executed by their false views about extermination of 'informers'
who reveal crimes of their co-religionists. The rabbis often
succeed in obscuring the [official] investigation to such an extent
that not only the identity of the assassins but even the identity
of the victim remain unclear."
Many Israeli new historians believe that the forms of violence
committed against both heretics and informers are intimately
connected.
Two additional halachic laws are of special importance both
generally and specifically when related to the Rabin assassination.
These two laws, employed since talmudic times to kill Jews, were
invoked by the assassin, Yigal Amir, as his justification for killing
Prime Minister Rabin and are still emphasized by Jews who
approved or have barely condemned that assassination. These are
the "law of the pursuer" (din rodef) and the "law of the informer"
(din moser). 16 The first law commands every Jew to kill or to
wound severely any Jew who is perceived as intending to kill
another Jew. According to halachic commentaries, it is not necessary
to see such a person pursuing a Jewish victim. It is enough if
rabbinic authorities, or even competent scholars, announce that the
law of the pursuer applies to such a person. The second law
commands every Jew to kill or wound severely any Jew who,
without a decision of a competent rabbinical authority, has informed
non-Jews, especially non-Jewish authorities, about Jewish affairs or
who has given them information about Jewish property or who has
delivered Jewish persons or property to their rule or authority.
Competent religious authorities are empowered to do, and at times
have done, those things forbidden to other Jews in the second law.
During the long period of incitement preceding the Rabin assas-
sination, many Haredi and messianic writers applied these laws to
138 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Rabin and other Israeli leaders. The religious insiders based
themselves on later developments in Halacha that came to include
other categories of Jews who were defined as "those to whom the
law of the pursuer" applied. Every Jew had a religious duty to kill
those Jews who were so included. Historically, Jews in the diaspora
followed this law whenever possible, until at least the advent of the
modern state. In the Tsarist Empire Jews followed this law until
well into the nineteenth century.
The land of Israel has been and still is considered by all religious
Jews as being the exclusive property of the Jews. Granting
Palestinians authority over any part of this land could be interpreted
as informing. Some religious Jews interpreted the relations that
developed between Rabin and the Palestinian Authority as causing
harm to the Jewish settlers. In this sense, Rabin had informed.
Influential rabbis, such as the Gush Emunin leader, Rabbi Moshe
Levinger, publicly denounced as informers Rabin, some Labor
and Meretz ministers and some Knesset members. Professor Asa
Kasher of Tel-Aviv University, a widely respected person in Israel,
tried to enlighten the public by writing a letter to the editor of
Haaretz about the exact meaning of the term employed by Levinger
and about the danger of assassination implied therein. His warnings
were disregarded by everyone, including Rabin and the editors of
Haaretz, Shabak, the branch of the Israeli secret police responsible
for domestic affairs and the body responsible for guarding Rabin,
also ignored the dangers implicit in a possible, and obviously
probable, application to Rabin of the law of the informer. Shabak
insisted until the actual happening that the danger of murder came
only from Muslim extremists. Interestingly, by the end of August
1998, the Israeli media was filled with Shabak's warnings that
Jewish religious fanatics intended to assassinate Netanyahu, Defense
Minister Mordechai and other ministers because of their agreement
in principle to Israeli withdrawal from an additional 1 3 per cent
of the West Bank. These warnings were based upon the same fun-
damentalist logic that led to the assassination of Rabin; they
indicated some of the danger posed by Jewish fundamentalism.
Rabin's murder followed logically from the religious premises of
the 1984 Jewish underground. Members of the underground were
then apprehended planting bombs under Arab buses near Jerusalem
on a Friday. The bombs had timing devices so that they would
explode after the Sabbath eve had commenced when under Jewish
religious law, travel on a bus was prohibited and sinful. At that time,
before the Intifada, many Israeli Jews rode in Arab buses. The only
category of people not likely to use these buses when the bombs
were due to explode were religious Jews. The pious members of
the Jewish underground sought prior rabbinical approval for all their
actions. Peres, Rabin and Shamir, acting together in accordance
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 139
with the agreement that the national unity government then in power
had devised, ordered the police to stop investigating the extremist
rabbis. Not one rabbi opposed the religious reasoning that led to
the planting of these bombs. The conclusion is inescapable that
some rabbis approved and others did not oppose wanton killing of
non-religious Jews, presumably because of their heretical opinions.
Yediot Ahronot in its November 16, 1995, issue alleged that Rabbi
Nahum Rabinowitz proposed the planting of mines and explosive
devices around settlements threatened with evacuation by the
Israeli army. This proposal followed the same line of reasoning.
When asked about the danger inherent to lives of Jewish soldiers
in his proposal, Rabbi Rabinowitz answered: "If they obey the order
to remove a Jewish settlement, then they are wicked Jews" and as
such, he implied, they deserve death. This should be seen within
the context of the twofold hatred of non-Jews and secular Jews that
settlement rabbis had preached for some time.
The reason for the willful ignorance of this danger, shared by
many Israeli Jews, including Rabin himself, was in our view Jewish
chauvinism, which is so prevalent among Jews. The chauvinists
falsify the history of their nation in order to make it appear better
than it really was. They also falsify the current situation by claiming
that their nation is the best. This claim, often made by too many
Jews, is especially dangerous when reinforced by a combination of
religious fanaticism and willful ignorance. Jewish chauvinism is
especially virulent, because the identification between Jewish
religion and Jewish nationality has prevailed for so long and still
prevails among many Jews. It should not be forgotten that
democracy and the rule of law were brought into Judaism from the
outside. Before the advent of the modern state, Jewish communities
were mostly ruled by rabbis who employed arbitrary and cruel
methods as bad as those employed by totalitarian regimes. The
dearest wish of the current Jewish fundamentalists is to restore this
state of affairs.
The information in the Talmud itself about killing and punishing
Jewish informers is scanty and is anecdotal in nature. Fear of
Roman and Sassanid authorities was at least partially responsible
for this. The same situation existed during the time of the Ge'onim
of Iraq, who lived from about ad 750 to 1050 under the strong rule
of the Abassid Caliphate. The responsa of the Ge'onim rarely deal
only with informers and impose at most only religious penalties.
Rabbi Paltoi, according to Asaf on page 49 of The Punishments, stated
in the mid-ninth century that an informer is not only a Jew who
actually informs but one who during a quarrel in public with
another Jew says that he will inform. Paltoi, nevertheless, imposed
the mild penalty of designating such a person "wicked" and thus
incapable of giving either an oath or testimony. In Muslim Spain,
140 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
after the dissolution of the strong Ummayad Caliphate in the early
years of the eleventh century, the situation was different, and
informers were frequently executed. In Alicena, a city mostly
inhabited by Jews in the mid-eleventh century, Rabbi Yosef Halevi
Ibn Ha'migash, a famous scholar, according to Asaf on page 63 of
The Punishments, ordered Jews to stone an informer during the
Ne'yila prayer on Yom Kippur, which that year fell on the Sabbath.
Stoning is usually considered to be a severe violation of both Yom
Kippur and the Sabbath. The Ne'yila prayer, moreover, said only
once a year at the close of Yom Kippur, is probably the most holy
prayer in the Jewish calendar. The choice of that particular time
must have been dictated by the need to explain to all Jews that the
duty of killing a Jewish informer is more important than other
religious considerations. Indeed, Maimonides wrote in his author-
itative commentary to the Mishnah, as quoted by Asaf in The
Punishments on page 63: "It happens every day in the west [Spain
and North Africa] that informers who allegedly informed about
money of the Jews are killed or are [themselves] informed against
to non-Jews so that they [the Jewish informers] would be either killed
or beaten by them [the non-Jews] or given to the wicked." This
rule, widely quoted by later authorities, established an important
precedent: informing is permitted, even enjoyed, when done by
communal Jewish authorities in cases that they consider essential.
Only individual Jews should be killed if they inform. 17
In another part of his commentary Maimonides said that the
obligation to kill both informers and heretics is a tradition that is
applied in all cities of the west. After the reconquest of most of Spain
by the Christians, except for the kingdom of Grenada, killings of
informers continued and actually intensified in the kingdoms of
Granada, Castile and Aragon. The number of cases recorded in
the Spanish responsa is very large. The following few examples are
representative: Rabenu Asher, as quoted by Asaf in The Punishments
on page 73, answered a question about a Jew who was a notorious
informer; the rabbinical court investigated the case. Rabenu Asher
answered that the killing of informers does not need witnesses but
only the expression of opinion by other Jews that a given person is
indeed an informer. "Had we needed to take testimony of witnesses
before the accused," Rabenu Asher opined, "we would never be
able to convict them [the informers] . " (This same reasoning was
employed by the Inquisition, by modern totalitarian states and by
the Israeli conquest regime in the territories occupied since 1967.)
Rabenu Asher immigrated to Spain from northern France when
already a famous rabbi; he was probably familiar with Ashkenazi
customs as well as with those of Spanish Jews. Hence, he could
probably comment with knowledge and sophistication that common
practice in the diaspora was to punish with death an informer who
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 141
informed three times on the Jews or their money. This was necessary,
Rabenu Asher maintained, so that the number of informers among
Jews would not increase. After reflecting upon all of this a bit
more, he concluded that killing the informer as a punishment was
a good deed. It would emphasize that all the Lord's enemies should
perish.
In another responsa, cited by Asaf on page 74, Rabenu Asher
dealt with a Jew, called either Avraham or Alot. Some Jews had
charged that he had informed several times. Rabenu Asher insisted
for all to know that the informer could be punished even on Yom
Kippur when it falls on the Sabbath; he said that this had occurred
in Germany and France. Rabbi Yehuda, the son of Rabenu Asher,
opined, according to Asaf on page 79 of The Punishments, "[In the
case of a Jew who had been an informer for years] every one who
kills him will be rewarded by God. A Jew who could kill the
informer and did not can be punished for all that the informer did
as if he did it himself." In another case Rabbi Yehuda explained
that the Jews themselves should kill the informers lest non-Jewish
judges would refuse to inflict death penalties for informing. In some
cases Jewish congregations literally bought the life of an informer
from the king and then executed him publicly. This occurred for
instance, in Barcelona in April, 1279. Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet,
according to Asaf in The Punishments on pages 65 to 67, reported
this in his responsa. A Jew, named Vidalan de Porta, who belonged
to a noble family, informed to King Pedro II of Aragon, who was
also the Count of Catalonia. After being requested by the Jewish
inhabitants of Catalonia, the king agreed (probably for a payment)
to deliver him to the Jewish authorities of Barcelona, who had
previously sentenced de Porta to death. Jews in Barcelona led him
"to the street before the cemetery in Barcelona, and they opened
the veins of both his arms. He bled to death." Three years after
the execution, brothers of the victim protested against it. Rabbi
Shlomo ben Aderet defended the verdict by noting that such
verdicts were often carried out in Aragon and Castile. He also wrote
to Germany seeking and receiving support for the verdict from the
most important rabbi of that time, Meir of Rothenburg (Maharam).
The law of the informer is clearly apparent in an anonymous
Spanish responsa, important because it was quoted by the famous
sixteenth-century Polish rabbi, Shlomo Luria. This is cited by
Asaf in The Punishments on pages 83 to 87: "He [the informer] is
not only killed by decision of the [rabbinic] court, but any Jew who
himself is first to kill him will be rewarded by God." This same
statement appeared in numerous rabbinical responsa.
Spanish Jews killed and/or mutilated informers as late as the
fifteenth century. Jews in other communities, especially in North
Africa and Portugal, who were influenced by Spanish Jews did
142 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
likewise. Rabbi Shimon, the son of Rabbi Tzemach, who emigrated
from Spain and went to Algiers in the early fifteenth century wrote
in a responsa, as reported by Asaf on page 88 of The Punishments,
about the sacred duty to kill an informer. In another responsa,
according to Asaf on page 89 of The Punishments, Rabbi Shimon
recognized that killing was not always possible. He advised in such
cases that the informer should be branded on his brow or flogged
but in any case should have his name as an informer publicized in
all communities.
Information about the killing of reformers in early Ashkenazi
communities in northern France and Germany is sparse before and
non-existent after the thirteenth century. This was probably due
to lesser Jewish autonomy and to the stronger power of non-Jewish
states. Rabenu Asher, as previously mentioned, testified that in his
time the killing of informers in Germany was common. He presented
little evidence. Rabenu Tarn, one of the chief rabbi of northern
France, according to Asaf in The Punishments on page 107, reported
that an assembly of French rabbis, held in Troyes, debated the
problems "caused by the criminals of our nation," who either
secretly or openly informed, and by the Jews who brought their cases
against other Jews to non-Jewish judges, thereby flouting the
exclusive authority of rabbinical courts. The only explicit
punishment inflicted upon those criminals was excommunication,
which included a prohibition against speaking to them. The rabbis
tempered the prohibition somewhat by stating that those Jews who
feared the anger of the king or the feudal lords could speak to the
excommunicated informers but could not use such permission as
merely an excuse to do so. Some rabbis said that an obscure ancient
rule against informers could in addition be inflected. In the latter
part of the thirteenth century, according to Asaf on page 107 of
The Punishments, Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg wrote that Jews could
kill or mutilate, by cutting out the tongue of an informer, who
remained in a state of permanent excommunication. In only a few
known informer cases in Germany in this time period were killing
or mutilation inflicted. One such case concerned an informer in
Strasbourg in the early fourteenth century. As reported by Asaf on
page 108 of The Punishments, Rabbi Samuel Shlitzstat of Strasbourg
sentenced an informer to death. The Jewish community applied
to a non-Jewish judge who ordered the informer to be drowned in
the Rhine. Some of the informer's friends then appealed to some
powerful feudal lords and through them to the emperor. The
friends testified in non-Jewish courts and gave signed testimony,
apparently written in Latin. They testified that Rabbi Shlitzstat sent
a letter to the Jews in which he said the informer should be killed.
They also testified that he collected money from the Strasbourg
and nearby Jewish communities to insure the drowning. The
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 143
implication here was that the judge who gave the order to drown
was bribed. The result in this case was that Rabbi Shlitzstat had
to hide from the authorities for several years and thereafter escaped
from Germany to go to Iraq. He told the president of the Iraqi Jewish
community, David son of Hodaya, about the inequities of the Jews
who had persecuted him. David son of Hodaya then solemnly
excommunicated the offenders in writing. Rabbi Shlitzstat returned
to Germany with the excommunication order. What happened upon
his return, that is, the end of the story, is not known. From that
time rabbinical sources reveal nothing about killings but much about
excommunication of informers.
Detailed information about Ashkenazi Jews in sixteenth-century
Poland is available. These Polish Jews, as previously indicated,
enjoyed extensive autonomy in the relatively weak Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth. Because of this, killings and other punishments
of Jewish informers, for which evidence is abundant, were
commonplace. Rabbi Shlomo Luria, as Asaf made clear on page
1 22 of The Punishments, stipulated that informers should be killed.
He added:
It is better to kill than to mutilate them, for example by cutting
out their tongues, so as to remove the evil from our midst. It is
also not only probable but nearly certain that a [mutilated] Jew
would convert and, in order to take revenge, would tell incorrect
things about Jews. I saw myself that by only mutilating them [the
informers] Jews have greatly suffered.
After the early seventeenth century, Polish rabbis and the Jewish
autonomous authorities tended to employ more cautious language
when writing about killing Jewish informers. In a case of a certain
Jewish informer who had been expelled from the town of Pinsk and
from all Lithuania but who appeared in Lubavitch, the Committee
of Lithuanian Jews in its ruling used the Hebrew phrase "hatarat
dam" ("allowing the shedding of blood"). Asaf on page 128 and
129 of The Punishments discussed this ruling. This phrase, which
became common in such rulings thereafter, was a bit less direct
than an actual order to kill an informer. In this same case the
Committee of Lithuanian Jews, after ruling that Jews who revealed
Jewish secrets should be excommunicated even on Yom Kippur,
stipulated, as reported by Asaf:
In case of anybody who informs, even about Jewish money, and
certainly in cases of bodily harm, every Jew knows the law and
therefore there is no need to make any rules. We only are warning,
we order every Jew who sees or hears such action, whether it
concerns him or not, within three days to tell it to two notables
144 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
of the town who are not connected to the informer. Otherwise
he [that Jew who sees of hears such action] will be excommu-
nicated himself, and the punishment of the informer will be
applied to him. The two notables will then do what they should
do. But if the informer is powerful and for the time being they
[the notables] cannot do anything to him, the rabbis and notables
will write his name in the Chronicle [of the town] so that his [the
informer's] sons will not be circumcised, no one will marry his
daughters and he will be excluded from all sacred matters. The
good chief rabbis will also keep watch so that the verse "and when
I shall avenge" [a verse occurring several times in the Pentateuch
that supposedly means that God's revenge has been delayed but
will come] would apply to him.
Again, the language employed is more cautious and indirect than
a direct order to kill an informer or a Jew who did not report an
informer. The last sentence of the ruling is especially relevant.
A second Polish example is found in the preserved chronicle of
the Jewish community in Krakow. This is discussed by Asaf on page
133 of The Punishments. This chronicle condemns Yisrael, son of
Rabbi Aharon Welitshker, for informing on the Jews in regard to
financial matters, robbing, using violence and committing religious
offences that cannot be written. The condemnation continued:
We, the notables of the community and we the most honorable
[rabbinical court], let the Lord guard them, considered the
honor of his family and lessened his punishment. We therefore
condemn him only to be excommunicated in all the synagogues
and be incapable of either bearing testimony or swearing [in
rabbinical court]. An iron collar should be put on his neck. He
must also give back what he took by robbery, whether it was stolen
from individuals or from communities. His property should be
confiscated wherever found.
Additionally, he was ordered expelled from the town; not one of
his descendents was ever allowed to live in that town. This tempered
verdict was issued in the spring of 1772.
The third Polish example is taken from the preface to a talmudic
book, Taharat Kodesh, published in 1733 and written by Rabbi
Benyamin, son of the important Polish religious leader, Rabbi
Matattya. This book, to which Asaf referred on page 133 of The
Punishments, showed that informers increased in number over a
period of time, in spite of killings and other ferocious punishments
meted out to them. Rabbi Benyamin bitterly complained about the
large number of Jewish informers in his time and added that many
Jews helped or flattered them. He asked Jews to avoid the informers.
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 145
His proposed remedy was "to allow their blood [to be shed] so that
we shall exterminate them totally." Rabbi Benyamin additionally
prohibited accepting money from them for charitable purposes. He
added that in an unspecified distant country the Jews had succeeded
in exterminating the informers and thereby were secure in spite of
their spending a goodly amount of money for their security. Rabbi
Benyamin's recommendations were not cautious. More importantly,
the Tsarist police investigations of the killing of Jewish informers
and the many testimonies of enlightened Jews in the nineteenth
century show that the problem of Jewish informers was not solved
by these recommendations.
After the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
between Russia, Austria and Prussia, finalized in 1795, and after
the resultant abolition of autonomy of Jewish communities by the
three conquering powers, violence inflicted by Jews, especially by
Jewish authorities, on other Jews rapidly declined. Violence virtually
disappeared in the Prussian part of Poland and remained at about
the same level in the areas ruled by Russia. In the Russian area,
violence, when practiced however, was often secret. In the area ruled
by Austria (Galicia) the situation was a bit more complex; Jewish
violence such as assassinations of modernist rabbis occurred under
certain conditions.
The different levels of inter-Jewish violence in the three parts of
divided Poland should be ascribed to the different levels of modern
influences after the division. The Jews in the Prussian part of
Poland were in an efficient absolutist monarchy, equipped with a
good police and civil administration that were greatly influenced
by modernist tendencies. The first partition of Poland occurred
when Frederic II, the Great, the friend of Voltaire and other French
philosophers of the age of the Enlightenment, ruled Prussia. The
influences of the Enlightenment, at least in the ranks of Prussian
administrators, remained strong for at least a generation after the
death of Frederic II in 1786. Probably of equal importance was the
fact that the Jewish Enlightenment began in Prussia, which possessed
even before the partition of Poland a strong community of
enlightened Jews, centered on Berlin, who at that time expressed
themselves as much in Hebrew as in German. These enlightened
Jews could thus be immediately understood by the majority of male
Jews in areas annexed to Prussia,
The Jews in the Russian area of Poland were by contrast in a
more backward regime that had a weak and inefficient adminis-
tration in spite of the thin veneer of the Enlightenment provided
by Catherine II, the Great. Russia had also been a country without
Jews for hundreds of years. The first Jews allowed to live in the
Tsarist Empire were the Jews who lived in the annexed Polish
territory. The notorious "Pale," the only area of Russia where
146 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Jews, with a few exceptions, were allowed to live until 1917, was
simply the area of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth annexed
to Russia. The "old Russia" kept its "purity" of being forbidden
to Jews. Because of the absence of Jews, Russians, especially
Russian Church leaders, had a strong tradition of anti-Semitism.
Anti-Semitism in Russia in 1800 was worse than in any other
country at that time. The Tsarist regime, moreover, at the beginning
of the Polish takeover introduced special taxes on Jews, in force
until 1905, as well as other discriminations against Jews. The
absence of large towns and cities, except for St. Petersburg and
Moscow which were forbidden to Jews, and the undeveloped state
of education enabled most Jews annexed to Russia to continue their
old customs, especially in the smaller communities, until the 1880s.
The old customs included the persecution of heretics and the
killing of informers. Nevertheless, the small but growing group of
enlightened Jews found it easier to oppose these and other old
customs under Russian rule than under the conditions of Jewish
autonomy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Russian rule,
even with its deficiencies, afforded the enlightened Jews somewhat
more protection than they previously had, enabling them at least
to testify about killings of informers.
The Jews in the territories annexed by Austria were in an
intermediate situation between Prussia and Russia. After 1848
and especially after 1867, when Austria granted a limited form of
constitution and other civil liberties, the Jewish situation in Austria
came to approximate more the Prussian and after the unification
of Germany in 1871, the German model. 18 Austria and the
Hapsburg dynasty had strong anti-Semitic tendencies that were
prominent under Maria Theresa (1740-80), who was probably the
most anti-Jewish ruler of eighteenth-century Europe and who was
responsible for the largest expulsion of Jews before the Nazi era:
she expelled about 70,000 Jews from Prague and other Bohemian
towns in 1745. Maria Theresa had to reverse her decree and allow
Jews to return within a short time because of the strong protests
of her allies, Britain and Holland, upon whose subsidies she
depended in the War of Austrian Succession. Her successor, Joseph
II, reversed her policies and in 1782 issued a decree granting
limited, but still significant, rights to Jews. He did this in the face
of considerable opposition. 19 After Joseph's death in 1 790, the two
tendencies fluctuated until Emperor Franz Joseph decided to adopt
a pro-Jewish policy in 1867.
The new Israeli historians have presented evidence showing that
until the 1880s the killings of Jewish informers by Jews in the
Tsarist Empire were numerous. In his article dealing with the new
Israeli historians Rosen quoted the writer, Shaul Ginzberg, who
wrote in his autobiography that during the nineteenth century
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 147
hundreds of Jewish informers were drowned in the Dnieper, the
largest river flowing in the "Pale." These informers were charged
and convicted under the law of the informers simply because they
were suspected of informing the authorities about something.
Rosen wrote: "Like Avraham Cohen, some of them acted because
of ideological reasons such as the wish to bring the Jewish
community to a modern way of life." Dr David Asaf researched
some of those affairs and said: "Some of the informers were pro-
fessionals who gave the authorities information about tax
concealment, but even in such cases, judging them by what amounts
to rabbinical martial courts and their execution by what amounts
to lynching help us to understand the conflict between the
enlightened Jews and the Orthodox, particularly the Hassids." As
previously shown, a Jewish informer was condemned to death in
secret without being able to say anything in his own defense. This
mode of execution was employed for hundreds of years until the
recent time. 20 Rosen asked Asaf if the Jewish community regarded
those informers as traitors. Asaf responded:
They were not so regarded by the enlightened Jews. More than
this, the enlightened Jews wanted the Jews to be citizens of the
state. This included in their view paying taxes and serving in the
army. Giving information to authorities was in many cases a
necessary thing in their view. If you compare the situation to the
one existing [in Israel] now [one year after the assassination of
Rabin] then, with some changes, the present conflict is similar
to what went on then.
To show what was involved, Asaf recounted an affair he had
researched involving a famous Hassidic rabbi from the town of
Rozin, Israel Friedman, who was known as the "holy man of
Rozin." Friedman as a major Hassidic personage was important,
because the Hassidic movement played a major role in those assas-
sinations. Asaf related, as reported by Rosen:
Friedman was one of the greatest Hassidic leaders. In Jewish
history books he is represented as a person of small scholarly
knowledge but also as a man of power who enjoyed the delights
of life. He was instrumental in the issuing of the law of the
pursuer against some informers from the town of Oshitz in the
Podolia district of the Ukraine. In February, 1836, a corpse of
one of the persons, Yitzhak Oxman, was found beneath blocks
of ice on the frozen river. The corpse was so mutilated, apparently
as a result of torture, that it was difficult to identify. Only some
time thereafter, when the corpse was taken out of its grave, were
new witnesses able to identify it. The corpse of the other murdered
148 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
person, Shmuel Schwatzman, disappeared. We now know that
he was strangled while praying in the synagogue. His corpse was
cut into pieces and burned in the oven that heated the community
bath. Following a police investigation, in which even Tsar Nicolai
I was interested, it was established that the Jews of the community
where the murder was committed, including relatives of the
murdered persons, knew perfectly well what had taken place and
how it was carried out. Everyone stayed silent either because of
strong discipline or because of fear. This case was one of the few
in which a secret rabbinical court, which issues unwritten verdicts
of the law of the pursuer and death punishments, was discovered.
Yosef Perl, one of the chiefs of the enlightened Jews of Galicia,
secretly supplied information to the Russian authorities in order
to bring about the conviction of Rabbi Yisrael of Rozin.
Asaf, who also described other Hassidic murders, said that Perl,
who hated the Hassids, acted for reasons that he believed to be
ideological. Rosen, in interviewing the new historians, discovered
that the various Hassids also struggled violently with one another
mainly because of economic interests. He wrote: "Since the Hassids
gave money to their holy men and some of the latter adopted a
nineteenth century way of life that rivalled the luxuries of
contemporary kings, they were interested in the places from which
their incomes came."
Pre-modern Judaism was characterized by many cases of inter-
Jewish violence, of which the few cases mentioned above are merely
representative. These few cases, however, are sufficient to show that
Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, both in its messianic and Haredi
forms, is a reversion to a situation that existed before the onset of
modernization and the loss of the type of Jewish autonomy with
its arbitrary powers that allowed killing or otherwise severely
punishing informers. What occurred in Jewish fundamentalism is
not dissimilar to what occurred in other forms of fundamentalism.
Some innovations have been made, largely to disguise true intent.
The predominant wish ideologically is to return to the supposedly
"good times" when everything was seen and kept in proper order.
In the case of the Jewish messianic variety of fundamentalism, the
idea is to use modern methods to achieve the power to re-establish
the traditional way of life in an effectual manner. The dangers of
Jewish fundamentalism being established in Israel as at least part
of the ruling power are great. For non-Jews in the Middle East,
the Arabs and especially the Palestinians, the main danger is in and
with the messianic variety of Jewish fundamentalism. This is most
apparent in the role of the Jewish religious settlers in the Occupied
Territories. For Israeli Jews who will not accept the tenets of Jewish
fundamentalism, however, all varieties are dangerous. The Jewish
THE BACKGROUND OF RABIN'S ASSASSINATION 149
fundamentalist attitude towards heretics is much worse than is the
attitude towards non-Jews. This is analogous to the situation in other
religions. A contemporary example is the attitude of the Iranian
regime to Baha'ists, regarded as Muslim heretics, which is much
worse than the attitude towards Christians and Jews. Our firm belief
is that a fundamentalist Jewish regime, if it came to power in Israel,
would treat Israeli Jews who did not accept its tenets worse than
it would treat Palestinians. This book is an attempt to provide wider
understanding of Jewish fundamentalism and hopefully help avert
the danger from becoming a reality.
Note on Bibliography
and Related Matters
Serious books describing a social phenomenon usually contain a bib-
liographical listing or essay, detailing and perhaps briefly discussing
the primary and secondary sources consulted by the authors. For
some years we have read a significant number of books in English
and Hebrew that are concerned with Judaism and the state of Israel.
In our book we decided to refer only minimally to those books in
English; we relied primarily upon the Israeli Hebrew press, basic
Jewish religious (and in a few cases literary) texts and some learned
Hebrew articles, published in Israeli journals and magazines. We
identified these in our text. Our first reason for doing this is that
Hebrew sources are, with few exceptions, the most pertinent in
dealing with Jewish fundamentalism in Israel. We are nevertheless
aware that the number of books that focus on aspects of or
background to our topic, published in English and languages other
than Hebrew, is large. We wish to offer an explanation about why
we did not cite, and most often ignored, much of this voluminous
literature.
We believe that the great majority of the books on Judaism and
Israel, published in English especially, falsify their subject matter.
The falsification is sometimes a result of explicit lying but is mostly
the result of omission of major facts that may create what the authors
consider to be an adverse view of their subjects. Many of the books
that fit into this category are comparable to much of the literature
produced in totalitarian systems, whether religious or secular and
whether or not embodied in a state. We do not deny that books on
Israel and Judaism published in English have value; they may, and
often do, contain correct and valuable information. Books about the
USSR under Stalin or his successors written by Stalinists, books about
Iran written by followers of Khomeini, books on Christian funda-
mentalism written by its adherents often contain correct and valuable
information. Many other analagous examples exist. What usually
makes such books unreliable are not so much the lies but rather the
purposeful omissions. Regarding Judaism and Israel, the omissions
are more blatant and numerous in books published in English
outside of Israel than they are in Israel's Hebrew literature. The
omissions pertinent to our subject of Jewish fundamentalism exist
150
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 1 5 1
for the same apologetic reasons as do the literary omissions in any
totalitarian system. The information freely available in Hebrew can
and should be used to redress apologia by omissions in English. The
coverage in Hebrew of Jewish fundamentalism is more complete and
is not riddled with omissions, because, as our book shows, Jewish
fundamentalism poses an immediate threat to the beliefs and style
of life of a majority of Israeli Jews. Jewish fundamentalism, if it
increases in strength, could destroy Israeli democracy; this danger
does not exist in the diaspora where Jews, even when supporting the
worst aspects of Jewish fundamentalism, benefit from democracy and
pluralism. In our view the state of Israel has faults that have been
and still are caused by the nature of Zionism and by the open and
hidden influences of Jewish fundamentalism. To exchange the
present reality of the state of Israel for a Jewish fundamentalist state
of either the Haredi or messianic variety would create a far worse
situation for Jews, Palestinians and perhaps the entire Middle East.
We believe that our book, based primarily upon Hebrew sources,
correctly points out this danger for the first time in English.
To document our above comments, we shall present a short list
of important issues in Israel and in Jewish history of the diaspora
before the modern period, which are relevant for Jewish funda-
mentalism but are nevertheless omitted from the literature in English
about Israel and Judaism. We shall first consider two issues, closely
connected to Jewish fundamentalism, that are not specifically
mentioned in our book. We shall thereafter present some issues that,
although discussed in our book, are not mentioned in the voluminous
literature in English. During the Labor Party primaries of the 1999
Israeli election campaigns, accusations appeared in the Hebrew
press claiming that fraud in the vote counts occurred in Druze and
Arab sectors of the party. The use of such expressions should raise
concern. Political parties in the United States and Britain do not
specify Jewish, non-Jewish or similar sectors. Readers of the Israeli
Hebrew press know that an Arab or Druze, that is, a non-Jew who
is an Israeli citizen, even if living in Tel- Aviv or Haifa, cannot belong
to the Labor Party branch of her or his neighborhood; that person
must belong to one of the two sectors that exist for Druze and Arabs
respectively. Jews cannot belong to one of those sectors.
Consequently, an Arab living in Tel- Aviv votes in the primaries of
the Israeli Labor Party only as a member of the Arab sector and not
together with her or his neighbors. Other types of sectors also exist,
based upon social structure in the Labor Party. The kibbutzim
sector is one example. In these other sectors membership fluctuates
according to the natural movements of population, not according
to racist criteria. A kibbutz member of the Labor Party who leaves
the Kibbutz to settle in Tel- Aviv becomes a member of the party
branch of that person's new neighborhood; conversely, a Tel-Aviv
member of the Labor Party who joins a kibbutz automatically
152 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
becomes a member of the kibbutz sector. In contrast, an Arab
member of the Labor Party remains an Arab wherever that person
lives, confined ethnically or more precisely religiously. Such a
proposal for the operation of political parties in the United States
or Great Britain would be quickly labeled and condemned correctly
as anti-Semitic. Such a proposal would be roundly discussed in the
press and in other literature concerned with the United States and/or
Great Britain. In the voluminous descriptions in English of Israel,
this phenomenon, although known in Israel, is almost never
mentioned.
The probable reasons for the above omission are most likely the
same as those for other similar omissions. The first and most
important probable reason is that many Jews and those who
sympathize with them wish to avoid comparisons between what
rights Jews as a minority in the diaspora demand for themselves and
what rights Jews deny to non-Jews in those areas where Jews are a
majority and wield the power. We believe that Jewish fundamentalism
justifies, explicitly and unconsciously as a believed survival tactic,
both the discrimination and its cover-up. As noted in our book, Jewish
fundamentalism in Israel influences most of society. Its influence is
especially significant in regard to the principles of Israeli state
policies, but its hidden and often clear-cut influence upon a majority
of Jews in the diaspora is strong. Two additional reasons in our view
account for omissions of vital facts in the English discussion of
phenomena in Israel that could be disturbing to many people. A
hidden, and sometimes not so hidden, assumption made in much
of the English literature about Judaism and about Israel as a Jewish
state is that Jews are morally superior to all other nations. This is
the most important belief of Jewish fundamentalists who condemn
almost everything "not Jewish" mostly because it is non-Jewish.
Any discussion of the fact that many Jews, when they are able,
practice the same kind of discrimination against non-Jews that some
non-Jews practice against Jews could be detrimental to the theory
of Jewish moral superiority. Although we believe this is part of racist
theory, which we oppose, we understand that unfortunately human
beings, including Jews, often have xenophobic tendencies influenced
by historical circumstances. Thus, Jews can and should be viewed
within the same context as other human beings and should in this
regard work to eradicate Jewish xenophobia by exposing it in its
present and past forms. The second reason emanates from writers
who are apologists for and from other advocates of the Israeli political
left. The Labor Party is Israel has consistently practiced blatant
racism. Likud, the most important party of the Israeli right, has not
practiced racism so severely and generally as has the Labor Party.
As opposed to the Labor Party situation, Arabs have been, and still
are, able to be members of Likud in their own neighborhood
branches. The idea that the Israeli right wing is in this particular case
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 1 53
better than the Labor Party is abhorrent to the dogmatists of and
apologists for the left just as in the 1 930s the idea that many practices
in Great Britain were better than those of Stalin was abhorrent to
fellow travelers. The refuge in both cases was and is a consistent
omission of facts that do not fit into the dogma.
A similar case in point is kibbutz membership in Israel. The
kibbutz is one of the most admired, especially by leftist apologists,
Israeli phenomena. It is a fact, widely known and discussed in Israel,
that only Jews can be kibbutz members. Non-Jews who wish to
become kibbutz members must not only acquire the approval of the
kibbutz members; they must, as a condition of joining, convert to
Judaism. The Israeli Chief Rabbinate has established conversion
schools for non-Jews who wish to join kibbutzim. One of the
conditions for conversion to Judaism of women in this as in other
situations is that the female convert must be observed naked in a
purification bath by three rabbis. Some of the other conditions for
conversion of those non-Jews desirous of joining kibbutzim are
lighter than are conditions for other potential converts. The Israeli
Hebrew press has often focused upon the degree of difference in
conversion procedures and has also mentioned repeatedly that to date
not one Palestinian has become a kibbutz member. This specific,
clearly influenced by Jewish fundamentalism, is almost always
omitted in English language books published about and media
coverage of Israel. We need not empha *ze the wide discussion that
would ensue if a British or American institution allowed Jews to
become members only if they converted to Christianity.
Scholars and news media people who purport to describe Israel
authoritatively have, as previously indicated, systematically ignored
by omission critical phenomena, discussed in our book. Some
examples of this follow. In Chapter 1 of our book we mentioned that
the concept of Jewish blood bound together the Israeli secular right
wing and religious Jews. This concept, which deems the blood of a
killed or wounded Jew to be infinitely greater in value than the
blood of a killed or wounded non-Jew, is of supreme importance in
Israeli politics. The Netanyahu government in 1998 refused, even
when pushed by the United States government, to release Palestinian
prisoners who had killed Jews, whether they were soldiers killed in
a clash or civilians murdered in a terrorist attack. The Jewish blood
concept was the only possible reason. The same Netanyahu
government, as well as some previous Israeli governments, have not
objected to freeing Palestinian prisoners who had killed other
Palestinians. The Palestinians killed were usually presumed to be
agents of the Israeli secret police. The same situation has existed in
regard to the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon and to the
South Lebanese Army. The main reason for creating those entities,
which have prevented a cease-fire occurring between Israel and
Lebanon, was the Israeli desire, influenced by Jewish fundamental-
154 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
ism, to save "Jewish blood." A majority of Israeli Jews have paid little
attention to Lebanese, who have been killed, whether they were
members of the South Lebanese Army or simply inhabitants of this
zone. Bursts of anguish and even protests, on the other hand, have
accompanied almost every Jewish casualty. Israeli protesters
demanding that Israel leave Lebanon have mentioned only the
Israeli casualties. Usually, only those Israeli Jews who have openly
opposed Jewish fundamentalism in all its aspects, such as Israel
Shahak, one of the authors of this book, have mentioned the Lebanese
casualties. The politically important distinction between Jewish
blood and non-Jewish blood is well-known to most Israelis but is
ignored by almost all those who write about Israel and its policies.
As also noted in Chapter 1, Rabbi Yoseph, who commands the
unquestioned allegiance often Shas members of the Knesset, argued
in a published article that Israel is not sufficiently strong to destroy
Christian churches on its territory and should therefore return some
of the occupied territory to the Palestinians. Otherwise, Rabbi
Yoseph contended, Jews might be killed in a war that could erupt.
We pointed out that most writers who discussed Rabbi Yoseph's
alleged dovish leanings falsified by omitting his reasons for advocating
concessions. In addition to emphasizing Israeli weakness, Rabbi
Yoseph expressed willingness to command the destruction of
idolatrous, Christian churches if Israel and the Jews were sufficiently
strong to do this without serious damage to Jews. Rabbi Yoseph thus
illustrated the fierce and visible hatred of Christianity and Christians
so evident among fundamentalists Jews and, to a lesser extent,
among many other Israeli Jews of the political right. Although dis-
crimination against and persecution of Jews in Christian countries
has helped to persuade some secular Jews to accept this funda-
mentalist attitude, it is not the sole explanation. Oriental Jewish rabbis,
and to a lesser extent their followers who came from Muslim countries
wherein they were generally not persecuted by Christians, have
expressed more hate of Christianity and its symbols than the fun-
damentalist European rabbis and their followers who were persecuted
by Christians. In dealing with political factors in our book, we did
not specify many of the often petty forms of hatred of Christianity
that are officially approved. One case in point is that Israeli
educational authorities removed the international plus sign from the
textbooks of elementary arithmetic used in the first grades of Israeli
schools. Allegedly, this plus sign, which is a cross, could religiously
corrupt little Jewish children. Instead of the offending cross, the
authorities substituted a capital "T." This substitution was made
some years after Israel became a state; the influence of Jewish fun-
damentalism was responsible. If this substitution had been made by
the Taliban in Afghanistan, by the Iranian regime or by China
during the cultural revolution, it would probably have been discussed
at length. In contrast, this easily discoverable fact has been omitted
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 155
in English-language articles and books concerned with Israeli Jewish
society and Judaism. This omission is but one piece of the existent
evidence that most books of this genre are unreliable.
In Chapter 2 we pointed to specific acts of discrimination against
and abuse of women perpetrated by Jewish fundamentalists.
Seemingly unimpressed by the Israeli Hebrew discussion of and the
Israeli Jewish feminist criticism of this discrimination and abuse,
writers of English-language books and articles about Israel have
rarely mentioned this phenomenon. They have not acknowledged
that until modern times most Jewish women were kept illiterate and
denied education by command of the rabbis. They and others have
condemned abuses of women in Iran and other countries but have
refused to specify the even more abusive acts against women in Israel.
Jewish feminists have instead celebrated in their writings the few
important Jewish women mentioned in the Bible and the one woman
mentioned in the Talmud, Bruria, the wife of the second-century
ad sage, Rabbi Meir. The diaspora Jewish feminists and other
English-language writers have neglected any reference to the
disparaging stories about women in talmudic literature; they have
also failed to admit that from the time of Bruria until the advent of
modern influences upon Jews in western Europe in the seventeenth
century not one Jewish woman was sufficiently important to be
emphasized as a leading figure in Jewish history. (This can be
compared to the numerous women who became leading figures in
many areas, including religion, in Western Christendom in the same
time period, in spite of Christianity's well-known discrimination
against women.) The inescapable conclusion is that English-language
sources are unreliable, not only in the study of the Jewish funda-
mentalist attitude towards women but also in the more general
study of the status of women in historical Judaism.
In discussing the topic of Jewish blood in Chapter 2, we quoted
both the previously mentioned Rabbi Yoseph and the former chief
rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, both of whom ordered
pious Jews not to accept blood donations from non-Jews unless
their lives were at risk. These two eminent rabbis, as well as others
inside and outside of Israel who agree with this view did not invent
this opinion. This and other similar opinions, existent from the
beginning of blood transfusions, are based upon a talmudic
prohibition that does not allow a non-Jewish nurse to breast feed a
Jewish child. The cited reason for this prohibition is that the milk
from a non-Jewish woman would have an adverse effect upon a Jewish
child. In Chapter 2 we quoted the discussion of the Jewish blood
topic that was published in 1995 not only in Israel's most widely
read daily Hebrew newspaper but in other Hebrew newspapers as
well. We can assume that readers of this book who are not literate
in Hebrew and who were not previously told about such discussion
in the Hebrew press would be unaware of this prohibition of pious
156 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Jews accepting blood transfusions from non-Jews and sometimes even
from secular Jews. This prohibition is not to be found in English-
language articles or books about Judaism or Israeli Jewish society.
(Some fundamentalist Jews may discuss this topic among themselves,
but they limit that discussion to their own groupings and do not write
about it for publication in English.) It would be absurd to suggest
that in the last years of the twentieth century scholars, writers and
others from around the world would not discuss and attack an
analogous edict, issued by highest ranking Christian Church leaders,
prohibiting Christians from accepting blood transfusions from Jews.
The prohibition is not a secret; it has been openly discussed in the
Israeli Hebrew press. This is yet another example of distortion by
omission, which makes English-language coverage of various aspects
of Israeli Jewish society unreliable.
In Chapter 3 we briefly discussed how followers of Rabbis Yoseph
and Shach attempted to use magic against one another. This occurred
after the struggle between these two leading rabbis became intense.
The political significance here transcended the Yoseph-Shach
disputation; the alleged use of magic is part of the deep division
between Israel A and Israel B, which are defined previously in both
our text and glossary. Members of Israel B, following some historic
Jewish customs, believe in magic and witchcraft; they often practice
it themselves or follow directives supposedly derived from it by
rabbis and cabbalists. (Books in Hebrew detailing instructions for
spells and witchcraft recipes have been best sellers in Israel for many
years.) Individuals who are reputed to achieve success by use of magic
frequently obtain political power in Israel. Most Israeli political
pundits are agreed that one of the important reasons for Netanyahu's
victory in the 1 996 election was the exclusive blessing he received
during the campaign from the cabbalist Rabbi Kaduri, and the firm
refusals of many Jewish magicians and cabbalists to bless Peres. (Only
the Hassidic Belzer rabbi said that he was neutral regarding Peres.)
Rabbi Kaduri has remained to date a widely reported, highly visible
Hollywood type star in the Israeli Hebrew press. He was at the
center of media attention when he descended below the surface of
the sea in Eilat in a device, usually used to allow tourists to see
underwater sea life, and supposedly instituted spells in order to
avert an earthquake that was predicted by scientists. He claimed to
have diverted the earthquake from Jews to non-Jews. Many Israeli
Jews believed this claim, because the predicted earthquake was light
in Eilat but was much more severe in upper Egypt.
Another example of the popularity in Israel of magic was evident
in the circumstances surrounding the 1999 trial in the District Court
of Jerusalem of a major Shas Party politician, Aryeh Der'i. Der'i was
convicted and sentenced for taking bribes in spite of tens of amulets
hung on his body and blessed by the most outstanding cabbalists,
who additionally engaged in other magic ceremonies on Der'i's
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 157
behalf. At the same time of this trial a scientific congress on the use
of magic and witchcraft in Judaism was held in Jerusalem. Tom Segev,
a columnist for Haaretz and one of Israel's best known authors, wrote
that the use of magic by Jews was nothing new in Judaism. In his
March 26, 1999, Hebrew-language Haaretz article, Segev transcribed
a magical recipe found in a book, composed in talmudic times (ad
200-500) but still popular in the Diaspora in the eighteenth century.
This recipe, which was devised to confuse a judge and cause him to
acquit unjustly a person who used magic, called for the following:
"Slaughter a lion cub with a copper knife. Gather its blood; tear out
its heart and put the blood into it. Then, write the names of angels
on the cub's face, and wipe the names with three year-old wine. Mix
the wine with the blood. Next, take three heaps of perfume (names
omitted). After purifying yourself, stand before the planet Venus at
night with the perfume and the blood, which must be put on fire."
This act would supposedly compel the bewitched judge to acquit.
Segev reported that the Israeli scientists participating in this Congress
believed magic to be "an inseparable part of Judaism - used in past
intrigues involving rabbis." To support this view, Segev quoted a
saying in the Palestinian Talmud attributing the large number of High
Priests during the Second Temple period to the fact that High
Priests often killed one another by using witchcraft. This opinion
expressed in the Palestinian Talmud is probably incorrect; the large
number of High Priests during this period should most likely be
attributed to bribery and other political actions of secular (mostly
Jewish) authorities of time connected with making appointments.
This opinion, which is not quoted in English-language writings on
Judaism, nevertheless indicates the wide use of witchcraft by Jews'
attempting to kill one another in this time period. The typical
picture, presented in English-language works, of the pious Jews of
the third period of Jewish history is on balance invalid. The picture
of the pious Jew of talmudic times, standing at night before a planet
and attempting to perform magic rites, is more accurate and can help
us understand the reality of Israeli Jewish society better than the
fictional description offered by apologists. The use of magic in
everyday life is also common in certain Jewish neighborhoods of New
York, London, Paris and other cities.
In spite of its obvious political importance and social significance,
this aspect of Judaism in modern times remains as widely unreported
in English, and thus as unknown to those who do not read Hebrew,
as the past use of magic and witchcraft. In all known societies some
individuals have indulged, and still do indulge, in magic. The
misguided attempt to hide this past and present tendency, which is
widespread in Israel, has infested the English-language histories of
the Jews. The substitution of apologetics for historical fact renders
these history texts at least unreliable and perhaps unfit for study.
158 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
In Chapters 4 and 5 we dealt with the religious Jewish settlers in
territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and with Gush Emunim,
the movement that produced the settlers. Despite the attention given
to the issues of Israeli settlements in the territories, English-language
coverage has almost totally neglected the two major considerations,
without which proper understanding of this overall topic is impossible.
The first consideration is that the urge to settle has been theologi-
cally motivated and is a manifestation of Jewish fundamentalism. In
discussions of the obligations that people must obey in countries ruled
or influenced by Muslim fundamentalists the religious reasons are
highlighted. In most English-language discussions of Jewish religious
settlements, however, the religious reasons are usually either totally
missing or are replaced with biblical quotations, uttered by the
settlers. In our text we showed that the real motivating factors for
the religious settlers, some of whom have moved to improbable
sites, have minimal connections to the Bible. The real reasons
emanate instead from a special idea of Jewish fundamentalism. This
idea asserts that the messiah will arrive soon and postulates that the
world is already in the messianic age.
We began Chapter 4 by asserting that messianic ideology, as a
radical part of Jewish fundamentalism, is based upon the differences
and opposition between Jews and non-Jews rather than simply
between Jews and Arabs (or Muslims) . Writers of English-language
books, articles and book reviews have rarely mentioned this basic
tenet, the major exceptions being those writers who have composed
the invalid, out-of-context, virulent and poisonous anti-Semitic
literature. The published reviews of Yehoshafat Harkabi's book,
Israel's Fateful Hour, provide a good illustration of this point. The
original Hebrew edition of this book was first published in Israel;
the English edition was published thereafter in the United States in
1988. Harkabi's book received wide attention in the United States
because of its analysis of Israeli politics in the 1980s and its emphasis
upon differences between the Labor Party and Likud in foreign
politics. In one crucial chapter, from which we quoted and
paraphrased in our text, Harkabi analyzed some major issues of Jewish
fundamentalism and stressed the importance of messianic ideology
within that context. Harkabi's book was extensively reviewed in
American publications, but only one reviewer in a small circulation
progressive publication referred to this crucial chapter. The other
reviewers in American publications avoided any mention of this
chapter and/or its substance. Reviewers in Israel emphasized this
chapter in their comments. The difference in reviewing between the
United States and Israel is telling.
In maintaining that differences and opposition exist between Jews
and non-Jews, messianic ideology continues to be the primary
motivating factor for Gush Emunim and its major supporter, the
National Religious Party. Those who have written about Israeli
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 1 59
Jewish society and about Judaism but have avoided mention of this
have distorted understanding. The significance here is most striking
when the broad support, both direct and indirect, for Gush Emunim
is considered. About one-half of Israel's Jewish population supports
Gush Emunim. The support, especially monetary, from Jews in the
diaspora is also of great importance. Many Orthodox and other
Jews as well in New York City and elsewhere have been and are
encouraged to assist Gush Emunim by what they read in the largest
circulation American Jewish weekly newspaper, the Jewish Press.
Published in Brooklyn, the Jewish Press has been and continues to
be an editorial advocate of Gush Emunim, often presenting op-ed
articles written by leading Gush Emunim spokesmen. New York City
and New York State politicians regularly seek backing of the Jewish
Press during electoral campaigns. Not only have Jewish Press editorial
writers advocated messianic ideology; they have also expressed
admiration of Yigal Amir, the assassin of Yitzhak Rabin. The New
York Times, which is read and probably influences many American
Jews, has published in-depth analyses of Christian and Muslim fun-
damentalism but has refrained from presenting similar articles
describing Jewish fundamentalism or even advocacies printed in
the Jewish Press. Even so-called liberal American periodicals, such
as the Nation and the New York Review of Books, which have published
editorial comments and articles upholding and advocating Palestinian
rights, have neglected to present analyses of Jewish fundamentalism
in their own country. Readers of these and most other periodicals
in the United States, and in other countries as well, would not
know, unless they read books and articles published in Hebrew in
Israel, that Gush Emunim's goal is to build a "sacred society" whose
nuclei are the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. It is
insufficient, if not folly, to advocate Palestinian rights without under-
standing and referring to the principal cause of the denial of those
rights: Jewish fundamentalism in general and the messianic variety
in particular.
The Goldstein massacre, discussed in Chapter 6, was inadequately
covered in the English press. That Israeli Jewish society was divided
in its attitude towards the massacre was evident in the Hebrew but
not in the English press and literature. Before the massacre,
Goldstein's refusal as a doctor on religious grounds to treat non-
Jewish patients, including soldiers serving with him in the army, was,
although mentioned briefly, treated lightly in the English coverage.
Goldstein clearly derived his views from fundamentalist interpreta-
tions of sacred Hebrew texts. The English coverage indicated that
he merely followed the teachings of Rabbi Meir Kahane, a whipping
boy of the American press. In reality, Goldstein's views were more
broadly based and centered in Jewish fundamentalism. Having
immigrated to Israel as an adult, Goldstein, prior to his arrival in
Israel, had been influenced by the "Lubovitcher Rebbe" and his
160 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
influential disciple, Rabbi Ginsburgh. His attitude, moreover, was
condoned by important, Israeli politicians and the Minister of
Defense. Articles in the Hebrew press, to which we referred in our
text, discussed these points in depth; the English coverage avoided
mention of much of this.
In Chapter 7 we showed how well-documented features of Jewish
fundamentalism during the past 800 years, the third and longest
period of Jewish history, have influenced and continue to influence
contemporary Jews in the state of Israel and in the diaspora as well.
Both the popular and more scholarly and renowned, standard Jewish
histories, written in English, omit most of these features. The historic
features of Jewish fundamentalism were manifest in the Rabin assas-
sination and in the reactions to it. Because of omission, distortion
and lack of criticism of Jewish fundamentalism, the English-language
coverage could not and did not put the Rabin assassination in the
correct context and thus was misleading.
Important issues are involved here, all of which are omitted in the
standard Jewish histories. The first of these, well-known to serious
students of the third period of Jewish history and especially to those
who have knowledge of Jewish religious law and Orthodoxy, is that,
before being affected by outside modern influences, Jewish society
was not tolerant. On the contrary, autonomous Jewish authorities
persecuted deviants, perhaps more than did Christian and Muslim
authorities in their respective religions and certainly more than did
pagan, Buddhist and Hindu authorities. The intolerant attitudes and
activities, enshrined in the sacred texts of Jewish fundamentalism
in all its varieties, influenced the behavior and politics of Jews,
especially when they had autonomous power. To oppose the current
dangers posed by Jewish fundamentalism, it is first necessary to expose
its historical basis. As we have repeatedly stated, most writers of books
on Judaism in English have not done this. Influenced by their
heritage, many Jews have unfortunately either remained indifferent
to the oppression of Palestinians in and by the State of Israel or have
at times criticized acts of oppression as posing possible danger to
Jews. Some of these individuals, for example, condemn the use of
torture as being unconditionally inhumane when used by states
other than Israel, but they argue pragmatically that its use by Israeli
authorities is not in Israel's best interest because of worldwide public
opinion. Many of these same people in the United States are zealous
in advocating and fighting for the separation of religion and state in
their own country, but they react differently in regard to Israel.
They do not criticize, indeed they most often support, the Israeli
Ministry of Religion, which is almost always controlled by Jewish
religious parties influenced by Jewish fundamentalism, for allotting
only 2 per cent of its budget to non-Jews when nearly 20 per cent
of Israel's citizenry consists of Muslims and Christians. Both in
Israel and in the diaspora the relatively few Jews who have attempted
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 161
to defend non-Jews against discrimination and oppression by Jews
have been those who have been influenced by modern theories of
justice. The fact that the majority of Jews do not protest against, but
actually support, Jewish discrimination against non-Jews, especially
in the Jewish state, indicates, at least to some extent, the conscious
and unconscious influence of Jewish fundamentalism. We believe
that attempts to hide historical reality in Judaism and Jewish societies
were wrong when Jews were discriminated against and persecuted
in most countries. By the end of the twentieth century, when Jews
have achieved greater power in many societies than any minority
group of comparable numbers and when a Jewish state with nuclear
weapons is protected by the United States, falsification by omission
of Jewish history is purely adverse and totally unacceptable. The
nearly total absence of discussion of the above intolerant aspects of
the Jewish past and present in English-language books caused us to
dispense with a traditional bibliographical listing or essay.
The issue of Jewish normalcy and the exceptions to it require
examination. Jews in many instances oppressed their own people as
other people did. During the same time period, for example, that rabbis
ordered the hands of Jewish offenders to be cut, Spanish judges, as
well as judges in most Christian and Muslim courts, did likewise.
Rabbis ordered Jewish offenders put into stocks in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth just as non-Jewish authorities used the
stock as a feature of regular punishment throughout Europe and in
the American colonies. The systematic killing of informers, enjoined
by eminent rabbis as a religious duty, has no parallel in other societies.
Killing of informers has nevertheless occurred and still occurs in other
societies and, as is the case in Sicilian society, is often well known.
Scholarly historical works, historical novels and the classical literature
in general of many countries and societies depict the sometimes-
employed punishment of killing informers. In contrary fashion, the
major Jewish historians who have written about the third period of
Jewish history, for example, Salo W. Baron, Simon Dubnow and
Yitzhak Baer, have omitted such references in their works. Other highly
regarded Jewish historians who have focused upon the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, Christian Spain and Germany have
done likewise. Numerous Israeli scholars, who have written in Hebrew
and from whom we quoted and paraphrased in our text, have in
contrast displayed more honesty in their scholarship by including
examples of the systematic killing by Jews of Jewish informers.
Consequently, those readers who are not literate in Hebrew (or have
not been told in detail about books in Hebrew about Jewish history)
must have distorted perceptions of this aspect of Jewish history. This
reflection solidified our resolve not to include a traditional biblio-
graphical listing or essay.
The distortions, largely by omission, in the English-language
histories of the third period of Jewish history are greater and more
162 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
severe than are those of the first and second periods. The reason for
this is obvious. Because Judaism and Jewish history are so important
for the history and theology of Christianity until and shortly after
the time of Jesus, Christian historians and biblical scholars, often
critical in their writings, dealt with Jewish history and Israelite society
during the first two periods. The better Jewish historians of those
two periods have felt obligated to follow trends established in
scholarship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; they have
engaged in critical discussion, even while complaining about what
they regarded as hostile tendencies of Christians who wrote about
Jewish history. Few Christian or Muslim scholars have been or are
interested in Jewish history between AD 70 and modern times, the
third period. Apologetic writing of Jewish history is not unique.
Most national histories include apologetic writings. The writing in
English by Jews of Jewish history has remained far more retarded
than have the writings of other national histories. A comparison that
illustrates this point is the difference between the development of
historical writing by American historians of United States history and
the lack of development in the writing of Jewish history, especially
of the third period. In recent decades standard United States history
textbooks have included numerous negative features, previously
omitted, of past discrimination and oppression of African Americans,
Native Americans, women and other disadvantaged minority groups.
As previously reiterated, most books in English of Jewish history,
especially of the third period, continue to omit negative features of
discrimination and oppression of both Jews and non-Jews by Jews.
The harmful effects of these omissions remain.
We are finally troubled by the near unanimity in standard English-
language Jewish histories regarding issues involving "Jewish interest."
Whereas the Israeli new historians of the 1980s and 1990s have
sparked fruitful debate about basic issues not only of the past century
in regard to Palestine but of the entire course of Jewish history,
previous historians who wrote in English have omitted facts and
disputations over interpretations of sensitive items. Having already
detailed much of this in our bibliographical note, we, in attempting
to illustrate our point, shall here present only one additional example.
The famous scholar Gershom Scholem, early in his career raised an
important intellectual issue about the nature of Judaism; soon
thereafter he, together with numerous other scholars, dropped it.
This issue then became virtually unknown to people who did not
know Hebrew. In his first book in English about Jewish mysticism,
Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, based upon a previous set of
lectures delivered in New York City, first published in 1941 and
reprinted many times, Scholem questioned whether Jews who
believed in Cabbala had preserved the belief in monotheism that had
been previously so characteristic of Judaism. In his seventh lecture
towards the end of section five of the book, Scholem, after describing
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RELATED MATTERS 163
the process, which according to the Lurianic Cabbala takes place
by Jewish initiative within God, wrote: "To reconcile this process
with the monotheistic doctrine, which was dear to the Kabbalists as
it was to every Jew, became the task of the theorists of Kabbalistic
theosoply. Although they applied themselves bravely to it, it cannot
be said that they were completely successful." These two convoluted
sentences implied that the most popular form of Cabbala, still
believed by many Jews in Israel and in the diaspora, is not
monotheistic. Actually, Scholem refrained from mentioning that
many Jewish opponents of Cabbala, before it became dominant
around 1550 and during the Jewish Enlightenment, asked the same
question more clearly and expressed more sharply their opposition
to the predominant Lurianic form on the ground that it denied
monotheism. Since then, scholars who have written in English about
Judaism, including Scholem himself in later books, have not, with
few exceptions, questioned whether Judaism in all its forms and all
times was monotheistic and/or whether many pious Jews were
believers in monotheism. (Raphael Patai was one exception. In
Chapters 5 to 8 of his book, The Hebrew Goddess, published in 1967,
Patai raised this question. Israel Shahak, another exception, did
likewise in his more recent book, Jewish History, Jewish Religion.) The
scholars who have written in English about Judaism have, again with
few exceptions, not considered in their books the even more important
question of whether Judaism throughout its entire history has had
fixed tenets.
We are aware that the books we have not put into a bibliography
contain useful data. We nevertheless believe that these books are guilty
of purposeful omission resulting in grave distortion and do not
necessarily deserve to be listed in a bibliography. These books
anyway can be easily found in other bibliographies. We append this
note in lieu of a traditional bibliography in protest against what too
often happens in Jewish studies outside Israel.
Notes
Preface
1 . Baruch Kimmerling, review of Yohanan Peres and Efraim Ya'ar Yukhtman,
Between Agreement and Dispute: Democracy and Peace in Israeli Society (Jerusalem:
The Israeli Institute for Democracy, 1998) in Hebrew. Kimmerling carefully
reviewed and analyzed the data, assembled between 1993 and 1995 by Peres
and Yukhtman.
Introduction
1 . We explain this to some extent in this book. This is explained in greater detail
in Israel Shahak, Jewish History, Jewish Religion (London: Pluto Press, 1 994) .
2. The Romans actually adopted the term Judea by employing the form of
"provincia Judea" in describing Palestine, which in the Bible is called by other
names.
3. The Hebrew word for gentiles is "goyim," a word which, as used in the
Bible, simply means nations. The singular "goy" in the Bible was - and is -
applied to the Israelites themselves.
Chapter 1
1 . Some Israeli Jews refuse to enter a synagogue as a principled protest against
the Jewish religion; this phenomenon is rarely found in non-Israeli Jewish
communities but can be compared to the attitude of some radicals to
Christianity, for example, in France.
2. The Kishinev pogrom in 1903 in the Ukraine section of the Russian Empire
was the first major pogrom in eastern Europe after a lapse of many years.
Kishinev became the symbolic term of and for murders of Jews everywhere.
3. The religious reasons centered upon the fulfillment of religious observance.
Common to almost all pious Jews who emigrated to Palestine in pre-Zionist
times was the belief that all religious observances connected with agriculture
could not be fulfilled outside of but rather only in the land of Israel. Wanting
to fulfill as many commandments as possible, therefore, these Jews thus
emigrated to Palestine.
Chapter 4
Pollard, an American Jew very devoted to Israel, was in the 1980s a highly
placed employee of US Naval Intelligence. He gave many intelligence secrets
(not only concerning Middle Eastern affairs) to Israel. He received a severe
prison sentence in the US. Many American and Israeli Jews, and since the
164
NOTES 165
mid-1990s also the Israeli government, have tried to persuade the US President
to reduce his sentence or give him a pardon. However, these attempts have
been unsuccessful, due to the strong opposition of US intelligence chiefs.
Chapter 5
1 . Hardelim is an acronym of two Hebrew words that translated into English
are "Haredi-nationalist" and "mustard-like."
2. Some religious Jews acquire religious study deferments and are excused from
military service.
3 . After the Rabin assassination, Hesder Yeshivot colleagues of the assassin, Yigal
Amir, told members of the press how Amir beat Palestinians in the worst
manner. They did not disguise the fact that all members of their unit beat
Palestinians more than did soldiers in regular units.
4. All NRP members do not adhere to the messianic religious right-wing trend.
Chapter 7
1 . "Rabenu" is the Hebrew word for "our rabbi." It was an honorary title given
only to a few of the most famous rabbis.
2. Before and during talmudic times, rabbis in the Holy Land who were
empowered to teach authoritatively and to serve as judges were appointed by
"laying of hands." A rabbi, already so appointed, laid his hands on the head
of a candidate and pronounced a sacred formula designed to transmit a
sacred power, supposedly derived from Moses although not mentioned in the
Bible. Rabbis in other countries never were given this form of appointment.
Even if diaspora rabbis came to the Holy Land and after a long stay of study
received the "laying of hands" appointment, they were forbidden to transmit
it to other diaspora rabbis not in the Holy Land. The students of diaspora
rabbis, who themselves became rabbis but did not go to the Holy Land, were,
therefore, unable to judge in many matters under the normal law. The last
Palestinian rabbis with powers derived from "laying of hands" seemingly
disappeared in the tenth century without leaving successors.
3. This rule, which was never abrogated, seemingly applies to Torah scrolls used
by Conservative and Reform rabbis. Many Orthodox rabbis in Israel have
proclaimed that Reform and Conservative rabbis are heretics. Some of these
Orthodox rabbis have publicly stated that Reform Jews are worse than heretics.
4. One example of these freely discussed issues is: After the Great Flood, how
did animals who could not swim well and far reach islands in the
Mediterranean?
5. One example of such theological problems is: What is God by his very nature
incapable of doing?
6. Israel Shahak, one of the authors of this book, was present as a child in Warsaw,
Poland, in early 1939 at a funeral of a Jewish heretic, the second cousin of
his father. (He also heard this story confirmed by family members later.) At
the funeral the immediate family members, including the father, put on the
white garments that pious Jews wear on the holidays and rejoiced. One of
Shahak's friends who came from Alexandria, Egypt, after hearing this story,
recalled a similar Jewish funeral in Alexandria in the early 1940s with the family
dressed in white.
7 . Rabbi Samuel the Prince was so called, because he was a minister and a general
in the kingdom of Granada.
166 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
8. The Karaites denied the authority of the Talmud and only accepted the
Bible. Rabbi Yoseph ben Faruj, who was made the head of the Jews in Spain
and given the title of Prince, expelled the Karaites.
9. A punishment considered to be similar to the kuneh was the putting of an
iron collar on the neck of a Jewish criminal. The criminal then would have
to walk or pace with this iron collar.
10. This important background is unfortunately not mentioned in the major
historical studies of the Jews in the United States or in other countries to which
Jews immigrated in the nineteenth century. The background is likewise not
mentioned in those romantic, apologetic works that purport to describe the
lives of first-generation Jewish immigrants. Many characteristics of the Jews
in the United States and elsewhere were probably affected by this background.
11. This letter is described and partially quoted in Meir Balaban, The History of
the Frankist Movement (Tel-Aviv, 1934 in Hebrew, p. 128). The letter was
published in full in Rabbi Yaakov Emden's Sefer Hashimush, a collection of
documents about various heresies (part B, document B).
12. Ibid.
13. This important point is seldom acknowledged in the histories of Jews written
in English.
14. David Asaf should be distinguished from Rabbi Simha Asaf who wrote The
Punishments After the Talmud was Finalized: Materials for the History of Hebrew
Law (Jerusalem, 1992).
15. Two most important sources should be consulted to gain an understanding
of these satires and the nature of the Hassidic movement against which they
were directed. The first source is Yitzhak Erter's satire, Metempychosis (Gilgul
Nefesh in Hebrew) . Erter, who died in 1 8 5 2, was regarded as the best Hebrew
satirist of his time; his works were widely read and were republished again
and again, the last time in 1996 in Israel. In his satire, Ertel dealt with the
Hassidic belief in metempsychosis and the help given by holy rabbis to the
soul as it passes from a human body to an animal and then back again. The
author meets a soul of a recendy deceased Jew that tells him about its seventeen
changes of abode. In one of those adventures, the soul inhabited a body of
an intriguing zealot who died of chagrin when one of his intrigues failed; the
soul then passed into the body of a fox with an especially beautiful and long
tail. The tail caused the fox to be noticed by fox hunters and killed. Because
a blessing of a holy rabbi was not said at the moment of death, however, the
soul became a disembodied ghost. A Hassid bought the fur made of the fox's
tail and in turn made it into a collar for a coat that he offered to his holy rabbi.
A miracle occurred when the holy rabbi put on the coat and the fur touched
his (the rabbi's) holy flesh. Erter wrote: "The fox's late soul was born again
in a body of another holy rabbi, a person as clever and deceitful as a fox."
The second source is an earlier work, The Discoverer of Secrets (Megaleh
Temirin in Hebrew), published anonymously in 1819 by YosefPerl, the most
enlightened Jew in Galicia at that time. The book purports to consist of
letters written (in atrocious Hebrew, imitated from the bad style and grammar
common in Hassidic books) by one Hassid to another and supposedly edited
by another Hassid who found the letters and added learned references from
major Hassidic books for every absurdity piously related by the correspon-
dents. In Letter 150, one of the Hassids related that his holy rabbi died and
that his widow earned a great amount of money by selling his garments to
Hassids. Clothes of holy rabbis have sacramental value and absolve even the
greatest sins if worn. Putting on a shirt of a holy rabbi; for example, absolves
a person of the sin of murder, while putting on a holy rabbi's trousers absolves
a person of adultery. The supposed editor of this book added several authentic
references from Hassidic books to substantiate this belief among Hassids of
his time. Such beliefs continue to be common among Hassids of today.
NOTES 167
Unfortunately many of the books written specifically about Hassidism and
almost all general Jewish histories written in English do not mention such
beliefs.
16. "Moser," the Hebrew word for informer, is a terrible insult for Jews, similar
to the word "collaborator" for Palestinians.
17. This was feasible if the Jewish community was united in facing a single
informer or heretic or even a few of them. Difficulty arose when the community
was split; each group then thought the other was heretical and should be
reported to the authorities. This happened often in Jewish history. The
consequences of such quarrels in which the non-Jewish authorities became
involved were sometimes localized but other times spread to and disturbed
Jewish communities in several countries. One such controversy involved
Maimonides, a most severe critic of heresy who in this case was accused of
being a heretic himself. Maimonides' position as a doctor to Al-Abdal, the
brother of Saladin and the governor of Egypt, and as the supervisor of
Egyptian Jews, prevented any significant Jewish attacks upon him in Muslim
countries. Some Iraqi rabbis, who presumably enjoyed the patronage of the
Khalif A-Nasir (1180-1225), made cautious accusations against him. Even
after his death, Maimonides' position as supervisor of Egyptian Jews, which
was inherited by his descendants for six generations, greatly fortified his
position in all Muslim countries. In Christian Europe, however, Maimonides
was repeatedly accused of being a heretic. Rabbi Shlomo of Montpellier from
southern France first made this charge in the 1220s. Some rabbis and notables
defended him; others opposed him. The anti-Maimonidean faction informed
the Christian inquisitors, who were busy persecuting the Albigenses in
southern France, that the philosophical, as well as some halachic, writings of
Maimonides also offended Christianity. The inquisitors probably knew neither
Hebrew nor Arabic, the languages in which the supposedly offending books
were written, but they collected and burned some of them publicly. The pro-
Maimonidean faction appealed to feudal lords, who captured some of the
anti-Maimonidean Jews and delivered them to their Jewish enemies, who
punished them as informers by cutting out their tongues. The controversy,
nevertheless, continued until about 1300. This controversy probably still
exists. In spite of the enormous prestige Maimonides enjoys among Orthodox
Jews as the first codifier of the Halacha and as the leading philosopher of
Judaism, he remains suspect among the Haredim. Most Haredi rabbis keep
the philosophical writings of Maimonides away from most of their pupils.
Maimonides, in the opinion of some scholars and in the view of this book's
writers, was in some ways a heretic according to his own definition of the term.
The obscure writing of his philosophy makes his heresies difficult for most
readers to perceive. On this point, see Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of
Writing, Chapters 2 and 3. Strauss compared the style of writing employed
by some writers under the Communist regimes of the 1950s with the style
employed by Maimonides and other Jewish medieval thinkers. Both groups
used a comparable style to obscure some points from many readers because
of fear of persecution by zealots, while at the same time giving hints that could
be understood by sophisticated readers.
1 8 . This situation, which endured until the rise of Nazism, made the Jews of eastern
Europe strong German sympathizers and contributed to the rise of modern
Polish anti-Semitism. Contrary to what Goldhagen has propagated, Jews of
eastern Europe, even during World War I, regarded the Germans and the
German occupying army as philo-Semitic. They had good reasons for holding
this view.
19. In addition to the standard works of Jewish history, see Ernst Wangermann,
The Austrian Achievement 1700-1800 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973).
Wangermann noted outbursts of anti-Semitic violence in the period after the
168 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
limited tolerance granted by Joseph II. He also noted that a conservative
member of the Council of State, critical of the Jews of Vienna for beginning
to dress in a modern way, remarked: "[The sight of] young Jewish men,
contrary to all custom going in public dressed indistinguishably from Christians
. . . some even with swords at their sides [presages dissolution of society] . "
Cardinal Migazzi, the Archbishop of Vienna and the leader of the Catholic
Conservative Party, was one of the people who most warned against any
toleration for Jews. After the death of Joseph II and at the request of some
rabbis, the Austrian government instituted strict censorship of Jewish books
and prohibited the printing and import of all books of the Cabbala. Eliezer
Falklash, the rabbi of Prague and the personal friend of the censor appointed
to carry out this "holy work," addressed a long responsa to the censor on this
subject. Rabbi Falklash in his responsa praised the order and applauded the
Emperors Leopold II and Francis II for upholding the purity of the Jewish
religion. See Shmuel Vertes, Enlightenment and False Messianic Tendencies:
History of a Struggle (Jerusalem: Shmuel Vertes, 1998, in Hebrew).
20. This is unknown to many Jews living in English-speaking countries because
of censorship and apologetic writing that leaves out negative aspects of Jewish
history. In Israel today, the Hebrew press frequently reports the use by
Haredim of the law of the informer and the law of the pursuer. On February
18, 1999, for example, Haaretz reported that Israeli prosecutors accused
Yosef Prushinovsky, a Haredi Jew who lived in the Mea She'arim quarter of
Jerusalem and was on trial for swindling tens of millions of dollars from
Haredim around the world, of trying to intimidate Haredi witnesses with these
two laws. Prushinovsky allegedly threatened to use these two laws against any
Haredi witnesses who dared to testify against him in Israeli secular courts.
Many Haredi rabbis have held that testifying in Israeli secular courts, in
which Arabs can be judges, constitutes informing to non-Jewish authorities.
Haredi Jews, such as Prushinovsky, are thus often able to commit crimes,
usually swindling, with legal impunity so long as they do it in their own
community and do not steal so much that their pious victims are influenced
to commit a grave sin in order to retrieve their money. The same situation is
prevalent in some of the Haredi Jewish communities in the United States,
but the American press rarely reports the cases or offers any halachic
explanation.
Index
Abassid Caliphate 139
Abaye 27
Abromovitz, Amnon 36-7
Agudat Israel 50
Aharon, Rabbi Abu 126
Albaum, Dov 32, 33, 34, 40-1, 84-6
Alfey Menashe 79
Alicena 140
Alon, Rabbi Benny 73^1
Aloni, Shulamit 15, 34-7, 52, 53, 75,
76
Amir, Yigal viii, 114, 137, 159
Amital, Rabbi Yehuda 63, 65
anti-Semitism xi, 13, 17, 146
Arabs, and political parties 151-2, 153
Arafat, Yasser 107, 108
Ariel 79
Ariel, Azri'el Rabbi 87-8
Ariel, Rabbi Israel 71, 72, 102
Ariel, Uri 99
Arieli, Rabbi Shmaryahu 63-4
army 89-90, 98
penetration by zealots 90-5
Arutz, (radio station) 9-10
Asaf, David 133^, 147, 148
Asaf, Rabbi Simha 116, 117-18,
125-30, 139^4
Asher, Rabbi Rabenu 117, 127, 140-1,
142
Asheri, Ehud 29-30
Ashkenazi Jews 7-9, 44, 45-6
and emigration to Palestine 47-8
exclusiveness 44, 45, 48-50
rise of 47
and treatment of Oriental Jews
48-50
and violence 116
ass, messianic 67
assassination 134-8
see also death penalty; murder;
Rabin
Association of Judea and Samaria
Rabbis 84
atiases viii, 72
Austria 134-7, 146
autonomy, Jewish 4, 17, 128-32, 142,
143, 145, 161
Aviner, Rabbi Shlomo 71, 72, 75,
76-7
Baer, Yitzhak 162
Baker, James 66, 82
Balaban, Meir 131
Balkans 46
Bar Hama, Rabbi Hanina 123
Bar-Ilan University 68
Bar-Kochba, Moshe 85
Bar-Pilpel, Avraham 136
Barak, Aharon 32, 33
Barnea, Nahum 36, 81, 98-100
Baron, Gabby 110-11
Baron, SaloW. 162
Banal, Yisrael 115, 135
Baruch, Rabbi 131
Barzilay, Amnon 111
Baum, liana 102-3
Begin, Benny 12, 107-8
Begin, Menachem 1 1, 56, 93
Beilin, Yossi 82
Beit El B 79
Beitos 121
ben Aderet, Rabbi Shlomo 127, 141
Ben-David, Mordechai 109
Ben-Gurion, David 22, 93
Ben-Simon, Daniel 82
Ben-Zion, Rabbi Shimon 1 10, 1 1 1
Benedict XVIII, Pope 131
Benyamin, Rabbi 144-5
Benziman, Uzi 101
Berenstein, Rabbi Hertz 135
betrayal 86-7
Bibikov, General 137
Bible 2, 5, 25
Black Panthers 48
blasphemy 35
blood
donations 41-2, 155-6
Jewish and non-Jewish 11,41, 71-2,
153-4
BneiAkiva 110
169
170
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Bnei Brak 19-20, 54, 108-9
books, burning of 121-2, 130
breast feeding 42, 156
Bruhl, Minister (Poland) 131
Bruria 155
Bush, George 84
Cabbala x, xi, 4, 66-7, 86
and monotheism 163-4
status of non-Jews 57-8, 62
Cairo Accords 8 1
Chabad Hassid movement 59, 61, 102
chauvinism, Jewish 65, 139
Christian fundamentalists 73, 74-5
Christianity 64, 75-6, 89, 116, 154-5
Cohen, Avraham 134-7, 146
Cohn, Norman 64
conversion 62, 153
corruption 29, 51
crucifixions, mock 116
D'Acusta, Uriel 132
Daud, Rabbi Avraham Ibn 1 26
Davis, Natalie Z. 64
Dayan, Moshe 55-6, 84
de Porta, Vidilan 141
death penalty 77, 129
for heretics 126-7, 131, 139
for informers 140-5, 146-7, 162
Degel HaTora 33, 50
democracy ix, 16, 83, 151
Der'i,Aryeh33, 157
D'eri, Yitzhak 54
diaspora 3, 19,44,70, 151
discrimination, inter-Jewish 161-2
see also persecution
DNA, Jewish 43, 62
Doron, Professor Gideon 52
dress 7, 8, 49
Dreyfus, Rabbi Yair 88-9
Druze, and Labor Party 151-2
Dubnow, Simon 162
Edelist, Ran 92-3
education 24-9, 26, 40, 51-2
Egypt 66
Eibshutz, Yehonathan 19
Eitan, Rafael 74
elections 1996 7-8
Eliezer the Priest 114
Eliezer, Rabbi 18
Eliyahu, Rabbi Mordechai 41-2,
155-6
Eliyahu of Vilna, Rabbi 130
embryos, Jewish and non-Jewish 59-60
Emden, Rabbi Ya'akov 131
Emunim 73-4
England 128, 131
Enlightenment, Jewish 145-6
Eshkoli, Dr Ze'ev Aharon 135
Etzion, Yehuda 87
exclusiveness, Jewish 2, 43, 44, 45, 46,
48-59
see also superiority; uniqueness
excommunication 128, 130, 132, 142
extermination, of non-Jews 64, 73
Ezra, Rabbi 18-19
Falangists, Lebanese 70
Fisch, Harold 70, 71
France 128
Friedman, Israel 34, 147
Friedman, Menachem 14-16
Gal, Dr Reuven 93-4
Gaza City 80
Gaza Strip 55, 56, 72, 78-9, 84
military roads 80, 81-2
Gentiles 2, 11, 12, 15,65,88
Ge'onim (Iraq) 125, 139
Georgia 44
Germany 128, 131, 146
Ginsburgh, Rabbi Yitzhak 43, 61-2,
112, 160
Ginzberg, Shaul 146-7
Golan, Avirama 108
Golan Heights 75, 78-9
golden age xii
Goldman, Mikha 110-11
Goldstein, Baruchviii, 96-112
condemnation of 105-7, 1 10-1 1
in English press 1 60
eulogies 43, 61, 87, 103-4, 112
funeral 100-3
reactions to massacre 99, 100-10
refusal to treat Arabs 96-9, 100,
103
seen as 'saint' 110, 111
Goren, Rabbi Shlomo 75, 108
'greater Jerusalem' 78-9
Green Line 78, 79
Gris, Ze'ev 135-6, 137
Grossman, Nathan Ze'ev 34
Gur Hassids 52
Gush Emunim 19, 72-7
and Arab-Israeli conflict 72-3
and army service 68, 83, 90
Ashkenazi background 69
codes of justice 71-2
foreign policy 72-3
ideology 57, 58, 62-6, 69, 70-1, 83,
159
INDEX
171
influence of 55-6, 72, 83
involvement in society 68
and peace treaty 69-70
and redemption doctrine 20, 67
and secular clothing 68
settlements 56, 72, 78-95
support for 68, 1 59
Gutman Institute 7
Ha'ain HashviHt 32
Haaretz
on Aloni scandal 35, 36
on assassination 115
on dangers of peace process 12
and Goldstein massacre 106, 108,
110
Gush Emunim ideology 57, 69, 74,
75,86-9, 111
on Jewish exclusiveness 43
on military service deferment 30
on zealots in army 90, 93
Habad movement 43
Hadashot 35, 66
Hadaya, Rabbi E. 64
Ha'i, Rabbi 125, 126
Hakah, Tohay 103
Halacha
and assassination 137-8
and death penalty 59, 77, 99-100,
112, 118
and dress 8
and emergency law 127-8
and homosexuality ix
as law of Israel 43
and non-Jews 59, 62, 77, 99-100,
103, 112, 118
and women 8-9, 38, 40
Halperin, Rabbi Levy Yitzhak 42
Halvertal, Dov 110
Ha'Meiri, Menahem 124
Ha'migash, Rabbi Yosef Halevi Ibn
140
Hardelim 86
Haredi parties
male monopoly 1 7
'special money' 51
structure 16-17
see also Agudat Israel; Degel Hatora;
Shas party
Haredim 7-9, 17-18, 23-43, 44-54
attitude to secular Jews 34
and education 23-4, 26, 27, 31, 51
influence of 10-1 1, 23-4, 31, 40-1
and military service 68
and modern times 30-1
and sacred studies 30
and symbols 34
and women 9, 10, 37
world outlook 14-16
and Zionism 17-18, 19
see also Ashkenazi Jews; Oriental
Jews; Sephardi Jews
Harel, Israel 69
Harkabi, Yehoshafat 57, 62, 71, 72,
73, 158-9
Ha'Shavua 32
Hasmonean dynasty 3
Hassidism xi, 58-9, 66
Hassids
murders 115, 136, 147-8
persecution 133-5
punishment 130
Hatanya 59
'Hatikva' 10, 17
hatred
of Arabs and secular Jews 86
of Christians 154-5
internecine 53-4
of Western culture 65
Hebron 82, 96
heder 24
Hellenism 2-3
heretics 120, 124-5, 149
burial of 123^1
punishments 125-6, 130-3
see also Cohen, Rabbi; idolatry
Herzl, Theodor 17
Hesder Yeshivot 91-2, 93, 103
Hillel 28
Hirsch, Rabbi Rafael 19
history xii, 1-4, 12
distortion of 150, 162-4
Israeli Jewish historians 14
Holland 131-2
Holocaust 31, 52
homosexuals and lesbians ix-x
Horowitz, Nerri 86
hypocrisy x, 12, 37
idolatry 120, 121, 122
indoctrination 17, 26
informers 138^5, 146-7, 162
Intifada 68, 76, 80, 84, 91
Iraq 3, 44, 125, 139
Ish, Rabbi Hazon 124-5
Israel
conquest of 64
expelling non-Jews 20, 22, 76
extent of viii
as kingdom of Heaven on earth 69
as secular state 87
Israel A/Israel B 6, 7, 11, 12, 156
172
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Issar, Meir 130
Italy 131
Jerusalem Quarterly, The 57
Jewish fundamentalism
basic principles viii
dangers of 148-9, 151, 161
defined 5
influence of ix, 4, 5-6
intolerance 160-1
and peace vii-viii, 15-16
similarities with German Nazism
62,65,73, 112
Jewish underground, rabbinical
approval 138-9
Jewish Week 43, 62
Jews
corrupted by West 67-8
and non-Jews 15, 18, 58-62, 65, 71,
76-7, 119-20
and racism 105, 152-3
religious 12-13, 17, 49, 53-4, 79
religious division 6-7
religious-nationalist 7-9
secular ix, 7, 17
and souls x-xi, 58, 60, 62
Jordan Valley 56
Jordanian option 80
Joshua, Book of 64
Judaism
and independent thought 122, 123
origin of 2
pollution by Arabs 88-9
and Zionism 18
see also Jewish fundamentalism; Jews
Judea 2
Kaduri, Rabbi 53, 156-7
Kahane, Rabbi Meir 96, 98, 102, 103,
106, 160
Karo, Rabbi Joseph 28-9
Karpel, Mordechai 87
Kasher, Asa 138
Kasher, Rabbi Menachem 70
kashrut 36
Katz, Ben-Zion 58
Katz,Yuval 104, 105
Katzover, Tzvi (Benny) 101, 1 1 1
Kedumim 56, 85
'KesefMishne' 28
Kibbutzim 34, 153
Kimmerling, Baruch ix, 6-7, 90
Kiryat Arba 79, 82, 97, 98, 100, 101,
110, 111
Kissinger, Henry 56
Kitzur Shulhan Aruch 37-8
Kivunim 73
Kizel, Arych 96, 100
Knesset
opening ceremony 10
and retention of settlements 78
Knesset Committee for Defense and
Foreign Affairs 12, 106-8
kollel 25
Kook, Rabbi Abraham Yitzhak x-xi,
55, 57,65-9, 124-5
Kook, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda 55, 57, 64,
65, 68-9, 72
kosher/non-kosher foods 34, 41, 42
kuneh 130
Labor party
coalition 15, 52
and Gush Emunim 69
and Haredim 10, 37, 50-1, 52-3
and Lubovitcher Rebbe 6 1
and non-Jews 11, 151-2
oppression of Palestinians 80-1
and racism 152-3
and settlements 82
world outiook 13
and Zionism 17
Landau, Uzi 12
language 45, 46, 49
laws, Jewish
emergency 127-8
in European countries 128-32, 142,
143, 145, 161
and non-Jews 76-7
oral 38
symbolism 34-6
three oaths 18-19, 21
and women 8-9, 37-8, 40, 116-18
Lebanon 22, 64, 65-6, 70, 72
Lebanon War (1982-85) 91
Heft', the 6, 13, 88
Leibowitz, Yossi 110
Lemberg (Lviv) 134-5
Leper, Kadid 40
Levinger, Rabbi Moshe 99-100, 138
Levy, Moshe 97
Likud party
and Gush Emunim 69
and Haredim 10, 50
and Jewish blood 1 1
and Jewish past 13
oppression of Palestinians 80
and racism 152-3
world outlook 16
and Zionism 17
Lior, Rabbi Dov 65-6, 101, 103-4
literature, Jewish 4
INDEX
173
Lubovitchers 61-2
Luria, Rabbi Shlomo 129, 141, 143
Luria, Rabbi Yitzhak 58
Lurianic School 58
Lustick, Ian 57, 62, 70-1, 72, 73
Maariv 74 3 82, 100
Madrid Conference 84
magic/witchcraft 53, 156-8
Maharam 129, 141, 142
Maimonides, Moses
on Ashkenazi Jews 45
on heretics 121, 122, 123-4, 140
on idolatry 122
influence on Goldstein 96
on non-Jews 73
on punishment 76, 118-19, 120,
126, 140
on rabbis' salaries 27-8
on women and sacred study 39-40
Markus,Yoel35, 36, 37
marriages, arranged 49
Masada 113-14
maskilim 135
Meir, Golda 53, 93
Meir, Rabbi see Maharam
Melamed, Rabbi Zalman 75, 76
Menahem 114
Mendelsohn, Moses 19
Meretz party 6, 15, 17, 74, 88
Merkaz Harav 55
Mesorati 26
Messiah, collective incarnation 66-7
messianism viii, xi, 4
messianic era 64, 71
and non-Jews 65, 158-9
redemption 10, 19-20, 21
two Messiahs 66-7
see also Gush Emunim; three oaths
military service, deferment from
29-30
Miller, Yidan 93
Min-Hahar, Rabbi Shlomo 75-6
Mishnah 140
monuments, to murderers 111-12
Moshe, Rabbi 127
murder
Hassidic 115, 136, 147-8
of Jews and non-Jews 43, 71-2,
99-100
of non- religious Jews 139
punishment for 119
using magic 157-8
see also death penalty; punishment
Muslims 75-6
mysticism, Jewish x, xi, 4, 66-7, 163
Nachmanides, Rabbi Moshe 19
Nahman of Braslaw, Rabbi 133
National Religious Party (NRP) 7-8,
55-77
and army 89-91, 92
attitudes 73-6
and Haredim 10
ideology 10,70
and Jewish state 19, 20, 21
and Occupied Territories viii
and women 8-9
see also Gush Emunim
Nazism 62, 65, 73, 106, 112
neo-Nazism 34
Netanyahu, Benyamin 16, 94-5
blessing from Rabbi Kaduri 156
and Rabbi Yoseph 20, 21
and settlements 72, 95
support of Lubovitchers 61
warnings of assassination 138
Netivot 3 1
Netzarim 80, 81,82
new Canaanite era 88-9
Ne'yila prayer 140
Nisan, Mordechai 73
non-Jews 15, 18,58-62
blood 11,41,71-2, 153-4
Cabbala 57-8, 62
embodiment of Satan 58, 66
expulsion from Israel 20, 22, 76
extermination 64, 73
and Halacha 59, 62, 77, 99-100,
103, 112, 118
in Israel 72-3
and Jewish laws 76-7
and Labor party 11, 151-2
and messianism 65, 158-9
and murder 43, 71-2, 99-100
souls x-xi, 58, 60, 62
and Talmud 119-20, 156
normalcy 11, 13-14,71, 161
observance vs. belief 7
Occupied Territories 20-1, 55, 64, 78
Ofra 56
Or, Orri 98
Oren, Amir 36, 97-8
Orenstein, Rabbi Tzvi 135
organ transplants 41, 42-3, 62
Oriental Jews
cultural socialization 48
in government 94
and Gush Emunim 69
inferior status 49-50
influence of Ashkenazi Jews 48-9
transformation of 54
174
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
and violence 1 1 6
see also Sephardi Jews
Oslo process 80-1, 82, 84, 86-7, 94
Ottoman Empire, and Sephardi Jews
46
Oxman, Yitzhzak 147
Palestine
autonomy 75, 107
control of 8 1-2, 84
earthquake 19
emigration to 18-19, 47-8
Jewish state 6,17
self-rule 80-1, 84
state of 74, 107
Palestinians, irrelevance of 88
Paltoi, Rabbi 125, 139
Patai, Raphael 164
Patriarch 3-4
Patriarch's Cave massacre 96, 104, 160
peace vii-viii, 12-13, 15-16, 55,
69-70, 107
Pentateuch, study of 24, 40
Peres, Shimon
and Goldstein massacre 106-7
and Haredim 32, 50-1
lack of support 156
andPLO 107-8
and Rabbi Yoseph 20, 21
and religious laws 35
and settlement policy 84
support for Gush Emunim 56, 63,
65,72
Peretz, Rabbi Yitzhak 31
Perl, Yosef 148
persecution, inter-Jewish 130-1,
133^, 146
PetahTikva31
Pharisees and Saducees, dispute 2
Pinhassi, Rabbi 54
PLO 75, 107-8
pogroms 133, 134
Poland 129-30, 131, 132, 134, 143-6
polarisation, in Israeli Jewish society
14
politics, and spirituality 74
Pollak, Tiran 103
Pollard, Jonathan 57
prayer for the State of Israel 86-7
pre-military academies
religious 92, 93
secular 94
press
American and English 159-60
Haredi 32-3
Preuss, Teddy 105-6
prostitutes 117-18, 121
punishment 126-34
expulsion 129-30
and God 31
mutilation 128, 129, 141, 142, 143
see also death penalty; murder
Purim 107-9, 136
rabbinical court 77, 119
rabbis
attitudes to 48
and corruption 29
and financial reward 28-9
intelligence network 85
and oppression 29
power of 84-6
and violence 114-15, 1 18, 119
Rabin, Yitzhak
and Aloni scandal 35, 36-7
assassination viii, 10-1 1, 89, 90,
134, 137-8
background to assassination 1 1 3-49
and Goldstein massacre 97, 111
and Haredim 32
and Rabbi Yoseph 21
seen as informer/traitor 86, 87, 138
settlement policy 56, 72, 74, 75-6,
80,81,82,84
talks with rabbis 85-6
victory over Peres 5 1
Rabiniwitz, Rabbi Nahum 139
Rachlevsky, Seffi x, xi
Ravitsky, Aviezer 18-19
Ravitz, Deputy Minister 21
Rayan, Yael 34
Raz, Avi 74
reasoning, Jewish 28-9
rebellions, against Romans 3, 113-14
redemption 19-20, 21, 65, 67, 69, 75,
86
Reshef, Rafi 104-5
right, secular 11-14, 22
'right and religious parties', the 6,
11-12, 16
Rosen, Rami 115-16, 118, 134-6,
146-8
Rosenblum, Doron 12-13
Rosner, Shmuel 108
Rubinstein, Amnon 111
Rubinstein, Danny 75
Russia 132-4, 137, 145-6
Rzhishchev riot 133-4
Sabra massacre 1 1, 22
sacred studies
benefits for others 27
INDEX
175
and financial reward 27-9
privileges 26-7, 29
and support from wife 49
sacred water miracles 32
Safad, earthquake 19
Saloniki 46
salvation, Jews and non-Jews 58
Samuel the Prince, Rabbi 126
Sanhedrin 3
Satan 58, 64, 66
Satmar Hassids 102
scandals, political, and Jewish symbols
34-5
Schneerson, Rabbi Menachem
(Lubovitcher Rebbi) 15, 58-61,
102, 160
Scholem, Gershon xi, 58, 163
Schwatzman, Shmuel 148
Sebastia, demonstration by Gush
Emunim 56
Second Temple, destruction of 2, 3,
113
secular Jews ix, 7
in army 93-4
attitude to sacred studies 30
and Haredim 32-4, 34, 37
hatred of 86
see also right, secular
secular press 32, 36
Segev, Tom 157
Sephardi Jews 44-5, 46, 47
see also Oriental Jews
settlement policy 56, 84, 158-9
settlements
attitude of Israeli Jews to 78-9
evacuation 139
and Jewish consciousness 87-8
religious messianic 79, 80, 82, 84
voting patterns 79
Shabak 138
Shach, Rabbi 15, 19-21, 33, 50-1, 53,
156
Shamir, Yitzhak 50, 84, 93
Sharon, Ariel 11, 13
on Goldstein massacre 107
and Lebanon 22, 70
and Lubovitcher Rebbe 61
West Bank settlements 82
Shas party 7-8, 50
harassment from Ashkenazi Jews
53-4
political activity 51-2
and Rabin 36-7
split with Rabbi Scach 33, 52-4
Shatila Camp massacre 1 1, 22
Sheinberger, Rabbi Yehoshua 41, 42
Shilo, Rabbi Daniel 56, 85
Shimon, Rabbi 142
Shishi 86
Shlitzstat, Rabbi Samuel 142-3
Shmuel, Rabbi 18
Shraggai, Nadav 74, 75, 86-8, 110
Shulhan Aruch 40
Sikarikin 113-14
Sinai viii, 22, 56, 66, 72
Singer, Tzvi 102-3
Smolenskin, Peretz 124
souls, of Jews and non-Jews x-xi, 58,
60,62
Spain, punishment of sinners 1 26-7
Spinoza, Baruch 131-2
superiority, Jewish xi-xii, 43, 58, 60,
62, 152
see also exclusiveness; uniqueness
symbolism, religious 34-6, 86
Syria 12,55
Tal, Professor Uriel 57, 62-5, 69
Talmor, Ranny 35
Talmud
Babylonian 5
Haredi interpretations 17
and heretics 124
and magic 157
and non-Jews 119-20, 156
parodies 30
and punishments 118-19, 139
study of 24
three oaths 18-19, 21
and women 38-40
and women singing 9
Talmud Torah 39
Talmudic Encyclopaedia 38
talmudic literature
commentaries 28
translation of 1, 5
talmudic studies see sacred studies
Tarn, Rabenu 142
taxes, on kosher meat and sabbath
candles 136
Teitelbaum, Rabbi Moshe 19
three oaths 18-19,21
Tiberius Julius Alexander 114
Tishbi, Yesaiah 58
Torah 27-8, 122
see also sacred studies
Torah Sheba'al Peh 38
Tractate Ketubot 1 8
Tractate Kiddushin 39
Tractate Sanhedrin 124
Tractate Shabat 38
traditionalists 7, 1 1
176
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL
Tzadock 121
Tzemach, Rabbi 125, 142
Ummayad Caliphate 140
uniqueness 11, 13, 71
see also exclusiveness
'village leagues' 80, 84
Vilna, Hassids 130
Violence, inter-Jewish 114-18, 145,
147-9
see also murder; punishment
Vital, Rabbi Hayim 58
Vyshegrad 134
Waldman, Eliezer 73
war
and God's intervention 30
as process of purification 63-4
as punishment 65
Weil, Rabbi Yosef 128
Weizman, Ezer 98, 101, 102
West, public opinion 13
West Bank
military roads 81, 82
population of settlements 78-9
settlement 55, 56, 82, 84
withdrawal viii, 72
women
in army 89
and education 24, 38-40
Jewish feminists 155
andjewish law 8-9,37-8, 40, 116-18
in politics 53
religious inferiority 38-9
and religious obligations 39-40
shaving heads 37, 117
singers 9
violence against 116-17, 118, 155
World Zionist Organization 73
Yad Eliahu Stadium 109
Yahadut Ha'Torah 7-8, 21
Yaron, Amos 98
Yated Ne'eman 16, 19, 33, 34, 52
Yatom, General 101
Yediot Ahronot
on Aloni scandal 36
on Goldstein massacre 96, 98, 100,
110-11
on Haredi press 32
on killing of non-religious Jews 139
survey of Jewish society ix
Yehuda, Rabbi 117, 127, 141
Yerushalaim 92, 101, 103, 104
yeshiva 24-5
Yeshu'a, Ben-Shoshan 102
Yiddish 49
Yisrael, Rabbi 148
Yitzhaki, Rabbi Shlomo (Rashi) 24
Yo'av 30
Yohana of Gush Halav 114
YomKippur 128, 140, 141
Yom Kippur War 53, 63, 65
Yoseph, Rabbi Ovadia
and Aloni scandal 35, 36
and blood transfusions 41, 155-6
hatred of NRP 50
and Shas party 50, 52-3
spiritual authority 53
teaching Peres 50-1
territorial concessions 16, 19-22,
154
Zion 133
Zionism 6, 16, 17, 68-9, 88
and classical Judaism 18, 47
ideology 6, 17
independent thought 122, 123
partial secularization 22, 87
secular Zionists 71
Zionist anthem see Hatikva
Z'Manim 6
Zohavsky, Rabbi Natan 33
Zvi, Shabtai 66
Index compiled by Sue Carlton